

LEADING WITH LEGITIMACY IN GOVERNMENT DESIGN LABS

Introducing Design Thinking to the Finnish Immigration Service

Master's Thesis
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Leading with Legitimacy in Government Design Labs

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Abstract

Design thinking has increasingly become the business buzzword of the 21st century. Adopted from designers' ways of working, thinking, and creating, design thinking is a user-centered approach to innovation. While some designers argue that it is nothing more than a buzzword, it is nonetheless creating some serious buzz in not just the private sector, but increasingly in government as well.

The application of design thinking in government is still quite new. Globally, governments are adopting design in very different ways, at different levels in government, and with differing focus areas and scopes of work. One thing is consistent though - design thinking is being applied in the public sector in order to help governments innovate, incorporate new technology, and respond to their citizens' increasing service expectations. There is no one-size-fits-all "How to" guide for establishing design in government. Design teams in the private and public sectors alike, face similar challenges in introducing new designerly ways of working into their organizations. One fundamental challenge these labs face is establishing legitimacy of design thinking in the public sector, especially when their values differ so drastically from those of the organizations trying to adopt it.

This thesis examines the introduction of one such design lab, Inland Design, within the Finnish Immigration Service (Migri). This research aims to study what practices helped or hindered legitimacy-making of design thinking inside Migri during its early stages. The research draws from a combination of literature disciplines including design thinking, public sector innovation, and organizational legitimacy literature. Specifically organizational legitimacy is used as a lens to view the emerging phenomenon of design thinking inside the public sector.

This research was conducted during an intensive five month period from January 2018 to June 2018 within Inland Design. The researcher took the role of action researcher, working inside the team to initiate, facilitate, and develop the organizational strategy with the team. This work took the form of strategic action interventions to respond to the emerging needs of the organization that arose. Data for this research is the result of thorough analysis of the results of action interventions, participant observation and field notes, and semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders in the Inland Design organization.

Inland Design is the first and only in-house design lab in the Finnish government at this time, and thus has a great opportunity to lead the way for design in government, and help shape the landscape for future government design labs that follow, not just in Finland but around the world. This thesis provides a rare and unique opportunity to examine the introduction and implementation of Inland Design in the Finnish public sector, as well as insight into the challenges of legitimization of such initiatives, and the practices that both help and hinder their success. From the existing research, it seems legitimacy is often an afterthought for government design teams. This thesis aims to enable government design labs like Inland to lead with legitimacy, fast forward through the legitimization challenges, and more quickly help support public servants and society, by design.

Keywords Design Thinking, Public Sector Innovation, Organizational Legitimacy, Action Research

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Table of Contents

<i>Abstract of Master's Thesis</i>	<i>i</i>	3.3.1 Change is the Name of the Game	39
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>ii</i>	3.3.2 Inland Faces Resistance	40
<i>Table of Contents</i>	<i>iii</i>	3.4 Bringing Strategy into the Lab	40
<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>v</i>	4 Methodology	42
<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>v</i>	4.1 Action Research	42
<i>Glossary</i>	<i>vi</i>	4.1.1 Characteristics	43
1 Introduction	1	4.1.2 Iterative Cycles	45
1.1 Background	1	4.1.3 Grounded Theory in Action Research	46
1.2 Research Objectives	3	4.1.4 Role of the Action Researcher	47
1.2.1 Research Scope	3	4.1.5 Critique	48
1.2.2 Research Gap	3	4.2 Data Collection Methods	49
1.2.3 Research Question	5	4.2.1 Action Interventions	49
1.3 Thesis Structure	5	4.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews	50
2 Literature Review	6	4.2.3 Participant Observation	52
2.1 Design Thinking	7	4.3 Data Analysis	54
2.1.1 Design Thinking, Defined	7	4.3.1 Analysis Plan	55
2.1.2 Iterative Cycles	8	4.3.2 Analysis of Strategic Action Interventions	57
2.1.3 Critique	9	4.3.3 Analysis of Semi-structured Interviews	58
2.1.4 The New Innovation Strategy	11	4.3.4 Analysis of Field Notes	58
2.2 Public Sector Innovation	12	4.4 Validity & Ethical Concerns	59
2.2.1 Bureaucracy versus Innovation	12	4.4.1 Validity	59
2.2.2 History of New Public Sector Approaches	14	4.4.2 Ethical Considerations	60
2.3 Design Thinking in the Public Sector	15	5 Strategic Action Interventions	62
2.3.1 The Design in Government Movement	16	5.1 Network of Designers in Immigration	64
2.3.2 Government "Design Labs"	18	5.1.1 Background: Network for Collaboration	64
2.3.3 Challenges of Design in Government	22	5.1.2 Concept: Build a Network of Designers in Immigration	64
2.4 Organizational Legitimacy	23	5.1.3 Research: Is Anybody Out There?	64
2.4.1 Organizational Legitimacy, Defined	23	5.1.4 Intervention: Connecting	65
2.4.2 Design Thinking Legitimacy	29	5.2 Inland's Strategy on a Page	66
2.5 Summary and Synthesis	33	5.2.1 Background: Lost in Translation	66
3 Research Setting	36	5.2.2 Concept: Strategic Storytelling – Talking Strategy in Migri's Language	67
3.1 Motivation	36	5.2.3 Research: The SOAP Method	68
3.2 Inland Design	37	5.2.4 Intervention: SOAP Workshop	68
3.3 Research Timing & Context	39	5.3 Inland's Strategic Identity	71
		5.3.1 Background: Who Are We? Why?	71

5.3.2 Concept: Identity by Co-design	72	6.2.4 Give Guidelines & Support	92
5.3.3 Research: Vision vs. Mission	72	6.2.5 Ensure Everyone is Heard	93
5.3.4 Intervention: Prototyping Inland's Strategic Identity	73	6.2.6 Multidisciplinary Collaboration	94
5.4 Establishing Middle-Manager Buy-in	73	6.3 Informal Connections	96
5.4.1 Background: Struggling to Get Resources and Support from Migri Managers	73	6.3.1 Getting to Know the People	96
5.4.2 Concept: Workshoping Relationship Management	74	6.3.2 Listening	97
5.4.3 Research: Relationship Management Tools	74	6.3.3 A Chance for Others to Get to Know You	98
5.4.4 Intervention: A "Co-strategizing Inland's Key Stakeholders" Workshop	75	6.3.4 Establish Trust	99
5.5 Lunch & Learn	77	6.4 Ambassadors & Advocates	100
5.5.1 Background: Interviews as Strategy	77	6.4.1 Leadership Sponsorship	100
5.5.2 Concept: Lunch, Listen, and Learn	77	6.4.2 A Network of Advocates	102
5.5.3 Research: Semi-structured Social Interactions	77	6.5 Positioning	104
5.5.4 Intervention: Lunch as a Strategic Intervention	77	6.5.1 The Purpose	104
5.6 Long Range Strategic Planning	78	6.5.2 Team Identity vs. Organization Identity	106
5.6.1 Background: Holistic Strategic View	78	6.5.3 Organizational Structure	107
5.6.2 Concept: Long Term Strategic Roadmap	79	6.5.4 Incentives	108
5.6.3 Research: Strategy Roadmaps	79	6.6 Prove the Value	111
5.6.4 Intervention: "Long Range Strategic Planning Roadmap" Workshop	80	6.6.1 Using a Narrative Approach to Communicate Value	111
5.7 Summary of Action Interventions	82	6.6.2 Show Results	112
6 Findings & Analysis	85	6.6.3 Quick Wins	114
6.1 Communication	85	7 Discussion	116
6.1.1 Terminology and Lingo	86	7.1 Results	116
6.1.2 Communication Methods	87	7.1.1 Practices that Help and Hinder Legitimacy	116
6.1.3 Language	89	7.1.2 Strategic Interventions that Support Legitimacy	120
6.2 Engagement & Involvement	90	7.2 Contributions	122
6.2.1 Engage all of your Customers	90	7.3 Limitations	122
6.2.2 Enable Others to Experience Design Thinking	91	7.4 Suggestions for Future Research	123
6.2.3 Physical Space	91	7.5 Practical Implications for Inland	124
		7.5.1 Future Action Plan for Inland	124
		7.5.2 Overall Recommendations	127
		8 Conclusions	128
		References	130
		Appendices	136

List of Tables

Table 1: Summary of Strategic Action Interventions	50
Table 2: Summary of Interviews	51
Table 3: Inland Advisory Board Members Present in June 14, 2018 Meeting	53

List of Figures

Figure 1: Approach to literature review	6
Figure 2: Iterative nature of the design thinking process (source: Gibbons 2016)	9
Figure 3: Adapted from SEE's (2013b)	17
Figure 4: Adapted from Bason & Schneider (2014) - Level of Design Lab Influence	20
Figure 5: Adapted from Bason & Schneider (2014) - Level of Design Lab Scale	20
Figure 6: Adapted from Tuckman's (1965) <i>Development Sequence in Small Groups</i>	40
Figure 7: Key characteristics of action research	43
Figure 8: Adapted from Altrichter et alia's (2002) <i>Spirals of Action Research Cycles</i>	45
Figure 9: Adapted from Baskerville & Pries-Heje's (1999) <i>Overview of the Coding Process</i>	56
Figure 10: Iterative action research cycles – Strategic action interventions at Inland	62
Figure 11: Timeline of strategic action interventions	63
Figure 12: Map of innovation/design organizations in immigration	65
Figure 13: Inland's "Methods" slide - How Inland does their work (source: Inland Design)	67
Figure 14: Image of whiteboard after SOAP workshop activity 1	69
Figure 15: One workshop participant during SOAP	69
Figure 16: Mapping Inland's priorities to Migri's (source: Inland Design)	70
Figure 17: The latest iteration of Inland's SOAP (source: Inland Design)	71
Figure 18: Adapted from Galbraith & Kates' (2007, 243) <i>Relationship Health Check</i>	75
Figure 19: The Long Range Strategic Planning Roadmap workshop room	80
Figure 20: Workshop participant placing ideas on the roadmap	81
Figure 21: Workshop participants discussing their ideas	81
Figure 22: Summary of strategic action intervention cycles at Inland	84
Figure 23: Proposal for continuation of strategic action interventions for Inland	125

Glossary

AI: Abbreviation for Artificial Intelligence.

Co-creation: Co-creation (i.e. cooperative creation) is “a creation process where new solutions are designed with people, not for them” (Bason 2010, 8).

Co-design: Co-design (i.e. cooperative design, collaborative design) is the act of creating with stakeholders (employees, partners, citizens, users, etc.) specifically within the design development process to ensure the results meet their needs and are usable (Chisholm n.d.).

Design Lab: Design lab (i.e. innovation lab) is the term often given for In-house design teams in the public and private sectors. The main purpose of design labs is to bring innovation and change to their respective organizations.

DFG: Abbreviation for the Design for Government course at Aalto University. The DfG course pairs multidisciplinary student groups with one of the Finnish ministries to apply empathic design approaches, systems thinking, and behavioral insights to create relevant and user-centered solutions (DFG 2015).

EMN: The abbreviation for the European Migration Network. The EMN is an organization within the European Commission whose role it is to disseminate up-to-date and reliable information on the state of migration and asylum (European Commission 2018).

GDS: The abbreviation for Government Digital Service, the UK team tasked with digital service transformation (GDS n.d.a).

#govDesign: The shortened form of the name of the International Design in Government network, hosted by the UK’s Government Digital Service (GDS) team (Kane 2017).

Government Innovation Labs: A subset of Papageorgiou’s (2017) PSI labs. According to Bason & Schneider (2014), government innovation labs are “characterized by a direct connection with the public sector and [are] created to tackle complex public/social problems that more traditional governmental structures fail to resolve, in particular, using design to experiment and propose innovative public services and policies and at the same time reform and change the way government operates.”

HDL: The abbreviation for the Helsinki Design Lab. Helsinki Design Lab (HDL) was sponsored by Sitra (the Finnish national innovation fund) from 2009 to 2013, to apply strategic design to complex social challenges (HDL n.d.; Bason & Schneider 2014).

“How Might We” Questions: A tool created by the Stanford Design School (i.e. d.school), as a part of their resource guide (<https://dschool.stanford.edu/resources/>) that helps to frame the ideation process, and can help kickoff a brainstorm session. How-Might-We questions enable you to “turn your perspective into actionable provocations” (Stanford D.School 2017).

Inland: The shortened form of the name for Inland Design.

KPIs: The abbreviation for Key Performance Indicators, a term often used to describe the key metrics or targets tracked by a firm or organization.

Maahanmuuttovirasto: Finnish name for the Finnish Immigration Service.

Migri: The official abbreviation for the Finnish Immigration Service or Maahanmuuttovirasto.

NPM: The abbreviation for New Public Management. NPM became the dominant public sector management approach during the 1980s. NPM brought best practices from management and business planning to the public sector, particularly the results-oriented focus of private sector organizations. (Hood 1991; Hood 1995)

PPA: The abbreviation for Progressive Public Administration. PPA was the dominant public sector management approach during much of the 20th century. PPA focused on a clear separation between public and private sector practices, as well as extensive procedures, structures, and rules to prevent corruption and favoritism. (Hood 1995)

PSI labs: The abbreviation for Public and Social Innovation labs. Term by Papageorgiou (2017) used to define the broad category of types of labs in the social and public sectors: “social labs, policy labs, government innovation labs, innovation teams (or i-teams), design labs, change labs, living labs, do-tanks, hubs, hives, and accelerators.”

Public Innovation Places: The term given by Bason & Schneider (2014) to suggest, “Experimental sites, agencies or labs created to tackle innovative solutions to public/social problems, and dedicated to the creation of networks and partnerships - launching projects, events and platforms.”

SÄPA: Abbreviation for “Sähköiset Palvelut” in Finnish, meaning the digital services (i.e. e-services) team within Migri.

Service Design: An emerging occupation, service designers seek a deep and meaningful understanding of their customer (i.e. user, client), develop new services/products/customer experiences, create new solutions based on the needs of the customer, and finally help organizations to execute those solutions (Fayard et al. 2017).

SOAP: The abbreviation for the Strategy on a Page tool. The SOAP tool forces organizations to fit their entire organizational strategy succinctly on to a single page.

Strategic Action Intervention: The term used for the action interventions employed in this thesis research. Other terms used in literature include: action interventions and action experiments.

Transcription: Interview transcription involves creating a written transcript of all the words said in an interview.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Our world is changing faster than ever before. Climate change, migration, growing poverty, resource overutilization, and an aging population make up just a few examples of the massive-scale challenges, or *wicked problems*, that we face as a global society. Eggers and Muoio (2015) define wicked problems as, “Complex, dynamic, and seemingly intractable social challenges.” These problems are then only compounded by the rapid changes and disruptions in technology, information, connectivity, and globalization. Transformation, disruption, and change are defining terms of our times. New innovations are changing the way consumers interact with business, with each other, with natural resources, and with their environment. This all adds up to what The World Economic Forum (2016) describes as “a future of **exponentially disruptive change**.”

Wicked problems are a ‘class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing’. (Horst Rittel in: Buchanan 1992)

The challenges are massive, yet equal and opposite are the opportunities they create. Eggers and Muoio (2015) describe the recasting of wicked problems as *wicked opportunities*. The pursuit of solutions to these challenges provides serious opportunities for innovation and for collaboration. They describe how these problems/opportunities require new collaborative networks and ecosystems of actors across the private, public, and third sectors. In 2016, global leaders from across those sectors (representing business, government, civil society, academia, and international organizations) came together to discuss these opportunities at the World Economic Forum (2016) meeting in Davos. There, they referred to this era as the *fourth industrial revolution*. This particular industrial revolution will be one distinguished by innovation, but not just technological innovation; also innovation in collaboration models. Kelly (2015a) refers to these new collaborations as *ecosystems*, meaning, “Dynamic and co-evolving communities of diverse actors who create and capture new value through increasingly sophisticated models of both collaboration and competition.” These ecosystems are marked by diversity, bringing previously disparate actors together to -create solutions collaboratively. This is what is required to respond to our globe’s wicked challenges and harness the wicked opportunities within.

Governments around the world are realizing that they cannot use the same tools to solve problems of this size, scale, and magnitude. In some cases, brand new collaborations and ecosystems are being created across sectors to bring the best of the private sector to the fingertips of the public sector. In other cases, governments are experimenting with new ways

of working, new techniques, new tools, and new skills to rapidly ramp up to react and support society through this revolution. Despite the many and varied responses, one thing is certain - these wicked problems and wicked opportunities are acting as driving forces for change in the public sector (Bason 2010, 11-14).

Change is by no means new to the public sector. For at least the last 50 years, government agencies have experimented with new ways of management, as they transitioned from Progressive Public Administration to New Public Management. With that shift, and others that followed, the public sector began to emulate the methods and tools used by private sector organizations. With increasing pressures on public and private sector organizations alike to increase productivity and cut costs, and respond to increasing expectations of customers/users, the latest innovation approach is design thinking (Kimbell 2012; Bailey & Lloyd 2016; Kershaw, Dahl, & Roberts 2016; Tönurist, Kattel, & Lember 2017).

While designers have been thinking for centuries, design thinking is a term that has been borrowed and commandeered by business consultants and schools (e.g. Tim Brown of San Francisco consultancy IDEO, Roger Martin the Dean of the Rotman School of Management) at the turn of the 21st century. Design thinking is a unique and multidisciplinary approach that is anchored in user-centricity. According to this management perspective, multidisciplinary teams use integrative design thinking methods to prototype and experiment, all the while putting the user in the center of the design process. Iterative and nonlinear cycles of action take place to understand the user, define the problem based on that understanding, ideate new solutions for the user based on insights, build prototypes of those solutions, test the prototypes with users, and continually iterate until something innovative has been found.

Recently governments and public sector organizations have been experimenting with bringing design thinking inside their organizations to spark a new way of doing things, to enable cross-agency collaboration, and to create innovative solutions for public services (Tönurist et al. 2017). Often this is being done in the form of design labs inside the government at various levels. There are increasingly more examples of government design labs around the world. Yet, it is not easy to introduce new ways of working to old and traditional work.

Many design labs are facing considerable challenges inside their respective governments. In order to achieve their goals of bringing new user-centered practices to the public sector, introducing an experimental culture, or creating new solutions via collaborative multidisciplinary networks, they must first establish legitimacy and credibility within their organization. This is proving a difficult task when organizational cultures and norms differ so sharply between traditional public sector organizations and design teams (Bason 2010; Bason & Schneider 2014; Tönurist et al. 2017; Elsbach & Stigliani 2018).

Although these challenges remain, many public sector institutions around the world continue to experiment with bringing design thinking in house (e.g. Denmark's MindLab, the USA's

Lab@OPM, the UK's Government Digital Service, and many more). Despite the increasing trend, there is no "one size fits all" approach to adoption or success. Global design for government advocates were recently shocked at the news of 16 year old MindLab's forthcoming closure (Guay 2018a). MindLab is the first and oldest design lab in government. The world of design in government has modeled itself after them, and sought to provide as pervasive public sector impact as they have achieved. Even when doing great work for their respective agencies, design labs only last, on average, between three to five years (Bason 2010; Tönurist et al. 2017).

In a political, and thus volatile, position - how can design labs in government attempt to secure their position? Should more attention be paid up front to legitimation within the government agency? By strategically and proactively accounting for organizational dynamics like legitimacy, can government design labs ensure their long term position inside the government? By conducting research from within a brand new design lab in the Finnish Immigration Service, what can we learn about legitimization strategies that help or hinder this cause?

1.2 Research Objectives

This thesis aims to identify strategies for building legitimacy in design-led innovation labs in government, which practices support legitimation, and which practices may act as pitfalls to legitimation and credibility building.

1.2.1 Research Scope

This research takes place within the real world case of Inland Design, a newly established design lab in the Finnish Immigration Services office. At the time this research begins, the Inland team is only five months old. The research is practical in nature, enabling the use of the design thinking methodology to experiment, test, and iteratively modify strategic practices to support Inland's success. This thesis focuses only on the early stages of new design lab implementation in the public sector, as the research takes place during the 5-10 month old timeframe of Inland Design.

1.2.2 Research Gap

While there are myriad tool kits and guides for setting up design thinking in government (e.g. Bason 2010; SEE 2013a; SEE 2013b; Kershaw et al. 2016; OECD 2017a), there is yet no best practice approach. Instead, there are accounts of design and innovation labs that have created design-led transformation. There are numerous organizations around the world experimenting with new approaches, and this thesis documents yet another experiment.

There is considerable literature on new forms of design influencing the public sector at various levels (e.g. Bason 2010; Blyth & Kimbell 2011; Junginger 2013; Bason 2014; Bailey &

Lloyd 2017). Many of these articles focus on the application of a particular tool (e.g. experimentation, prototyping) or method (e.g. participatory design, service design). There is also considerable literature on design thinking from an organizational, management, and strategic studies standpoint (e.g. Kotler & Alexander Rath 1984; Liedtka 2000; Brown 2005; Camillus 2008; Ravasi & Stigliani 2012; Deserti & Rizzo 2015;), but few that look at the public sector specifically.

Moreover, there is recent literature merging design thinking and legitimacy (e.g. Rauth, Carlgren, & Elmquist 2015; Fayard, Stigliani, & Bechky 2017; Elsbach & Stigliani 2018). In fact, Fayard et alia (2017) specifically look at the occupational legitimacy of service designers. However, with one notable exception (Lykketoft 2014), there are no accounts of the process of legitimization of design practices inside the government. Moreover, as Fayard et alia (2017) identify, there is very little research during the emergent stages of legitimacy.

Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, and Suchman (2017) provide a comprehensive overview of organizational legitimacy research. They highlight that while much legitimacy research has focused on government actors as the source of legitimacy to external organizations (e.g. Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Singh, Tucker, & House 1986; Deephouse 1996; Bitektine & Haack 2015), very little research yet studies the government as the legitimacy source for a newly appointed team from within that very organization.

Finally, fewer still are the action research studies conducted in this area. Strategy as Practice (SAP) authors (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara 2010) mention that theoretical academic analysis can potentially isolate itself from the real world of strategy practitioners, or those working on strategy. Thus, they encourage new methods to maintain proximity to the actual practices of strategy practitioners, particularly through action research. Similarly, design scholars (Rauth et al. 2015) identify the lack of practical research on how managers actually make design thinking happen.

This is a particularly multi-disciplinary challenge when bringing the discipline of design into a traditional efficiency-oriented public sector organization, while leveraging an organizational legitimacy lens. As such, little existing research covers this specific convergence today.

This research provides a unique opportunity to study the legitimization strategies of one such public sector design lab in practice. It brings together the disciplines of design thinking, public sector innovation, and organizational legitimacy, and provides an opportunity to enhance the research of all three areas. My hope is that this thesis provides guidance to Inland Design, as well as all future public sector design labs, as they think strategically about legitimacy and credibility-building in the early stages of formation.

1.2.3 Research Question

This research focuses on the particular integration of design thinking methods to drive innovation in the public sector, with a lens of organizational legitimacy. Action research is employed to analyze the unfolding day-to-day practices and interactions between the employees of the lab and the existing organization civil servants. The aim of the research is to investigate legitimacy-building and -breaking practices within this intersection, in order to provide guidance for best practices of similar organizations. Thus, it aims to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What practices helped and/or hindered the organizational legitimacy during the early stages of Inland Design in Migri?

RQ2: What strategic interventions support the organizational legitimacy of new design labs in the public sector?

1.3 Thesis Structure

This master's thesis is divided into eight main sections. Chapter 1 introduces the research. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of design thinking, public sector innovation, the intersection of design thinking in the public sector, and of organizational legitimacy. Chapter 3 describes the research setting and context of Inland Design in more detail. Chapter 4 discusses the research design and methodological approach, action research. Chapter 5 describes the strategic action interventions that were carried out during this research. Chapter 6 discusses and analyzes the findings from research. Chapter 7 discusses the results and implications of this action research to Inland Design. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the research.

2 Literature Review

Establishing a literature frame for assessing the strategic legitimacy-building and -breaking practices of a newly minted design lab in the public sector could become a book all on its own. There are extensive materials available on the various facets of that objective: from public management literature as a whole, to public sector innovation; from the design discipline holistically, to specific forms such as service design; from design thinking as a concept, to its application in the private sector, or to its more recent application in the public sector; and finally, from the organizational ramifications of this phenomenon at a change level, or to the specifics of legitimization practices at play. Consequently, it is critical to define the scope of this literature frame. Overall this literature review chapter aims to provide the necessary context of the research objective.

While there are libraries of possible angles to take in this research, this thesis pulls from three streams of literature: design thinking, public sector innovation, and organizational legitimacy. Figure 1 depicts the approach to this chapter's literature review. The review starts broad, and defines the general topics at play including design thinking and public sector innovation. The first section focuses on the mainstream conceptualization of design by non-designers: design thinking, enabling the research to go deep into the organizational ramifications of design's application in new milieu. The second section focuses on public sector innovation literature, providing a broad summary of trends over the last three decades. The third section dives deeper into the intersection of these two areas, looking at the specifics of the phenomenon of design thinking in the public sector. The fourth section zooms back out to the lens with which this phenomenon is viewed through: organizational legitimacy. Finally, the fifth section synthesizes and summarizes the literature review.




Figure 1: Approach to literature review

2.1 Design Thinking

...Design thinking, a human-centered, design-driven, innovation methodology that uncovers unmet needs (sometimes functional, but more often emotional and psychological) and uses natural human behaviors to develop new solutions. (Smith & Gross 2015)

Design thinking is an often confused term, in some part due to the myriad associations of the word *design* in the English language. “Design” is often associated with making things pretty (e.g. designer jeans, interior design, fashion design), or as Koskinen, Zimmerman, Binder, Redstrom, and Wensveen (2011, 7-8) describe, with the “form-giving” of products, systems, or spaces (e.g. industrial design of products, user interface design of a website, graphic design of a menu). Thus the meaning of design thinking might not, at first, be intuitive. It does not, for instance, mean thinking about making things pretty, nor about the form-giving of things. Hence, this section aims to bring clarity to the term.

The design discipline is vast, covering a multitude of professions, and has evolved considerably over the years into different areas. Buchanan (1992) defines the four areas of professional design including the design of: symbolic and visual communications; material objects; activities and organized services; and complex systems or environments for living, working playing, and learning. All of these areas of design have continued to evolve since Buchanan’s writing. Manzini (2016) describes that evolution as “away from [the design of] objects and toward ‘ways of thinking and doing’.” That move toward design thinking and doing brought with it a new approach known as *co-design*, meaning collaborative design with various stakeholders. This new approach redefined the most important stakeholder in the design process - the end user. This shift marks the beginning of the current transformation of the design discipline toward *user-centered design* (Koskinen et al. 2011, 18; Manzini 2016).

2.1.1 Design Thinking, Defined

While certainly not the first to use the term *design thinking*, the man most often credited for the term is Tim Brown, founder of the San Francisco design consultancy, IDEO (Kimbell 2011). Brown’s (2008), famous *Harvard Business Review* article, “Design Thinking” followed by his book *Change by Design* (2009), bring the thinking of designers and their ways of working to the mainstream, and in particular to business schools and to management and organizational discourse (e.g. Kimbell 2011; Rauth et al. 2015; Elsbach & Stigliani 2018). “Thinking like a designer,” Brown (2008) says, “can transform the way you develop products, services, processes - and even strategy.” And thus the term design thinking, was coined meaning,

A human-centered approach to innovation that draws from the designer’s toolkit to integrate the needs of people, the possibilities of technology, and the requirements for business success. (IDEO U 2018)

One of the most important and most controversial claims Brown makes is that anyone can be a designer, or think and work like a designer (Brown 2008). He and fellow design thinking proponents in managerial academia, business schools (e.g. Roger Martin (2009), former Dean of Toronto's Rotman School of Management), and consulting firms popularize the concept. They subsequently attempt to break this way of "thinking and doing like a designer" into four simple sensibilities (Brown 2008; Kimbell 2011).

The first and most foundational principle of design thinking is *user-centricity*. User-centricity (i.e. human-centricity, or a people-first approach) refers to literally and figuratively putting the user (i.e. client, customer, citizen) at the center of the design process (Brown 2008; Brown 2009; Kimbell 2011; Smith & Gross 2015). The second sensibility of design thinking is *integrative thinking* involving divergent and convergent thinking, borrowed from the Double Diamond model (by the Design Council 2018; see Appendix A) of the creative process from the design discipline (Brown 2008; Brown 2009, 66-68). The third sensibility in design thinking is *experimentation and prototyping*, manifested both as a mindset of "let's try it out," as well as a method of making things tangible (i.e. prototyping), and testing them to quickly get feedback and gain an understanding of user's needs (Brown 2008; Brown 2009, 71; Rauth et al. 2015). The fourth design thinking sensibility described by Brown (2008; 2009, 26-28) is that of the *collaborative and multidisciplinary team*, ideally involving various backgrounds and viewpoints in the design process (Hall 2011; Rauth et al. 2015).

2.1.2 Iterative Cycles

It's a process of enlightened trial & error. Observe the world, identify patterns of behavior, generate ideas, get feedback, repeat the process, and keep refining until you're ready to bring the thing to market. (Brown 2005)

Design thinking is characterized as an iterative, non-linear, and cyclical process (Brown 2008; Brown 2009; Kimbell 2011). While it has been adopted and adapted by various authors and organizations, they all basically follow the same concept, but perhaps emphasize different elements. Design thinking is often represented visually as a cyclical process with phases involving empathy, definition, ideation, prototyping, and testing (e.g. Brown 2008; ME310 Stanford University 2010; Smith & Gross 2015; Stanford D.School 2017). Tim Brown (2008) describes it, not as a cycle, but instead as a "system of spaces" involving "inspiration, ideation, and implementation."

One example adaption of this iterative cycle, and arguably the most intuitive adaptation, is that of the Nielsen Norman Group's *Design Thinking 101* (Gibbons, 2016), pictured in Appendix B. Gibbons (2016) cuts through any required interpretation, intuitively naming the six key phases to the design thinking framework. The first phase, *empathy* (i.e. user research, design research, design ethnography, needfinding), involves gathering a deep understanding of the user, of what they do, say, think, and feel. Based on the findings from the empathy phase, the second phase, *problem definition*, seeks to gain deeper insight into users' problems

and needs, and the subsequent opportunities for innovation. Based on those insights, the third phase, *ideation*, focuses on generating as many ideas as possible. The fourth phase, *prototyping*, involves design teams selecting a subset of ideas from the ideation phase to make “quick and dirty,” real and tangible prototypes. During the fifth phase, *testing*, design teams take the prototype and test it on real users and gather feedback. Finally, once the design team has iterated in the process and found a solution that transforms the experience for users, the sixth phase, *implementation* involves executing the vision in the real world. (Brown 2008; Brown 2009; Smith & Gross 2015; Gibbons 2016)

The iterative element of the design thinking process is difficult to explain or emphasize, when depicted as a visual cycle. Gibbons (2016) manages to visually succinctly depict the iteration in Figure 2 below. The figure shows that at any point in the process, design teams can gain new insight and knowledge and bounce back to a previous step. For example, when testing a prototype, design teams may gather a whole new insight about the user, thus requiring them to re-define the problem, ideate again, adapt and iterate their prototype, and hit the streets to test again. (Brown 2009; Gibbons 2016)




Figure 2: Iterative nature of the design thinking process (source: Gibbons 2016)

According to Brown (2008), by equipping managers with this ideology and toolkit of methods, anyone is enabled to be a designer. In this way his work, and the work of his colleagues discussed above, democratizes creativity and innovation. Innovation no longer has to exist as an unachievable ambiguity, but instead a simple process might attain it. Unsurprisingly, this assertion is embraced by some of his readers, and rejected by others.

2.1.3 Critique

However, design is not only the sum of its methodologies and tools. Neither is the role of designer experts reducible merely to this equation. Before being a technique, design is a capacity for critical analysis and reflection, with which design experts produce knowledge, visions, and quality criteria that can be made concrete in feasible proposals. (Manzini 2016)

While often presented as something of a silver bullet for organizational innovation, the design thinking ideology is not without critique. Much of the critique on the design thinking ideology is written from the design school, arguing for an honest critique of the scientific and academic roots of design thinking. Additionally, critics defend the naive simplification and then appropriation of designer's hard won skills and expertise. Naturally, the assertion that anyone can be a designer does not go over well.

With the advent of the mainstream popularization of design thinking, many designers feel that design thinking has been hijacked by a managerialist framework, and its true meaning and history have been lost (Dorst 2010; Kimbell 2011; Johansson-Sköldberg, Woodilla, & Çetinkaya 2013; Rauth et al. 2015). Johansson-Sköldberg et alia (2013) differentiate *designerly thinking* from design thinking, whereby designerly thinking refers to,

...The academic construction of the professional designer's practice (practical skills and competence) and theoretical reflections around how to interpret and characterize this non-verbal competence of the designers. Designerly thinking links theory and practice from a design perspective, and is accordingly rooted in the academic field of design. (Johansson-Sköldberg et al. 2013)

Whereas, the authors attest that design thinking, on the other hand, refers to a simplified version of designerly thinking, in order to describe the methods of designers, from within management discourse (Johansson-Sköldberg et al. 2013). Kimbell (2011) and fellow design thinking critics specifically contend the credibility of design thinking due to its prevalence in popular management press, and proliferation in business schools, versus the peer-reviewed nature of its design-based counterpart. Nonetheless, design thinking is demonstrating itself to be a considerable trend in the world as it gains legitimacy in whole new arenas. Both in the private and public sectors, highly respected global organizations are adopting the concept (e.g. Apple, Samsung, the UK's design council, Denmark's former MindLab, and many more). Regardless if the origins began as academic or mainstream, design thinking is a force to be reckoned with, and literature both academic and popular is taking notice.

Design thinking critics disagree with Tim Brown and uphold that no, in fact, being a designer is not so effortless that "anyone can do it." This appropriation of designers' know-how and skills often oversimplifies the design profession, and discounts the role of the designers themselves (Kimbell 2011; Johansson-Sköldberg et al. 2013). Johansson-Sköldberg et alia (2013) stress that design is more than simply a toolbox enabling creativity. By taking the designer out of the context of the ideology, half of the equation is missing including critical competence and expertise (Kimbell 2011; 2012). Kimbell (2012) reminds her readers that design culture comes with a long educational tradition. Indeed, how arrogant to suggest that a seasoned discipline like design can be adopted by simply reading a *New York Times'* bestselling book?

Debates about the credibility or lack thereof, of mainstream design thinking persist. This often shows up when any entity attempts to explain designerly terms to non-designers.

Apolitical, a global online network and platform for public service innovation (Apolitical 2018), posted a simple yet insightful article (Guay 2018b) attempting to simplify some of the most often-confused design terms (e.g. design thinking, social innovation, and behavioral insights) used by designers. In this instance, Andrea Siodmok (2018), an extremely well regarded design scholar, took to twitter stating, "I am assuming this is a joke, but if not it is rather naive." For designers, this is a hot topic, and not one to joke about or to simplify.

Yet, "Innovators have to admit one failing: they are simply not good at defining what it is they do in straightforward terms" (Guay 2018b). The simplification of designers' and innovators' terms does not take away from their knowhow or expertise, but simply is a means to communicate effectively with the rest of the world. It is important to ensure that the long traditions of design are upheld and respected, but we are missing the point when over-sensitivity to simplification attempts means well-meaning agencies cannot help translate design's insular jargon.

The emergence of design outside of design fields, into new areas like management and the public sector, has its risks, as defined by design thinking critics, yet it also has its advantages. Vinh (2018), Principal Designer at Adobe, articulates this extremely well with his analogy of the democratization of technology over the last 20 years. Whereas designers have become quite territorial and defensive of their discipline, methods, tools, and ways of thinking; technologists, on the other hand have embraced the democratization of their discipline, methods, tools, and ways of thinking. Vinh (2018) argues that this is only for the better, for all of us. The spread of software development and programs to simplify and teach coding to everyone, did not topple the industry of existing coders, but instead made them some of the most sought after employees in the world. Vinh (2018) contends that, whereas the language of technology has fully permeated our lives and cultures (e.g. reboot, megabyte, 2.0, beta), the language of design still remains mysterious, unknown, and frankly confusing to anyone outside of the world of design. If designers and those of us "wannabe" designers alike, believe in the power of design to make a meaningful impact on the world and societies at large, it is critical that authors like Tim Brown and Roger Martin, and professors at major business schools continue to write about design, to simplify it and democratize it, in order to make it approachable to those very societies we purport to affect.

Any embrace of design by non-designers is a good thing, and design thinking qualifies here. The reason for this is that when that happens, it means our language, the vocabulary of design, is broadening to the rest of the world. (Vinh 2018)

2.1.4 The New Innovation Strategy

Despite this staunch critique by some design scholars, organizations around the world are nonetheless adopting design thinking and applying the ideology to their innovation strategies. Since the turn of the century, there has been a growing trend in research and

literature to study and provide evidence of the benefits of design thinking to firms, and as a skillset to management.

With its role as an innovation tool, design thinking began to permeate new product development literature. Dell’Era and Verganti (2009) explain the impetus for *design-driven innovation* in the new product development realm, both a technological push, as well as market pull. Similarly, Carlgren (2013) identifies in her PhD thesis and subsequent papers with colleagues (e.g. Carlgren, Elmquist, & Rauth 2012), that design thinking is often initiated in or near the new product development functions of large firms. She describes design thinking as the enabler of managerial innovation, noting its various conceptualizations and implementations in firms. Likewise, Chang, Kim, and Joo (2013) examine design thinking at Apple and Samsung through an intuitive-analytical lens, and find that the organizations internalize design thinking in very different ways, based on the organizational environment and capabilities.

All of these accounts demonstrate how design thinking is by no means a prescriptive approach. Nonetheless, it is a growing phenomenon in firms, with an increasing amount of evidence for its benefits to firms and their innovation strategies. Elsbach and Stigliani (2018) provide a succinct and thorough description of research proving design thinking’s positive effect on firm growth, profitability, and innovation capability. Yet, profit-bearing firms are not alone in this need to respond to technology pushes and market pulls. Nonprofit and public sector organizations face the same external impulses as the private sector. Private sector organizations may have been the early adopters of design thinking as an enabler of innovation, but public sector organizations are quickly following suit.

2.2 Public Sector Innovation

Just as the private sector has evolved and incorporated new methods and processes to improve efficiency, increase profitability, improve flexibility and response-time to changing market demands, so too have our governments and public sector organizations. Obviously, the “shareholders” of public sector organizations differ dramatically from those of profit-seeking companies. The public sector is employed by society, and is held accountable by the citizens and residents of their countries. Because of this, they operate differently, they are structured differently, and they are held accountable differently. However, as they face similar pressures to the private sector to cut costs and improve efficiency, they have often adopted practices and methodologies from the private sector.

2.2.1 Bureaucracy versus Innovation

In the name of doing things for people, traditional and hierarchical organizations end up doing things to people. (Charles Leadbeater in: Bason 2010, 1)

Traditionally and stereotypically, public sector government agencies have been run with high levels of bureaucracy, siloed process management, structured hierarchies, and increasing red tape. In his book *Leading Public Sector Innovation*, Bason (2010, 7) reminds his readers, though, that this is the way they were designed, and for good reason to serve their respective functions for the society. In fact, it is imperative that public services operate in a stable, repeatable, undiscriminating, and predictable manner to serve the citizens. Therefore, in this way, public sector agencies were designed and built to have stable standardized routines. However, an unavoidable side effect is their resistance to change and innovation.

This era of wicked problems, however, introduces difficulty to traditional agency structures and ways of working. For starters, these challenges are no-longer single-silo issues. Technological disruption is affecting every individual government agency at once. Citizen *users* of public services may face challenges that cross organizational barriers, requiring them to coordinate the uncoordinated activities and requirements of multiple organizations. All the while those same users are beginning to experience seamless, easy, intuitive, and connected services in the private sector. Companies like Uber, Airbnb, and Amazon, to name a few, are harnessing technology, data, and information and synthesizing it together with good user-centered design to create brilliant solutions for their users. Services are starting to become easier, more convenient, and more connected, and subsequently citizens are beginning to expect the same from their governments as well (Bason 2010, 12).

Yet this is not the way public services were built or designed. Public services were built long before the internet existed, and even longer before the mass adoption of mobile phones, enabling instant connectivity and access to information. As Boyne (2002) describes, the organizational structure of public agencies is more bureaucratic and less flexible, they have more red tape and rules, and the managers within have little autonomy and freedom. Government agencies, however, have been required to build standardized and repeatable processes and operating procedures in order to increase efficiency, reduce costs, and avoid risk (Boyne 2002; Lykketoft 2014). Over decades of service to society, efficiency and productivity targets have often led to more complicated experiences for citizens (Bason 2010).

However, government agencies prioritize these characteristics for very good reason. They are not thick red-taped bureaucratic behemoths for no reason. Government agencies are required, by law, to be truly democratic and equally serve all residents of the country. Thus any ideas or changes put forward for government must be ready to scale instantly. The very nature of trying something new means risk, and government agencies are built to avoid risk. Moreover, they are the only service providers in their field; there is no competition. They do not have the luxury to shut the service down and re-vamp, like the private sector has. If any government agency were to shut down for even one day, in most cases this would become a matter of national security. Furthermore, government agencies that operate in security functions (e.g. army, police, border guards, customs, and immigration services) must have a

keen focus on readiness and be prepared to respond at any time. This list is by no means exhaustive; there are certainly more reasons for why public sector agencies operate in the way they do.

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate all of the reasons that government organizations have prioritized these qualities, it is important to discuss some of these key characteristics as it helps to define the context for this research. Public sector organizations do not operate in the same way as the private sector. They are motivated differently, and they naturally have different levels of responsibility to society. They are stereotypically slow and bureaucratic, but for very important reasons. As we apply new disciplines of thought to this space, it is imperative to do so in the context that public sector agencies operate in.

2.2.2 History of New Public Sector Approaches

Various initiatives have been introduced over the years to initiate change in public sector management, but have shown limitations. One such movement is New Public Management (NPM), which arose in the 1980s. Hood (1995) describes the impetus for this new kind of public accountability following the previous era, known as Progressive Public Administration (PPA). Much of the 20th century was dominated by a PPA approach to public administration, marked by a clear separation between public and private sector practices, as well as the maintenance of elaborate procedural structures and rules to prevent corruption and favoritism (Hood 1995). NPM, on the other hand, flipped those two previous assumptions. NPM brought managerial and business planning practices to the public sector. Additionally, NPM brought a results-oriented focus with metric tracking practices from the private sector directly to the public sector (Hood 1991; Hood 1995; Townley 2002). The NPM doctrine became the go-to public administration doctrine by many OECD countries in the 1980s, at a time when governments around the globe were facing greater fiscal pressures, higher resistance to taxation, further privatization, faster information technology (IT), automation advances, and strong pressures toward internationalization (Hood 1991).

Since the fast and furious adoption of NPM, there has been much criticism pointing out its limitations, and in some cases its failures. Many authors argue that we are now in a post-NPM era, forging the way to the next evolution of public administration doctrine (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000; Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler 2006; Osborne 2006). Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) suggest that the aforementioned shift from PPA to NPM put public administrators in a steering position, with too much power to choose the direction of the government. They argue, instead, for a public administration focused on New Public Service, thereby serving and empowering the citizens - the true owners of the government. Similarly, in contrast to both PPA and NPM, Osborne (2006) suggests a New Public Governance approach focusing on inter-organizational relationships and process governance versus NPM's prior focus on all things intra-organizational. Additionally, New Public Governance shifts the focus toward service effectiveness and outcomes versus organizational results.

Finally Dunleary et alia (2006) alternatively suggest a more recent public administration reform agenda of Digital-Era Governance, focusing on governance in a time of digital and information technology (IT)-based change. Digital-era Governance focuses on fixing the challenges and failures of NPM by reintegrating government agencies, changing the agency-client relationship to one of a needs-based and transformative agency adoption of digitalization and IT capabilities.

As global governments face increasing pressures from external and internal sources, there is a growing need to find yet another way of working. Since the global economic crisis of 2008, many governments have faced increasing pressures on budgets, and needs to cut costs and personnel, as well as to increase productivity (Bason 2010; Hall 2011). Technological advances are beginning to challenge the boundaries of previously clear roles between government and business. For example, Uber and Airbnb, both are using technology to enable individuals to share their personal assets to benefit society. However, both cases are beginning to blur the lines of roles between private sector actors providing social services, and governments where these types of services (i.e. taxi transportation, and hotel housing, respectively) were previously regulated (Kelly 2015b). Governments' ability to respond to such innovation and entrepreneurship, and quickly create necessary regulation to support their citizens, has proved sluggish and unwieldy. Additionally, these technological advances also create potential for the public sector's adoption and use (e.g. artificial intelligence, automation). Yet, all of these trends create uncertainty for public sector organizations that are built on reliability and predictability (Lykketoft 2014). One potential new way of working is design thinking.

2.3 Design Thinking in the Public Sector

Design methods can bring a vital new energy to public services by helping them to listen to citizens about their lived experiences, prototyping fast and learning by doing, and using visualizations as well as texts. All of these quicken the pulse of innovation and help governments get to better solutions more quickly. (Geoff Mulgan, CEO of Nesta, in: Kershaw et al. 2016)

A recent approach to public sector innovation, along the lines of the needs-based approach proposed by Dunleary et alia (2006), is the introduction of design thinking to the public sector. This approach is characterized by the incorporation of design principles in the way of working, namely design thinking, co-creation, participatory design, and co-design (Bason 2010, 8). Bason (2010, 8) pivots on the co-creation term, meaning, "A creation process where new solutions are designed with people, not for them." This is the fundamental element of this movement: using the integrative skills of the design discipline, starting with the needs of the citizens, in order to respond to the complex challenges our governments face today (Lykketoft 2014; Whicher 2015).

2.3.1 The Design in Government Movement

Design is one of the most important drivers of the quality of experience for users of services. For governments to remain credible to their citizens, they must treat the design quality of their services as seriously as the best businesses. (Tim Brown in: Kershaw et al. 2016)

With the growing interest in design thinking in the private sector, in business schools, in conferences, and in literature, governments have begun to pick up the concept as well. In response to global technological changes, growing uncertainty, tightened budgets, and a need for user-centered services, just like their private sector counterparts, governments have begun to experiment with new design approaches as well (Kershaw et al. 2016; Bailey & Lloyd 2017; Tönurist et al. 2017). Moreover, the global situation of wicked problems and wicked opportunities is creating a sense of urgency for change and transformation not just in profit-generating companies, but also in how governments serve their citizens, as Amatullo (2014) describes,

This is a time when we recognize a sense of urgency for change to happen - perhaps at a broader scope than ever before - and with it, a call for a path creating forms of collaboration and generative modes of intervention.

Thus, in order to respond to these global impulses and changes, design thinking is proposed as a new way of doing things, applying new tools and practices, all with the possibility to respond to the increasing service expectations of the people. Just as the design thinking ideology promised private sector organizations to connect them with the true needs of their customers, so too can the user-centered approach connect governments to the true needs of their citizens. One factor facing many governments globally is tightened budgets and productivity targets, and thus the need for innovation is growing. Furthermore, new technological advances like automation and artificial intelligence enable brand new possibilities in services, whether private or public services. Thus, design thinking's promise to enable innovation by unearthing user insights and creative new solutions to previously unseen opportunities, is well received in the public sector as well (Bason 2010; Kershaw et al. 2016; Tönurist et al. 2017).

Design thinking enables a newfound direct connection between citizens, government service providers, and policy makers; IDEO and Nesta describe this as, "A shift from designing from the inside out to designing from the outside in" (Kershaw et al. 2016). While the exact approach to do so may vary dramatically in governments around the world, what remains consistent between the approaches is that they are anchored in participatory practices, co-design practices, and service design expertise to improve services for citizen users (Bailey & Lloyd 2017).

Levels of Design in Government

One of the differentiating factors for design's implementation in the public sector is the level of the work. The *Design for Public Good* report (SEE 2013b) distinguishes three different levels of design work in government, as is shown in Figure 3 below. The first level, *design for discrete problems*, refers to using design for specific one-off project problem solving, and where design is not embedded within the commissioning agency. The second level, *design as capability*, refers to designers working inside the public sector directly alongside public servants, with a focus on building the design thinking capability into the public sector agency. The third level, *design for policy*, refers to design being used in policy making directly, often facilitated by designers either internal and hired within the government, or external consultants. Based on the research context, this study focuses on level two, design as a capability within the Finnish Immigration Service.




Figure 3: Adapted from SEE's (2013b) *The Public Sector Design Ladder*

Kimbell and Bailey (2017), make a distinction between *design for public policy* and *design for public services*. They describe how design in the realm of public policy entails playing a role in the resource mediation of policy creation and distribution including, “passing laws, publishing regulations, commissioning or running public services, and stimulating business or civil society to provide solutions.” Public services, on the other hand, are a result of public policy (Kimbell & Bailey 2017). This is an important clarification as design in these two areas, as well as design in the aforementioned three levels, have very different ramifications.

With regards to this research, Migri is a public service agency within the policy-making body of the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. Thus, while there are fascinating discussions about the potential of design at the policy level, design for policy is out of scope for this research study. From Kimbell & Bailey's (2017) definitions, the focus of this research study is on the designing of public services.

A Global View of Design in Government

The increasing trend of design in government can be seen in many regions of the world. This trend is being observed in Europe (and in particular, in the Nordic countries), North America, Australia, and New Zealand (Bason & Schneider 2014). However, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Singapore), it has not yet travelled much to Asia, Africa, or Latin America (Tönurist et al. 2017). How design is brought to government in those regions, however, varies by country and region, by the level of government in question, as well as by the approach.

This design movement is happening at all levels of government, from a local and municipal level to the national or ministerial level (Bason & Schneider 2014). In some cases, design is brought to government via external consultants. In the US, for example, the IDEO consulting company has done contracts for the Social Security Administration, the General Services Administration, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Office of Personnel Management (Hall 2011). In other cases, design and innovation teams are brought in house, hired as employees inside government ministries, offices, agencies, and bureaus directly.

Design in Government in Finland

The Finnish government was an early adopter, and one of the first to integrate design into government. Helsinki Design Lab (HDL) was sponsored by Sitra (the Finnish national innovation fund) from 2009 to 2013, to apply strategic design to complex social challenges (HDL n.d.; Bason & Schneider 2014). Then, Aalto University's Design department's seminal Design for Government (DfG) course was kicked off in 2014. The DfG course pairs multidisciplinary student groups with one of the Finnish ministries to apply empathic design approaches, systems thinking, and behavioral insights to create relevant and user-centered solutions (DFG 2015). Later in 2015 the Finnish Prime Minister's Office commissioned a project called "Design for Government." The local think tanks Demos Helsinki and Avanto Helsinki, together with Aalto's DfG course, ran an experiment on design in government and created a working model for implementing experimentation in government (Annala, Kaskinen, Lee, Leppänen, Mattila, Neuvonen,... & Tarvainen 2015).

Since then, creating a culture of experimentation has been one of the key projects of the Finnish government's program (Prime Minister's Office 2017). To enable this, the Prime Minister's Office has created an Experimental Finland team, the kokeilunpaikka.fi (meaning "a place to experiment" in English) platform, as well as a parliamentary advisory board to kick start and drive experimentation throughout the government (Kokeileva Suomi n.d.; Prime Minister's Office 2017). In the meantime various other design & experimentation-focused offices and labs have been established throughout the Finnish government, including for example D9 and Inland (more details forthcoming). These both act as examples of one of the particular ways that design is manifesting within governments - as labs (i.e. laboratories, design labs, innovation labs).

2.3.2 Government "Design Labs"

An increasingly popular term in the world of design in government is that of the laboratory, or *lab*. The lab term has many different, yet similar meanings. This section attempts to elucidate the various terms, and specify what is meant by government design lab for the purposes of this research.

Papageorgiou (2017) describes perhaps one of the broadest definitions of labs, *public and social innovation labs (PSI labs)*. According to Papageorgiou (2017) PSI labs include the

broad and overarching category of all laboratory manifestations in the public and social sectors:

...Social labs, policy labs, government innovation labs, innovation teams (or i-teams), design labs, change labs, living labs, do-tanks, hubs, hives, and accelerators.

Similarly, Bason and Schneider (2014) refer to the myriad conceptualizations and implementations of such labs as *public innovation places*, defined as:

...Experimental sites, agencies or labs created to tackle innovative solutions to public/social problems, and dedicated to the creation of networks and partnerships - launching projects, events and platforms.

However, labs with a direct government connection entail only a subset of Papageorgiou's PSI labs or of Bason & Schneider's public innovation places. This government-connected subset of labs is referred to as *government innovation labs* by Bason & Schneider (2014). According to the authors, government innovation labs are:

Characterized by a direct connection with the public sector and [are] created to tackle complex public/social problems that more traditional governmental structures fail to resolve, in particular, using design to experiment and propose innovative public services and policies and at the same time reform and change the way government operates. (Bason & Schneider 2014)

Government innovation labs (i.e. government design labs, design labs, innovation labs) are thus located in-house, within the government directly. In some cases designers are hired within a specific agency, and in other cases they are hired at a higher level in government to spark collaboration and lead innovation projects across multiple government agencies. Regardless of where they are located or at what scale they are using design, the main purpose of government design labs is to bring innovation and change to the government (Tönurist et al. 2017). As they are located within the government, they are increasingly being viewed as a new resource for government actors (Bason 2010) to bring design thinking principles and its user-centered orientation directly to and inside the public sector. Some, but not all, leverage a physical space as one of their key elements (Bason & Schneider 2014), and thus embody a physical manifestation of design within the agency.

Focus of Design Labs

Even within the subset of government innovation labs, there is still tremendous variation in the focus and implementation of design. Bason and Schneider (2014) introduce a framework that maps government innovation labs according to their *influence* and *scale*. First the authors define design lab's influence by the role the government plays in the lab. Figure 4 illustrates those roles laid out on a continuum: owner, funder, co-funder, partner, client, or endorser. Those government roles farther on the left of Figure 4 represent higher levels of support from government, and are referred to as *government-led*. While, roles farther on the

right of Figure 4 have lower levels of support from the government, yet greater independence, and are referred to as *government-enabled*. (Bason & Schneider 2014)




Figure 4: Adapted from Bason & Schneider (2014) - Level of Design Lab Influence

Second, Bason and Schneider (2014) define the scale of design labs, by the types of activities they perform. Figure 5 represents the key activities the authors identified, from lowest to highest scale (bottom to top in Figure 5): research, communication, networking, advisory, capacity building, challenge, design, piloting, and implementation (Bason & Schneider 2014).




Figure 5: Adapted from Bason & Schneider (2014) - Level of Design Lab Scale

These influence and scale continuums provide a useful framework for comparison of government design labs. In this research study, the *government [acts] as owner* for Inland Design, thereby Inland is government-led and has a high level of influence. Additionally, the scale of work is quite empowering as Inland Design concentrates on high-scale activities including *design* (i.e. using design as the frame for problems and solutions) and *piloting* (i.e. developing and testing prototypes, as well as the proliferation of experimentation in general).

Design Labs of Finland

Government design labs are increasingly popping up around the world. There are numerous examples of noteworthy global design labs. Appendix C provides three key examples of design operating at different levels of government: MindLab in Denmark, the Lab @ OPM in the USA, and Government Digital Service (GDS) in the UK.

Finland provides examples of design labs operating at different influence levels and scale levels across the government. D9 is a digitalization design lab that was established in 2016 by the Finnish State Treasury, to enable cross-government agency experimentation (Valtiokonttori n.d.). Additionally the City of Helsinki established an experimental collaboration platform, Helsinki Lab, in 2016 (City of Helsinki 2017). Helsinki Lab was set up by one of the first known city Chief Design Officers in the world, Anne Stenros (City of Helsinki 2017). Similarly, the City of Vantaa established their own design laboratory, SmartLab Vantaa, in November, 2015 to bring an experimental culture to the city (SmartLab Vantaa n.d.; Luhtala 2016). Finally, the Finnish Immigration Service established its own in-house co-design lab, Inland Design, in 2017 (Inland Design n.d.). Thus, at the time of this writing Finland has government design labs operating at the city/regional level, at the government agency level, as well as the cross-agency level.

The Life and Death of Design Labs

Even though this is an emerging trend, it is not yet a sustaining trend. Design labs, like the ones mentioned above, are doing great work in their countries and contexts, but still, they do not always last. Bason (2010, 104) suggests that, anecdotally, many design labs only last three to five years. This is further substantiated in Tönurist et alia's (2017) "Innovation Labs in the Public Sector" article, which studies 35 public sector design labs. Both among labs that had shut down already (e.g. Helsinki Design Lab, DesignGov, and The Studio), as well as those still in operation, they identify chief executive sponsorship and buy-in as the most critical factor for survival. Without that chief executive sponsorship, many of the factors that make the lab successful (e.g. autonomy, smallness, and separation from the rest of the organization) actually begin to work against the lab. In particular, separation from the rest of the organization leads to a lack of understanding from the rest of the organization. (Tönurist et al. 2017)

In May, 2018, MindLab announced the devastating news of its impending closure (Guay 2018a). MindLab was, for many global design labs, the Ivy League of design in government; one of the movements "godfathers." MindLab is/was the example of international design lab best practice, and many design labs attempted to emulate them (Tönurist et al. 2017). One small but significant indicator is the amount of articles and publications that cite MindLab as one of the star examples of a government innovation lab done right (e.g. Bason 2010; Blyth & Kimbell 2011; Junginger 2013; Bason & Schneider 2014; Kershaw et al. 2016; Papageorgiou 2017; and Tönurist et al. 2017).

HDL was another influential government design lab, which acted as a catalyst for social innovation by design, and an example for labs that followed (Papageorgiou 2017). After five years in operation, HDL closed in 2013. However, HDL saw this as just another chapter in the life of the lab; after closing they transitioned the website to function as an archive of materials for others with a similar mission (HDL n.d.). Additionally in Finland, at the time of

this writing, it has been announced that D9 will close its doors at the end of 2018, despite reporting fantastic results of their work across multiple government agencies (D9 Digital Team 2018).

While design practices and labs continue to emerge and do great work in the public sector around the world, they do not seem to survive. Is it that the remit is short term? Is it simply bureaucracy and budgets? Or is there a missing justification or understanding for the long term impacts that design labs within the government can achieve?

2.3.3 Challenges of Design in Government

The ability to introduce, let alone embed, design into public organizations is closely tied to everyday realities, including the political situation, public expectations, the economic climate and a complex set of values, leadership challenges, the will to make very difficult change and, not least, the human factor in all its dimensions. (Bason & Schneider 2014)

Despite the growing trend, and more and more labs and similar organizations entering the scene, the landscape is complex and very context-centric. Naturally governments, policies, and the subsequent government agencies around the world differ in their needs, beliefs, values, and approaches. Additionally, as this section has demonstrated, there remains great variance in how labs apply design approaches, at what level of influence, and also at different scales.

There are many barriers and challenges to bringing innovation practices into the public sector. As Section 2.2.1 demonstrated, the bureaucratic nature and critical societal role played by public sector organizations make change quite difficult. For good reason, governments must keep a keen eye on efficiency, productivity, and predictability. Thus the promise of design has to be more than simply creating user-friendly services. Public sector organizations have publicly-funded budgets to work within, and critical metrics to achieve. Therefore, government innovation labs need to balance the need to improve productivity, the service experience, as well as participation, all the while proving outcomes with measurable results. The ability to provide concrete and measurable results proves difficult, especially when the scope of work goes beyond service solutions and toward organizational change. Furthermore, most government organizations and civil servants do not have incentives to change or try out new things. If anything, they are incentivized against change and toward predictable productivity. (Bason 2010, 104; Bason & Schneider 2014; Lykketoft 2014)

Additionally government innovation labs must establish a connection with the overall organization, or else risk being perceived as “outsiders inside.” They must create a meaningful connection at multiple levels of the organization. They require top management support and sponsorship in order to attain necessary resources and funding. Additionally, they require a meaningful connection with the mid-level managers, if they aim to actually make organizational change happen. (Bason 2010, 104-105; Bason & Schneider 2014)

Yet, is design really the appropriate profession when it comes to organizational change? Organizational change is a long term, and long time, process requiring engagement and eventual buy-in from an entire organization. While design and innovation labs are often founded on participatory and cooperative design practices, organizational change is a whole different arena. Bason and Schneider (2014) share their reservations,

While the process of ideating, developing concepts and orchestrating prototyping may be the domain of designers, long-term organizational change is not. Other people and other professions need to step in.

There are no silver bullets to solving the wicked problems of the world, nor how our globes incredibly diverse governments should respond. Design thinking is by no means a “knight in shining armor,” here to save the day and all the inertia-bogged woes of the public sector. The public sector is necessarily complex, and not surprisingly, so too are the various global implementations of design thinking in the public sector. Despite the variations in application of design in government around the world, the little existing literature on the topic suggests that the challenges they face begin with attainment of organizational legitimacy.

2.4 Organizational Legitimacy

Legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws. (Scott 1995, 45)

Increasing evidence seems to suggest that the biggest challenges to overcome when bringing design thinking to the public sector are challenges with organizational dynamics. Despite all of the literature available on how to do design thinking, tools of design thinking, and the benefits of design thinking, perhaps the most important lessons for new design labs in the public sector have nothing to with design at all. Foundationally, government design labs need to gain understanding, trust, and credibility within their completely new milieu – they need to gain legitimacy.

2.4.1 Organizational Legitimacy, Defined

Birkinshaw, Hamel, and Mol (2008) describe how the introduction of any new idea in organizations often leads to fear, uncertainty, and ambiguity, and thus it is crucial to prove usefulness and legitimacy in order to sustain the concept, and to gain support and acceptance. Yet attaining said legitimacy is no easy feat. In their extensive review of 1299 publications and papers related to legitimacy, Deephouse et alia (2017) provide a comprehensive overview of organizational legitimacy - what it is, why it matters, where it comes from, and much more. The authors identify that the concept of legitimacy was brought to the field of organization studies by Sociologist Max Weber (1978), who introduced sociological theory to the legitimacy discussion. Various authors contributed to the

conversation after that, but the most important and seminal work, both at the time and still today, is that of Suchman's (1995) "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches." In it, his famous and pivotal definition for legitimacy is formulated:

The generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. (Suchman 1995)

Deephouse et alia (2017) find that this definition, verbatim, is still the most commonly used definition of legitimacy¹. Building on more recent work by various authors to expand this now 23 year old definition (e.g. Deephouse & Suchman 2008; Bitektine 2011; Tost 2011; Bitektine & Haack 2015), Deephouse et alia (2017) propose an updated definition:

Organizational legitimacy is the perceived appropriateness of an organization to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and definitions.

Both Suchman's (1995) and Deephouse et alia's (2017) definitions refer to or imply the socially-constructed nature of organizational legitimacy. Suchman (1995), along with fellow sociologists like Weber (1978) and institutionalists like Scott (1995), posits that legitimacy is a foundational element in the "normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower organizational actors." Similarly, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) identify that legitimation is an interactive and collective meaning-making process, both iterative and a negotiation at the same time. Later various other authors (e.g. Deephouse & Suchman 2008; Bitektine 2011; Bitektine & Haack 2015) emphasize the crucial social element of organizational legitimacy as well.

Indeed, legitimacy is granted by the stakeholders of an organization, where they bestow upon the organization credibility within the social structure, and thus their support and resources. Deephouse et alia (2017) build on previous authors' definitions of these stakeholders as *audiences*, *evaluators* (Bitektine & Haack 2015), or *constituents* (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995), and refer to them more neutrally as *sources* of legitimacy. According to the authors, sources refer to, "An entity that makes either explicit or tacit legitimacy judgements about a focal organization" (Deephouse et al. 2017). Most legitimacy research focuses on sources as collective groups versus individuals.

Legitimacy serves as an invisible actor within organizations both enabling and inhibiting organizational continuity and credibility. Suchman (1995) discusses how legitimacy leads to continuity or persistence of an organization in a self-fulfilling way, as an organization appears embedded or within the bounds of the social organizational constructs. The more audiences are interested and willing to invest, the more legitimate the organization becomes. Thus legitimacy supports the continuity of organizations. Additionally, legitimacy affects the credibility or trustworthiness of an organization. The more audiences understand the

¹ Moreover, "as of June 15, 2016, [Suchman's (1995) article was] the second most cited article from *The Academy of Management Journal*" (Deephouse et al. 2017).

organization, the more trustworthy the organization appears, thus enabling “cultural congruence” for the audience and the organization. This credibility adds up to the audience being able to truly understand what the organization is doing and why. It is also important to point out that the actions that lead to continuity are not necessarily the same of those that lead to credibility (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy results in tangible ramifications for organizations. Deephouse et alia (2017) summarize these ramifications including: social exchange and engagement, economic exchange or market access, organizational survival, financial performance, organizational goal achievement, resource attainment, stakeholder support, and strategic choice.

Suchman (1995) synthesizes the then, three decades of organizational legitimacy literature into three dimensions of legitimacy: pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy, and cognitive legitimacy, each representing the different behavioral dynamics at play with organizational legitimation. First, pragmatic legitimacy, he explains, is based on the self-interests of the audience. Audiences therefore view the organization through their own lens of benefits and consequences. Second, moral legitimacy is based on value judgements of the organization's outputs, techniques, and structures. These judgments are based on “the audience's socially constructed value system” (Suchman 1995). Third, and the most elusive of the three, cognitive legitimacy, represents the unspoken active or passive support by audiences based on their comprehension and/or the level which they take the organization for granted. (Suchman 1995)

Legitimacy, thus, is highly complex and highly contextual, based on the social structure of an organization and the perceived appropriateness and desirability of the organization's actions. While it is virtually impossible to please everyone inside an organization, legitimacy is a crucial yet invisible resource that is absolutely imperative when any type of change is involved, like in the case of bringing new mindsets and approaches to old and traditional organizations. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) introduce three reasons for legitimation: *extending*, *maintaining*, and *defending*. Similarly Suchman (1995) describes the three legitimacy challenges: *gaining*, *maintaining*, and *repairing* legitimacy. These authors suggest that skillful legitimacy management strategies should be employed, depending on the organization's purpose or challenge. Deephouse et alia (2017), on the other hand, refer to these (as well as two additional concepts, *institutional innovation* and *challenged by*) as *scenarios* of legitimacy, that change over time; “different times call for different types of legitimation activities.”

Gaining Legitimacy

During the establishment of new organizations, whether in a new sector or an existing sector, managers attempt to gain legitimacy (Suchman 1995) (i.e. extending legitimacy, according to Ashforth & Gibbs (1990)). This kind of legitimacy management is often quite proactive from

managers as they seek legitimacy based on the nature of the organization's activities themselves or based on their own individual credibility or reputation.

Suchman (1995) describes how this legitimacy is sought through efforts to conform to, select from, or manipulate the existing organizational environment. *Conformity* is a relatively passive approach, whereby organizations fit within the existing social structure, providing relatively little challenge, but risk that their vision will be "remade in the vision of the environment." On the other hand, managers can proactively *select among existing environments* for the most favorable one that will give legitimacy as they are, with relatively little changes needed. When neither conformity nor selecting among environments is adequate, managers must proactively create new social realities, referred to as *manipulating environments* (i.e. institutional entrepreneurship). This type of legitimacy seeking involves enlisting external support for "collective mobilization," and thus becomes "less a matter of management than of evangelism." This is accomplished through strategic communication, advertising activities, the concrete demonstration of success/results, and achieving collective action through popularization and standardization activities. (Suchman 1995)

Deephouse et alia (2017) specifically distinguish two different scenarios of gaining legitimacy. First, is the type of legitimation activities entailing conformity and consistency with existing organizational norms, what Suchman (1995) refers to above as conformity or selecting among environments. Deephouse et alia (2017) similarly refer to these legitimation scenarios as gaining legitimacy. However, second, is the scenario of institutional innovation, whereby different legitimation activities are employed by new organizations who seek legitimacy.

Gaining Legitimacy when Institutionally Innovating

The scenario of new entrepreneurial and innovative organizations gaining legitimacy, according to Deephouse et alia (2017), is much more radical and does not only seek to conform to norms, but to transform them, subsequently requiring its own scenario distinction. The authors summarize various research studies whereby different strategies are employed by institutional entrepreneurs including institutional change, de-legitimizing the competition, and process models for new venture or industry legitimacy.

Kannan-Narasimhan (2014) specifically studies how newly created innovation-focused teams in large established organizations overcome organizational constraints and resistance, and gain scarce resources in order to develop legitimacy. Such teams are in a difficult position as they need to establish legitimacy in order to attain resources, while they need the resources in order to demonstrate their legitimacy:

The dilemma facing innovators is the need for resources to construct partially working artifacts, but a lack of access to resources until they can demonstrate legitimacy. (Kannan-Narasimhan 2014)

Kannan-Narasimhan's (2014) study describes one strategy to overcome constraints for resources; that of *organizational ingenuity*, or using creative solutions to free up or reimagine underutilized resources. This is extremely applicable to government design labs, acting as newly created innovation-oriented teams, needing to prove their value in established organizations.

Maintaining Legitimacy

Once legitimacy has been granted, the next level of legitimacy management is maintenance (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995; Deephouse et al. 2017). Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) describe how once it is granted, legitimacy becomes less conscious, second nature, and relatively routinized, and Suchman (1995) confers that legitimacy maintenance gets easier. However, legitimization is never done and should not be taken for granted. Collectively, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and Suchman (1995) identify three strategies for maintaining legitimacy.

First, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) discuss the importance of providing assurances for "business as usual" with the audience, which often takes place within maintenance routines (e.g. letters, advertising, speeches, press releases). Second and related to the first, Suchman (1995) discusses protecting already achieved accomplishments or "buttress[ing] the legitimacy they have already acquired." Strategies to accomplish that protection entail consistent and predictable behavior that avoids uncertainty and scrutiny, carefully balancing new legitimization efforts that will reopen audience scrutiny, and "stockpiling" the trust and support of sources (Suchman 1995). Third, all three authors identify the need to anticipate and perceive, and then proactively mitigate change (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995). One way to accomplish this is through *bridging*, or enlisting individuals across the organization to monitor or listen to the various interests, ethics, and outlooks at play (Suchman 1995).

When Legitimacy is Challenged

Whereas Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and Suchman (1995) refer to only one final legitimacy scenario (*defense*, or *repair*, respectively), Deephouse et alia (2017) propose an additional scenario referred to as *challenged by*. This separation distinguishes between the different legitimization activities of different types of legitimacy challenges, as well as those legitimacy activities when responding to legitimacy threats,

We seek to recognize the multiplicity inherent in legitimacy challenges by recognizing them as a unique part of the legitimization process, separate from the responses used to manage these challenges. (Deephouse et al. 2017)

Hirsch and Andrews (1986) distinguish between two different types of legitimacy challenges: performance and value challenges. Performance challenges refer to challenges where sources claim under-performance, that the organization has not met its goals, whereas value

challenges question the legitimacy of the organization's mission as a whole. Deephouse et alia (2017) state that through the distinct *challenged by* scenario, "We formally link performance challenges to regulatory and pragmatic legitimacy and value challenges to moral legitimacy." Thus, legitimacy challenges can manifest in completely different ways based on what the source is challenging (e.g. norms and values, versus performance) (Tost 2011; Deephouse et al. 2017).

Defending/Repairing Legitimacy

Finally, legitimacy management occurs when previously established legitimacy is threatened or challenged, thus requiring defense, repair, or response (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995; Deephouse et al. 2017). Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and Suchman (1995) refer to legitimacy defense and repair as reactive and intense, whereas Deephouse et alia (2017) refer to legitimacy challenge response as varying on a spectrum of reactive to proactive. Regardless, legitimacy challenge defense involves a few inherent challenges. First, the legitimization threat can actually impede managers from acting once the organization's infrastructure has been established (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990). Second, legitimacy threats raise the risk of stigmatization inside the organization and subsequently, the deterioration of previously established and legitimized supportive social networks, as sources avoid their own risk of legitimacy-loss, by association. Additionally, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) discuss the reactive nature of legitimacy threats preventing management from having proper time to plan the response.

Suchman (1995) goes on to suggest three strategies for repairing legitimacy. The first strategy, and often the first step, is to create a *normalizing account* through one of four techniques: denying the problem, excusing the problem and blaming a particular party, justifying the problem, or simply explaining the problem. The second strategy to repair legitimacy is *restructuring*, which when paired with "selective confession" of some faulty/wrong element of the organization, can visibly symbolize change to the sources. Additionally, organizations can establish monitoring systems or leverage disassociation from the element of the organization responsible for the de-legitimation (e.g. personnel, procedures, processes, or the preexisting structure). The third and final strategy to repair legitimacy is to *avoid panic*, and instead Suchman (1995) urges patience and "a light touch and sensitivity to environmental reactions." Deephouse et alia (2017) abstract from decades of organizational legitimacy that,

Effective responses may depend less on conforming to any single set of expectations than on determining which sources care about which criteria and constructing a viable bundle of reassurances that satisfy enough sources on enough criteria enough of the time.

Debates ensue about the relative fixed or unfixed nature of organizational legitimacy. Deephouse and Suchman (2008) argue that organizational legitimacy is essentially fixed:

either an organization is legitimate or is illegitimate. However, both authors later propose more of a continuum of legitimacy (Deephouse et al. 2017). Once legitimacy has been extended or gained, and an organization moves into legitimacy maintenance, it can be considered that they are legitimate. However, while an organization is attempting to gain legitimacy, or worse, while it is defending legitimacy, the organization lives somewhere between the bounds of legitimate and illegitimate (Deephouse et al. 2017). Thus, the degree to which legitimacy is questioned marks the position of the organization on the legitimacy spectrum.

Organizational legitimacy is indeed a valuable resource, and yet a fickle one. For any newly formed team or organization, legitimacy must be something fought for, whether consciously or unconsciously. Based on the definitions of legitimacy, it is an imperative element needed to enact change in any organization. Moreover, when introducing any new mindset, approach, or *praxis*, there will always be inertia and resistance to that change (Elsbach & Stigliani 2018). Inland Design has faced that inertia and resistance to change within Migri. With changes in leadership Inland has also faced continuous and iterative legitimacy challenges, many simply to gain legitimacy within the broader Migri organization, a few to maintain, and even a few to repair legitimacy.

Yet, organizational legitimacy is not the only legitimization battle Inland and similar design labs are facing. Legitimacy also occurs at an occupation level with newly formed or evolving occupations. Service design, itself, is a currently evolving occupation that in its own right is going through legitimacy struggles. This evolving occupational legitimacy is studied extensively by Fayard et alia (2017). While occupational legitimacy is not the scope of legitimacy for this research, it is important to note the double legitimacy challenge faced by Inland as they both seek to gain legitimacy at an organizational level, while concurrently at an occupational level. Simultaneously, these organizational and occupational legitimacy challenges are only compounded further by the current state of overall design thinking legitimacy.

2.4.2 Design Thinking Legitimacy

...Design legitimacy [is] about both intangible and tangible resources and how they are strategically and intuitively used to create the desired difference in the world. Ultimately it becomes about people, their beliefs and interactions.
(Lykketoft 2014)

Many organizations who begin to dabble with design thinking principles struggle with establishing legitimacy. In their article “Making it Happen: Legitimizing Design Thinking in Large Organizations” (Rauth et al. 2015), the authors interview six large corporations that have undergone the introduction of design thinking. While their study focuses on private sector organizations, Rauth et alia’s (2015) scope of large organizations provides parallels with the public sector, as both tend to have greater bureaucracy and hierarchies, and an

organizational focus on efficiency, productivity, and effectiveness. Regardless of the sector of work, or the size of the organization, implementing new concepts like design thinking is difficult as it challenges old ways of working and brings with it uncertainty and ambiguity (Birkinshaw et al. 2008). Subsequently, Rauth et alia (2015) argue that in order to achieve acceptance of design thinking, gaining legitimacy is crucial, "...It is therefore essential for those who seek to implement and sustain [design thinking] to create a general belief that the new concept is useful or legitimate."

In their research, Rauth et alia (2015) uncover five key challenges related to implementing design thinking. First is a lack of appreciation for the critical values of design thinking, such as learning from failure, following unforeseen design directions, and user-centricity. Second is a difficulty in attaining required resources for design thinking, combined with a perception that design thinking takes more time. Third is the difficulty in providing measurable and tangible proof of results, as many of the values of design thinking are actually intangible and very difficult to measure. Related to that, the fourth is a challenge with traceability of results of design thinking projects and efforts. Finally, the fifth challenge relates to internal organizational politics, as existing teams see design thinking as a threat to their role or practices.

All of these challenges relate to establishing the legitimacy of design thinking. Rauth et alia (2015) find that there is generally a misalignment between the cultures of design thinking and of large organizations, as large organizations generally prioritize efficiency efforts, and avoid failure at all costs in order to meet profitability targets or commitments. Thus design thinking can contrast with the existing values, norms, and culture of the organization. Subsequently, they posit that "legitimization is a central challenge of implementing design thinking" (Rauth et al 2015).

Based on the efforts and actions of managers in the six studied organizations to enlist support for design thinking, Rauth et alia (2015) propose a legitimacy perspective to legitimize design thinking. Appendix D summarizes the discussion from Rauth et alia (2015), showing how specific actions influence certain kinds of legitimacy. First, demonstrating the usefulness of design thinking, by communicating success stories and project-specific metrics, and communicating results in the proper way of the organization, over time builds legitimacy among individuals and eventually the collective. Second, meshing design thinking with organizational culture, by tailoring design thinking to the existing organizational terms, standards, practices, and culture builds legitimacy on all levels. Third, convincing others through experiencing design thinking is a strong method to build legitimacy with participants. This is done by involving employees in design thinking workshops, and thus rewarding them with new experiences and learning opportunities, and by providing them the chance to make a direct impact on users. Fourth, the creation of physical spaces, training, and design artifacts is a way for employees to physically experience and witness the legitimacy of design thinking. Fifth and finally, the establishment of ambassador networks

creates the potential for design thinking to “go viral,” as well as legitimacy via association with the right actors (e.g. HR, development units, and top management).

The authors point out that the majority of their interviewees had not planned these legitimization activities but had instead reacted to the situation at hand. It is also interesting to note that all six organizations took similar actions. Rauth et alia’s (2015) proposed legitimacy perspective can act as a tool or guide for design thinking organizations to more proactively attain, maintain, and defend legitimacy. For Inland Design, the findings from this study act as both a practical guide of advice, helping to guide strategic actions, as well as a great framework to analyze Inland’s legitimacy-making and -breaking actions. The organizational similarities between large corporations and public sector entities suggest that Rauth et alia’s (2015) findings are directly transferable to Inland Design, and similar public sector design labs.

The Role of Organizational Culture in Design Thinking Legitimization

We define organizational culture as the underlying norms, values, and assumptions that define the “right way” to behave in an organization. (Elsbach & Stigliani 2018)

Naturally, legitimacy has very close ties with organizational culture. In one recent and extensive study on *Design Thinking and Organizational Culture*, authors Elsbach and Stigliani (2018), review 86 articles that involve design thinking and organizational culture. Most importantly, for the purposes of this thesis research, they find that there are organizational cultures that support and others that impede the use of design thinking tools. Organizational cultures that value collaboration with users, experimentation, and specifically the belief that experimentation is vital for innovation, are supportive of design thinking.

On the other hand, they find that, “Cultures defined by values and norms of productivity, quantitative performance, and siloed specialization could impede the use of design thinking tools” (Elsbach & Stigliani 2018). When cultures are defined less by cross-functional collaboration and more by specialization in siloes, it can be very difficult to implement the tools and values of design thinking. Additionally, the values of design thinking can clash in cultures driven by quantitative measurement and productivity, as the unpredictability and ambiguity does not fit with the organizational culture. Finally, very structured, rigid, and formal hierarchies proved to impede practices such as co-design and experimentation (Elsbach & Stigliani 2018). This is a very important revelation for parties that attempt to implement design thinking in public sector organizations which tend to be hierarchical and siloed, productivity and efficiency focused, as well as rigid and formal. The very nature of public sector organizations - to deliver services in a predictable, efficient, and cost effective manner - may make the introduction of new practices like design thinking very difficult.

When viewed through a legitimacy lens, culture is one of the most important variables in gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Public sector organizations may have a preexisting

tendency to clash with design thinking, making organizational legitimacy a challenge. Moreover, the emergent nature of the service design profession, and its subsequent occupational legitimacy claims, may only add another layer of difficulty to the legitimacy equation. Indeed, Inland Design and similar design labs have a considerable challenge to truly infiltrate the public sector with a drastically different design culture. Yet, it is not without hope. Multitudes of innovation and design labs are sprouting around the world and taking on the challenge. While few research accounts of these attempts discuss organizational legitimacy, there is one exception, and from one of the most revered design labs in the world - MindLab.

The Case of Organizational Legitimacy at MindLab

How could design-praxis be introduced without appearing like a condemnation of the hard work being done in more traditional ways? And how could a balance between experimentation and citizen involvement and the culture of zero-mistakes be maintained? How could MindLab operate on all the levels needed and be legitimate within the existing system? (Lykketoft 2014)

At the time of the writing of Bason's (2014) *Design for Policy* book, Kit Lykketoft was the Deputy Director of MindLab, responsible for its, "strategic- and competence-related development" (Bason 2014, xxii). Kit contributes to Bason's (2014) book with her own chapter retroactively investigating legitimacy establishment at MindLab (Lykketoft 2014). She carries this out by interviewing MindLab employees, as well as internal and external MindLab stakeholders from various levels. Thus, her chapter provides a first-hand account of legitimization efforts of design thinking in the public sector.

In her study, Lykketoft (2014) finds that overall, the greatest factors in establishing legitimacy at MindLab come from how (praxis) things are done, versus what (practices) is specifically done. In particular she points out the all-important role of the individual actors at play; after all it is the actions and praxis of these practitioners that enable or disable legitimacy.

She identifies six key themes that were essential in establishing and maintaining legitimacy at MindLab. First, *organizational position* refers to MindLab's position inside the government, rather than being an external team consulting for the government. Second, MindLab's *adaptable strategy in a learning organization* refers to their flexible and adaptable strategy, as well as their focus on learning and reflection. Third, *forming the team*, as Lykketoft (2014) articulates, "Having the right people has been the most important factor for establishing MindLab's legitimacy to act," refers to the credibility gained from their combination of expertise, skills, and competencies (e.g. project management, organizational development, creative facilitation, and social skills). Fourth, *shared beliefs, consistent approaches, and empathy* create a perception of authenticity and enthusiasm among MindLab members, thus resonating with, and supporting legitimacy among stakeholders. Fifth, *the importance of a physical space* refers to the role MindLab's physical space played in further

exemplifying consistency throughout the organization, and playing the role of a neutral safe space zone for inter-organizational collaboration. Sixth and finally, *the dilemmas of value* refer to the maintenance of legitimacy when it is challenged, and the necessity to change approaches over time, as well as the challenge of proving the value. (Lykketoft 2014)

Furthermore, Mindlab faces unique challenges based on the international attention they garner. In some ways this international attention helped them gain legitimacy in Denmark, yet at the same time it increased the need to demonstrate concrete results in order to maintain that legitimacy. Herein lies the common challenge of design thinking legitimacy - how to demonstrate value? Even just the perception of value brings legitimacy. Yet, as one of MindLab's ministry Directors said, "At some point you reach a point where the question is no longer if you create value, but what value you create. And then you need to be able to prove it" (Lykketoft 2014).

The above findings are unique to MindLab, and to the context of the Danish government, the specific Ministries that MindLab worked with, and the Danish culture. Some may argue about the portability of these results to other contexts. However, thinking back to Rauth et alia's (2015) study of design thinking legitimacy of large corporations, the legitimacy actions undertaken by six completely disparate organizations were extremely similar. Moreover, for the purposes of this research, there are deep parallels between Nordic countries, their governments, and their mentalities, suggesting that there are at least some correlations between MindLab's results and the Finnish context.

...Skilled people and good models do not do the trick alone. MindLab cannot exist in a context where people do not want it. If you want to create a MindLab make sure that the surroundings want it. (MindLab stakeholder in: Lykketoft 2014)

Legitimacy theory suggests taking a step back from the processes, practices, and mindsets of design, and instead taking a long hard look at the people and the culture. Much of the design thinking focus is on models, tools, processes, and practices. A legitimacy lens, on the other hand, guides the focus elsewhere - towards the people, the culture, the norms, beliefs, and values.

2.5 Summary and Synthesis

One of the latest trends in management studies is design thinking. Design thinking has a long history in the design discipline, but has recently been adopted as a management ideology by consultants, business schools, and innovation managers. This managerial approach often touts design thinking as the "silver bullet" for creating innovative user-centered products and services. This user-centricity acts as the core of the ideology, but needs to be packaged with integrative thinking, experimentation, and multidisciplinary collaboration. Then, when applied with iterative cycles of empathizing, defining, ideating, prototyping, testing, and implementing, any individual, team, or organization can harness the creative and innovative

benefits of designerly ways of working. Unsurprisingly, these assertions are met with much criticism and debate by seasoned design professionals, who disagree that their hard won skills can so easily be simplified. Regardless of their apprehension, design thinking is being embraced as the new approach to innovation in many private sector organizations.

However, the private sector is not the only sector with a mandate for innovation. The public sector faces the same external forces for change and innovation as the private sector, but does not necessarily have the same flexibility to respond. The public sector is necessarily bureaucratic and opposed to risk-taking and change. Public sector organizations are funded by the state, with a mandate to use those funds efficiently, in order to provide equal, effective, and predictable services to society. Thus, they face similar pressures to the private sector in cutting costs, cutting personnel, and making things more efficient and effective. Over the years, various private sector management approaches have been applied to bring change to the public sector, including PPA and NPM, to name some of the most pervasive. In recent years, the global economic crisis and mass advancements in technology, like automation and artificial intelligence, create a fresh impetus for a new way of working in the public sector again.

One such solution to enable governments to respond to the complex challenges in the world, and the increasing expectations of citizens is design thinking. Design thinking's promise of harnessing the creative and innovative power of designers, creating user/client/citizen-centered solutions, and all the while doing so collaboratively with a diverse set of stakeholders - this is seemingly exactly what the public sector needs. Various governments around the world are embracing this ideology and implementing design at various levels of government, with different influence levels, and different scopes and scales of the design focus. One manifestation of this embrace of design in government is that of the design lab. Design labs have the mandate of bringing design thinking principles and user-centered practices into the public sector directly, both supporting the implementation of innovative projects, as well as disseminating a culture of design thinking throughout the organization. Needless to say, this is a difficult mandate to achieve, and many design labs face considerable challenges in doing so.

Perhaps one of the most salient of those challenges faced by design labs is the establishment and maintenance of legitimacy within the public sector organization. Organizational legitimacy is anchored in organizational culture. There is an invisible legitimacy dance that takes place when any new team enters an existing organizational structure to establish the "proper" ways of being (i.e. values, beliefs, and norms). For many design professions, like service design for example, that proper code of conduct, or "occupational mandate," may not mesh well with the proper way of being in the public sector. The existing culture in the public sector may not be conducive of the values and practices of design thinking. Subsequently, design labs both in the private and public sector struggle to gain legitimacy within their broader host organizations.

Change and the introduction of anything new to any existing organizational culture are often met with resistance. Organizational change is a well-documented field of study that lays out the challenges of change. Yet, in the cases of government design labs that are found in literature, the organizational forces for and against change seem to be an afterthought. As Rauth et alia (2015) identifies, all of their interviewees reacted to the challenges of organizational legitimacy; it was not something they had even considered to proactively plan for.

The application of design thinking by public sector actors in the form of design labs, in itself is an emergent area of study. Adding in the layer of organizational legitimacy proves to drastically cut the existing research on the topic. Both Rauth et alia's (2015) and Lykketoft's (2014) studies of legitimacy provide a retrospective account of design thinking legitimacy making within their respective organizations. However, there does not seem to be research yet on the proactive application of organizational legitimacy theory in the early formation stages of a government design lab. Thus, there is an opportunity to build on Lykketofts study, and on organizational legitimacy research as a whole, by studying organizational legitimacy as action research while one such government design lab seeks legitimacy. That is exactly what this thesis research aims to do.

3 Research Setting

As Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008a) say in the opening of their book, *Qualitative Methods in Business Research*, qualitative research provides “an opportunity to focus on the complexity of business-related phenomena in their contexts.” This research involves a fascinating, unique, and rare context: the establishment and early formation stages of a new design lab in the public sector in Finland. Therefore, it is important to specify the explicit and implicit context of this research in order to focus the research appropriately. This chapter provides an overview of the context for the research. The first section describes the researcher’s role and motivation in this thesis. The second section provides background and history to the Inland Design research setting. The third section gives context of the research timing and setting. Finally, the fourth section discusses the specific scope of work for this research.

3.1 Motivation

In October, 2017 Inland Design, then three months old, opened two thesis/internship positions, with the theme of “co-designing services at Migri.” The position was looking for “talented students with a passion to change the world and an interest in migration.” This short combination of words felt like the perfect culmination of my studies and passions.

After leaving a career in large scale project management at Microsoft, to move to Finland, I went back to school. Technically a master’s student in business strategy, I was incredibly fortunate to participate in some of Aalto’s best intensive multidisciplinary design-based innovation courses. First, I had the opportunity to take part in the aforementioned DfG course; our team worked with the Finnish Ministry of Transportation to help solve the challenges of providing public transportation in rural Finland, in the era of “Mobility as a Service” (Ferreira Litowtschenko, Ikonen, & Swan 2016). Second, I participated in ME310 - the Stanford Global Design Innovation course – which pairs multidisciplinary student teams from two different global universities with leading global companies for an intensive year of using design thinking and prototyping to innovate new products and services (ME310 Aalto n.d.). Third, I was incredibly blessed to work with refugees, asylum seekers, and all immigrants to help them integrate into Finnish society as a Co-founder of The Shortcut, a nonprofit organization under the Startup Foundation (The Shortcut 2017). Inland’s job notice truly could not have been more perfect. I applied immediately, and accepted the position to work as a Service Design Intern/Thesis Worker from January - June, 2018.

This thesis is the perfect opportunity for me to not just study, but work inside of my particular area of interest - the application of design thinking in the public sector. This is quite a non-traditional interest for a typical business strategy student. However, I believe there is incredible synergy between organizational strategy and the design thinking methodology. I am a firm believer in the power of multi-disciplinary teams tackling complex

challenges like the ones our global governments face today. Thus, the chance to work alongside expert designers in Inland, leverage my education and experience, grow and learn from the field of design, help Inland to overcome the barriers and challenges faced by design teams in the public sector, and ultimately to improve the lives of every individual who interacts with migration services in Finland, was the perfect opportunity for me, personally, as well as academically.

This thesis position provides a great opportunity to work practically and experiment with the combination of strategy practices and design thinking methods. My studies in business strategy, complimented with previous experience in organizational strategy, provide a new perspective to the field of design and practical support to an organization in its initiation stage. Concurrently, design provides new perspectives, new methods, and new tools to the field of strategy. This is why action research was chosen as the methodology - to experiment and try things out while studying the work and outcomes, with a new and fresh combination of disciplines.

3.2 Inland Design

The Finnish Immigration Service (i.e. *Maahanmuuttovirasto* as it is known in Finnish or *Migri* as its official abbreviation) handles immigration-related affairs for the Finnish government. Migri's duties include handling residence permits and rights of residence, citizenship applications, asylum applications, asylum seeker's reception and protection, passport processing, and deportation, among other duties. Migri is located within Finland's Ministry of the Interior, yet partners across multiple ministries in immigration-related affairs. (Maahanmuuttovirasto 2018)

Migri joined the ranks of Finnish public sector agencies with in-house design capability in August, 2017 by starting Inland Design (also known as Inland, for short²), a co-design team inside the agency. Two long-time Migri veterans and leaders in the Digital Services team saw the opportunity to bring a new way of working to Migri, in response to growing pressures of digitalization and technological disruption.

"Our idea was that in order to build completely new kinds of services, both in terms of collaboration and co-creation, collaboration with the other agencies, and co-creation with the customers. So we needed to technically change things, but also change how we are organized around the new ideas and new customer needs. So that was the original idea. Then we kind of figured out that service design would be one element in this co-creation thing." (I3)

They saw design thinking as an opportunity to experiment with a new approach inside Migri to conceptualize, prototype, experiment, and concretize the abstract world of technology. Thus, they hired two seasoned service designers for a 2.5 year period of time, to harness their

² Note: Both forms of the name, Inland and Inland Design, are used in this thesis

skillsets of co-design, participatory practices, facilitation, experimentation, prototyping, and strategic design.

The foundation for Inland began a few months prior, in March 2017, thanks to the work of design consulting agency Fjord Helsinki. Fjord worked with Inland's founder to get things started, to build the concept of Inland (see the Inland Manifesto in Appendix E for one example of the concept), the brand and visual identity, as well as to kick-start four pilot projects within Migri. These pilot projects were meant to provide a tangible experience of the kind of things designers do. In just four months, they made substantial progress that proved the concept and laid a foundation for Inland. This enabled the in-house service designers of Inland to quickly begin working with Migri in using design to simplify the immigrant journey.

Within Migri, Inland is positioned in the Digital Services team (*Sähköiset Palvelut* as it is known in Finnish or *SÄPA* for short). The SÄPA team is made up of 60-80 people, and is one of the biggest and best IT teams in the Finnish government, with very advanced technological capabilities. This connection to and position inside SÄPA enables Inland to combine advanced technology with the design thinking skill set: co-design, user research, experimentation, prototyping, and much more.

Inland's mission is to lead co-design processes in Migri to improve the immigration experience through the combination of empathy, experimentation, and technology. Their three strategic priorities include: bringing organizational change [to Migri] through an experimental culture, bringing a human-centered approach to Migri projects, and kick-starting cross-[government] agency projects.

After only five months in operation³, the Inland team had accomplished a lot. They established their Operational Model (see Appendix F), in the form of a Keynote to present the Inland concept, working methods, and model to audiences inside and outside Migri. At the time of this research, the team is tracking 14 unique projects or initiatives within Migri, ranging from simplifying customer services with the help of artificial intelligence (AI), to cross-team process simplification, to equipping the leadership with tools and processes to enable faster and better decision making. Not all 14 projects are created equal. Some projects are simple, for instance requiring a two-day process sprint. On the other hand, other projects are much more complex, for instance one projects requires at least 50 percent of one Inland designer's time. Additionally, Inland has established a solid social media presence and communication plan for sharing their work and results. Additionally, they built an infrastructure of online tools and new physical tools and supplies for the Inland office and

³ For the purposes of this thesis, the age of the Inland team is counted from when the two service designers were hired as full time Migri employees, August 2017 (versus from when Fjord began its work). As this research study takes a particular interest in organizational dynamics, it is important to look at those inter-Migri organizational dynamics, and not those due to external consultants.

workshop room in the Migri offices. At this point in time the team has not yet had the luxury to think about or build out their team strategy.

3.3 Research Timing & Context

The research for this master's thesis takes place during the six month period from January to June, 2018, at which time the in-house Inland team is five months old. At this time the team is made up of four people: two full time service designers and two service design interns. First, it is important to note the overall theme of change that Migri and the Inland teams have been undergoing during this time. Secondly, it is important to identify the organizational context within which Inland has operated at this point in time.

3.3.1 Change is the Name of the Game

The European refugee crisis of 2015-2016, naturally had an impact on Migri and its personnel. Between 2015 and 2016 well over 1 million people left their homes in the Middle East and Africa, seeking asylum in Europe (UNHCR n.d.). Over 30,000 of those individuals sought asylum in Finland in 2015 alone (Finnish Immigration Service 2016), effectively increasing Finland's year over year asylum applications by 822% and making Finland the fourth highest recipient of asylum seekers per capita in Europe (Eurostat 2016).

In order to respond to that increase and serve those clients, Migri increased their personnel from 300 people before the crisis, to nearly 1000 after. Personnel growth of that size does not come without an impact on organizational structure and working environment. During that time, Migri experimented with five different organizational structures.

During the first months of this research the Migri premises were located in the Kalasatama neighborhood of Helsinki, occupying six floors of a large office building. Then, in May, 2018, during the course of this research, Migri relocated to an office building in the Pasila neighborhood of Helsinki. The move was accompanied by a new way of working with an open, flexible, and consolidated office arrangement.

Finally, as if that was not enough change, the Inland team alone had four different managers during their first five months in Migri. Most importantly, the founder of Inland, with 11.5 years of experience in Migri, changed jobs in the first week of this research study.

It is important to note the impact of this much change, both on the Migri organization as a whole, and on the Inland team specifically. The personnel growth alone is staggering; growth of that magnitude is typically only seen in high-growth startup companies. Inland was created at a time when the overall Migri organization was still reeling from the effects of the refugee crisis, as well as waves upon waves of organizational change.

3.3.2 Inland Faces Resistance

Unsurprisingly, at their five-month-old mark when this research began, in the midst of so much change, the Inland team was beginning to feel resistance from inside Migri. To put it in Tuckman's (1965) terms of group development (see Figure 6), Inland was in the storming phase within the broader Migri organization. According to Tuckman, the first stage of group development of teams is termed forming, where team members test out identities, boundaries, and practices as they begin to form and establish their collective group habits and identities. The first five months for Inland, prior to the beginning of this research, were full of trying out new ways of working within Migri, new ways of communication, new tools, new media, and even introducing new language and terms.




Figure 6: Adapted from Tuckman's (1965) *Development Sequence in Small Groups*

Tuckman (1965) refers to the second stage of group development as storming, which is, "characterized by conflict and polarization around interpersonal issues...", and furthermore, "these behaviors serve as resistance to group influence and task requirements." When this research study began, Inland was beginning to experience polarization and conflict as a few critical Migri teams began to close doors on collaboration. In the first weeks of this research, one particular team began to exhibit resistance and inflexibility, with a striking similarity to Gilbert's (2005) routine rigidity behaviors: contraction of authority to centralized decision making, reduced experimentation of new practices, and a focus on existing resources only. The Inland team said it well in a presentation they gave to the monthly #govDesign community call (Kane 2017) in January, 2018: "we are outsiders on the inside."

3.4 Bringing Strategy into the Lab

So it was at this time that my research began - a time of great change, and increasing resistance from within the Migri organization. The aim of my role in Inland was initially to build a network of designers in immigration around the world, with the possibility to build or join other strategic advisory boards or networks (Swan 2018). As with the iterative nature of the design process, however, that scope changed quite quickly once I was in the organization, and opportunities arose to bring organizational strategy work and processes to Inland.

The goal of this research is to study and support Inland Design in their organizational strategy work to respond to the aforementioned challenges, as well as specific strategic priorities that arise throughout the course of the study. This research employs an action research methodology, working inside Inland Design and Migri as a Service Design Intern/Thesis Worker, and thus studying the strategy practices while using them, the practitioners while working with them, and the praxis while taking part in it directly.

This research focuses on the use of strategy tools to support a design lab in the public sector, in order to achieve legitimacy and to gain credibility and trust from the rest of the organization. The specific strategic action interventions emerge as the internship progresses, based on the needs and challenges that Inland faces at the time. For Inland this research provides strategic action interventions and experiments to help them achieve their strategic objectives.

4 Methodology

Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008b) define methodology as answering the question, “How can knowledge about a given issue or problem be produced?” Methodologies act as a guide to research, helping instruct methods for collecting and analyzing data. This research aims to study legitimation practices at a very practical level in a newly formed design lab inside an old public sector institution. Working within the design lab and with the designers themselves, versus studying them, is the best way to gain knowledge. Thus, this research employs an action research approach.

This chapter provides an overview of the methodology that directs this study. The first section introduces the action research methodological approach, its characteristics, and the role of action researcher. The second section describes the specific data collection methods used for this research, namely: action interventions, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation. The third section discusses the analysis methods used in this. Finally, the fourth section evaluates the validity and ethical considerations for the overall research plan.

4.1 Action Research

Action research is enquiry with people, rather than research on people.
(Altrichter, Kemmis, McTaggart & Zuber-Skerritt 2002)

While technically not a research method, action research is a broadly applicable research approach to research requiring collaborative participation in and with action-oriented problem solving. As it is not the product of a single academic discipline, but instead the evolution of a research approach from many and varied sources, it is used broadly by many disciplines. Action research grew as a research approach from a history of practice in philosophical work, education, early labor-organizing movements, social science, anthropology, and played a large role in early work on social justice, civil rights, oppression, democracy, and institutional change (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & Maguire 2003). Kurt Lewin is often cited for bringing the action research approach to the US in the 1940s (Brydon-Miller et al. 2003), while similarly and at the same time Tavistock Institute of Human Relations brought the approach to Britain (Susman & Evered 1978). This varied history has a theme for application in social science, in particular when there is a need for social change. As such, many of the action research characteristics today are still grounded in that history, seeking democratic participation, action/solution-orientation, and solving or contributing to real-life challenges (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h).

4.1.1 Characteristics

While there is not a single, generally agreed upon definition for action research, action research is often described instead in terms of its key characteristics (Altrichter et al. 2002; Coughlan & Coughlan 2002). Figure 7 gives a summarized and synthesized view of action research characteristics, as described by key action research literature (e.g. Susman & Evered 1978; Altrichter et al. 2002; Coughlan & Coughlan 2002; Brydon-Miller et al. 2003; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h; Lingard, Albert, & Levinson 2008; Sein, Henfridsson, Purao, Rossi, & Lindgren 2011).




Figure 7: Key characteristics of action research

At its heart, action research involves participative and collaborative actions done together between the researcher and the researched, in the pursuit of knowledge (Coughlan & Coughlan 2002; Brydon-Miller et al. 2003; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). In fact, unlike many traditional research methodologies, the researcher becomes a part of the researched group, no longer acting as a separate entity (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). There is a focus on democratic inclusion to ensure collaboration of all participants, ensuring all voices in the research are heard (Altrichter et al. 2002; Brydon-Miller et al. 2003; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). It harkens back to the earlier description of co-creation (see section 2.3) - creating collaboratively together with the diverse stakeholder group, based on their needs.

Action research is grounded in action-based problem solving. Coughlan and Coughlan (2002) describe it simply, “research in action, rather than research about action.” Most importantly, the actions are based in solving the real-time problems of the researched group (Gummesson 2000; Brydon-Miller et al. 2003; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). Contribution is focused not just in theory, but also in real-world solutioning, as Brydon-Miller et alia (2003) describe, “...we do tend to be practical and concerned with achieving real outcomes with real people.”

Action research is emergent and needs-based research. As a legitimate member of the researched group, the researcher brings expertise, aims to solve the problems faced by the group, aims to spark change within the group, as well as reflection and analysis with the group, all the while studying what unfolds (Coughlan & Coughlan 2002; Eriksson & Kovalainen

2008h). Again this is another example making action research particularly suited to a design-thinking mindset, as the problem solving is based in the real-time needs of users.

In this way, action research is unpredictable and even uncertain, as things evolve and emerge, as the real lives of the researched group evolve and real problems materialize. Brydon-Miller et alia (2003) describe the chaos or *messiness* of action research that comes with the unknown, “Messses are complex, multi-dimensional, intractable, dynamic problems that can only be partially addressed and partially resolved.” Thus, action research requires a certain degree of resiliency by the researcher to dance with that ambiguity, unpredictability, and uncertainty.

With an extensive history of its application in social impact and social change (Byron-Miller et al. 2003), action research is especially suited to study change or evolution in any environment. Subsequently, action research is specifically relevant in cases where research involves actions as they unfold over time, particularly as Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008h) describe when, “related to understanding the process of change, development or improvement of some actual problem.” In Gummesson’s (2000) words, action research is “fundamentally about change.” It is precisely applicable for organizational change in firms, and thus requires an understanding of organizational change dynamics by the researcher. This makes it a perfect fit to pair with Inland’s strategic priorities for organizational change in the broader Migri organization, as well as the emergent legitimacy-building and -breaking dynamics that surface during the research.

Action research recognizes the symbiotic relationship between theory and practice. Traditional scientific inquiry suggests that theory should inform practice. However, as Brydon-Miller et alia (2003) succinctly state, “Action research goes beyond the notion that theory can inform practice, to a recognition that theory can and should be generated through practice.” Put another way, in Eriksson and Kovalainen’s (2008h) words, often action research is not guided by theoretical interests, but by practical needs instead. In this way action research generates theory through actions that are guided by theory (Susman & Evered 1978). Subsequently, the output of action research includes both actions in practice, as well as knowledge (Coughlan & Coughlan 2002).

This research study is no exception. The purpose of this research is to support and develop Inland Design, from a strategic perspective. Early notions of the scope for that support and development change very quickly as strategic problems for Inland emerge. Initially, the researcher thinks to use Strategy-as-Practice literature as a theoretical lens, but as problems of organizational legitimacy begin to unfold, those problems themselves, in practice, guide the research toward a literature and theory that could guide change: namely organizational legitimacy. Action research enables both understanding and learning from processes of change (Coughlan & Coughlan 2002), and thus is particularly suited for this case, as the

formation of a new organization and its subsequent legitimacy-building is very much an evolving process of change over time.

4.1.2 Iterative Cycles

Parallel to the iterative cycles of design thinking, action research is characterized by iterative cycles of planning, action, observation, and reflection (see Figure 8 below). Coughlan and Coughlan (2002) describe this as both “a sequence of events and an approach to problem solving.” While various authors of action research define the phases with their own terms (e.g. Susman & Evered’s (1978) 5 phases: diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating, and specifying learning; Coughlan & Coughlan’s (2002) 6 steps: data gathering, data feedback, data analysis, action planning, implementation, and evaluation), they all maintain the same key characteristics. First, there is a key role for planning the action to be taken. Second, taking action and implementing that plan. Third, observing and evaluating the unfolding results of the action. Fourth and finally, reflecting on the whole process, and thus guiding future action.




Figure 8: Adapted from Altrichter et alia's (2002) *Spirals of Action Research Cycles*

It is important to point out the critical role of reflection in this process. Reflection is a key component of all the author's views of the cyclical process, emphasizing both the individual role of self-reflection, as well as the role of group reflection (Altrichter et al. 2002; Coughlan and Coughlan 2002; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). In Altrichter et alia's (2002) “working definition of action research,” reflection is such a critical element to their definition that it shows up in five out of ten definition points. Reflection or *monitoring*, as it's referred to by Coughlan and Coughlan (2002), is critical for the continuous learning of the organization, and driving the group towards solutions. To these authors, it is not represented by a step in the cycle, but instead as a meta-step occurring throughout every step of the cycle.

As an intern and action researcher within the Inland Design organization, the researcher's role is to focus on the strategy of the organization, particularly with a lens on legitimization, and by means of strategic action interventions. Action research cycles are used both for the overall research strategy, as well as for the action interventions themselves. By continuously observing, reflecting, and documenting the happenings within Inland Design, the research

plan is iterated and revised throughout the research. The action interventions proceed in the same way; interventions progress based on the available data at the time. The results of testing those interventions thus lead to new findings, new understanding of the problem, and further new interventions. The information is never complete, but instead it is the best known at the time, and thus this research employs an abductive approach. Based on the known problems and needs, best guess action interventions are brainstormed and employed collaboratively with the Inland team.

4.1.3 Grounded Theory in Action Research

Baskerville and Pries-Heje (1999) take the iterative cycles of action research one step further by combining the analytical and theoretical development methods from grounded theory. They suggest that action research studies can be improved, refined, and made more rigorous with the help of grounded theory's meticulous approach to data collection, analysis, and subsequent theoretical development (Baskerville & Pries-Heje 1999).

Like action research, grounded theory has origins in the social sciences, and was developed by Glaser and Strauss from the 1960s (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008g; Lingard et al. 2008). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008g) describe the main distinction between grounded theory and other types of research theory, whereby in grounded theory research the theory develops or evolves during the research itself. Strauss and Corbin (1990 In: Baskerville & Pries-Heje 1999) clarify this distinction,

... [The grounded theory] method does not begin with a theory, and then seek proof. Instead, it begins with an area of study and allows the relevant theory to emerge from that area.

According to Lingard et alia (2008), this theoretical generation and evolution are outcomes of iterative research study designs, subsequent purposeful research sampling, and constant comparative analysis. First and foremost, both action research and grounded theory are built upon iterative cycles of data collection and data analysis, which then informs the next iteration of action (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008g; Lingard et al. 2008). Particularly that overlapping relationship between data collection and analysis is emphasized in grounded theory by giving it, "specific procedural and rather formal form" (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008g). Consecutive cycles of data collection and analysis lead to future *purposeful research sampling*, where the data collection process is adapted in order to seek insight on emerging theories (Lingard et al. 2008). Finally, data is analyzed with *constant comparison*, whereby as issues are noted in the data, they are compared with the rest of the data for similarities and differences. Through this process, theory is constantly refined to cut to the true heart of an issue, rather than simply testing a hypothesis.

Lingard et alia (2008) point out grounded theory's usefulness when studying, "social interactions or experiences [and when it] aims to explain a process." Furthermore, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008g) discuss its suitability in organizational theory, as grounded theory

enables the study of complexity in context and connects to organizational practices and actions. Moreover, Baskerville and Pries-Heje (1999) identify how grounded action research is especially suited for studying organizational change. For all of these reasons, grounded action research is used in this study.

4.1.4 Role of the Action Researcher

Often, the differences between the researcher and management consultant diminish and even disappear, as academic research is geared towards achieving understanding of the real-life problems related to business activities and producing change processes and solutions for these problems. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h)

The action researcher can often be seen as one of helper, facilitator, or even consultant. Action research requires active involvement in the actual problems facing the researched group, and an action orientation to help solve them. Thus the researcher must be integrated into the researched community in a deep and meaningful way in order to have the access required within the organization, as well as with relevant critical stakeholders. The researcher does not act alone or study alone, instead working collaboratively and collectively with the members of the researched group. (Coughlan and Coughlan 2002; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h)

For this research study, the researcher is employed by Inland Design as a Service Design Intern/Master's Thesis Worker. The researcher takes on all three roles described above plus one more: helper, facilitator, consultant, as well as designer. In the early months of the work and research, the researcher mostly played the role of helper, in order to get to know the context and situation of Inland Design at the time. As the researcher led various strategic action interventions with Inland, she played the role of designer and facilitator, facilitating workshops, discussions, and continued actions from workshop reflections. Finally, as the researcher established an understanding for the overall organizational context, and particularly the challenges Inland faced, she began to play the role of design and strategy consultant, providing insight, advice, tools, and methods from previous experience as well as from literature.

The action researcher's time frame is also a critical element to consider. Action research requires a level of depth and understanding in an organization that takes time to develop. This depends greatly on the needs of the organization (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). With time in the organization, comes trust from all the key stakeholders, enabling truly collaborative actions and reflective learning (Brydon-Miller et al. 2003). For this research study, the researcher becomes an official member of the Inland Design team for five months. This time frame makes for an intensive period of study and work, but truly enables trust to build within the team, and the ability to get a deep understanding of the team, and the dynamics at play in the broader Migri organization.

The action researcher can employ three different types of inquiry, as defined by Schein (1999) in Coughlan and Coughlan (2002). First, *pure* inquiry is where the researcher takes a neutral stance, focused on listening and asking questions to uncover the sequence of happenings, and to probe for more details. Second, *exploratory diagnostic inquiry* is a bit more sophisticated, whereby the researcher attempts to manage the analysis process by others, through coaching questions that probe into team member's feelings, why they think something happened, their role in the happenings, and what they could or will do in the future. Third, *confrontive inquiry* involves the researcher sharing their knowledge on content, tools, and processes, and challenges others to use another perspective. Here, inquiry often comes in the form of suggestions or questions encouraging others to think of trying new approaches or new solutions. (Coughlan & Coughlan 2002)

Coughlan & Coughlan (2002) describe how these different types of inquiry help facilitate the skill development of the researcher, as all three types of inquiry are needed in the cyclical action research processes of identifying problems, creating hypotheses for solutions, planning and implementing actions, and managing the evaluation, assessment, and reflection of those actions. Furthermore, action research and the above inquiry facilitate growth and development of the researched group as well (Susman & Evered 1978). Moreover, "action researchers are themselves instruments in the generation of data," as the authors astutely say. Thus, it is important to remember that the inquiry conducted by the researcher, as well as her inherent listening and self-awareness characteristics have an effect on the research data generated. In this research study, the researcher uses all three levels of inquiry at different times (although not necessarily consciously), based on the situation.

While it critical to acknowledge the role and influence of the researcher in action research, it is equally important to acknowledge the co-created and co-generated knowledge of the group in action research. Unlike some other forms of qualitative research, in action research the researcher participates in the team, and in the data that she gathers. Thus, the researcher alone does not generate knowledge or data, but knowledge and data evolve collaboratively. Thus, while it is important in action research in business studies to discuss the individual role of the researcher, it is not to suggest the researcher acts alone.

4.1.5 Critique

Action research is not without critique, and there remain "many unanswered questions and many unresolved debates" (Brydon-Miller et al. 2003) about the approach. Critique of action research often refers to the inability to draw conclusions from the findings of action research due the local nature of the research, the inability to scale results, and the argument for the inapplicability of practical problem solving in business research (e.g. Brydon-Miller et al. 2003; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h; Gustavsen, Hansson, Qvale, 2011).

First, action research critics discuss the local nature and scalability of results. Gustavsen et alia (2011) refer to the case and context-centricity, "the problem is that action research is

dependent upon working with specific people in specific contexts.” Additionally, Brydon-Miller et alia (2003) point out the difficulty in affecting large-scale change, as action research often is applied only at very small local levels. Second, the validity of action research is often questioned in business research, due to the connection with practical problem solving, versus broadly generalizable theory building (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). As such, action research is a rare and even controversial research methodology in business studies.

While, there still remain questions of scalability, applicability of results beyond the studied case, and even more philosophically about the validity of practice in research, one thing is certain; action research contributes to the real world in a physical versus theoretical way. Action research is positioned to understand, deeply, the context of organizations today. In the case of this research, government design labs are still an incredibly new phenomenon. There is certainly a contextual nature to the scalability of one lab’s success or failure to another, depending on the scope of the lab, the political context the lab resides in, and even the individuals involved in the lab. The future of design in the public sector can only benefit from the type of results shared in this research study, combining theory and actually putting it into practice, and diving into the subsequent messiness to see what happens. Just as the public sector leans to embrace new ways of working (i.e. design), so too must the scientific area embrace new ways of research.

4.2 Data Collection Methods

Action research in itself is not a research method, but instead an approach that borrows from a variety of methods. Due to its action-oriented problem solving nature, there is significant data created and knowledge generated through practical action, and the observations and reflections therein. Additionally, interviews are commonly used in order to capture learning and insight from the parties involved. Finally, much of the knowledge from that action comes in the form of reflection, both collaboratively as well as individually. In this research study, knowledge about Inland Design, their legitimization practices and strategies, and the opportunities therein best come from this variety of sources.

The aim of this research is to investigate legitimacy-building and -breaking practices within Inland Design, thus aiming to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What practices helped and/or hindered the organizational legitimacy during the early stages of Inland Design in Migri?

RQ2: What strategic interventions support the organizational legitimacy of new design labs in the public sector?

4.2.1 Action Interventions

As the name Action Research suggests, *actions* taken are one of the most important sources of data in action research. While referred to by different names in different texts (Susman &

Evered 1978; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h), this research refers to such actions as strategic action interventions. Susman and Evered (1978) skillfully define action interventions:

...Acts of communication between two or more self-reflecting subjects, requiring mutual understanding of the meaning of the acts and common consent as to their presumed consequences. Such interventions have an element of surprise and unexpectedness to them so that they are unlike other actions routinely undertake within the organization.

The elements of surprise and unexpectedness harken back to the inquisitive role of the action researcher - probing for more information, managing analysis and reflection, and challenging new perspectives and approaches. Often these processes are mediated via communication practices in various forms. (Susman & Evered 1978)

During the research period, many such actions are taken, both small and large. For the purposes of this research study, six strategic action interventions are highlighted that support the research question of legitimacy-making in Inland Design. As these six strategic action interventions make up such an important part of empirical data gathering, they are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Per Coughlan and Coughlan's (2002) advice on action research reporting, Chapter 5 formally describes the story, as well as the outcomes, for each of the action interventions. Table 1 below summarizes the action interventions. The first column provides an abbreviation for the intervention, the second provides the name, and finally the third column gives details on the timing of the action intervention. To help guide the reader, excerpts from the strategic action interventions are listed in *blue italic text* with the respective action intervention abbreviation in brackets.

Table 1: Summary of Strategic Action Interventions

Strategic Action Intervention Abbreviation	Name	Date / Time Period (all in 2018)
SAI 1	Network of Designers in Immigration	Research: January - February Then 1-2 meetings/month March - June
SAI 2	Inland's Strategy on a Page (SOAP)	Workshop: 21 February Then ongoing work March - June
SAI 3	Inland's Strategic Identity	Work: March - April
SAI 4	Establishing Middle Manager Buy-in	Workshop: 17 April
SAI 5	Lunch & Learn	4 sessions occurring on: 24 April, 27 April, 18 May, and 1 June
SAI 6	Long Range Strategic Planning	Workshop: 25 May

4.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews

Qualitative interviews, as used in scholarly research, are research vehicles, the purpose of which is to produce empirical materials for the study in question. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008d)

In order to gain understanding about legitimization practices for design labs in the public sector, this research leverages semi-structured interviews with various parties from inside and outside Migri. Semi-structured interviews involve a structured and systematic approach to interviewing, while allowing some freedom in the interview. All interviews leverage a formal guide of questions prepared in advance, but interview questions are conducted in an open manner, to enable deep exploration of the interviewee's perspectives on a topic. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008d)

Interviews are conducted with seven participants. Table 2 below provides a summary of the interviews and interviewees, including: the interview abbreviation, the date of the interview, the research phase of the interview, the role of the interviewee, the interviewee's organization, as well as the time they have worked at their organization. Due to the iterative nature of this research, there are three phases of research that are conducted via interviews. First, phase I: *Founder* interviews focus on Inland's history, Inland and Migri's strategy, and tacit organizational knowledge on culture and legitimation. This information provides a critical foundation of understanding, as the Inland team seeks to gain credibility and legitimacy within the broader Migri organization. This information is sought from the two founders of Inland Design (see I1 & I3 in Table 2), as they were a part of Inland since initiation.

Table 2: Summary of Interviews

Interview Abbreviation	Date (in 2008)	Interview Research Phase	Role	Org.	Time at Org.
I1	13 Feb	I: Founder	Chief Digital Officer	Migri	13 years
I2	28 Feb	II: Legitimation	Deputy Director General (Apulaispäälikkö in Finnish)	Migri	1.5 years
I3	5 March	I: Founder	Former Director, Inland Design	Migri	11.5 years
I4	16 March	II: Legitimation	Head of Governance Innovation	Demos Helsinki	5 years
I5	26 March	II: Legitimation	Strategy & Organizational Change Consultant	Anonymous	8 years
I6	28 May	III: Action Analysis	Design Director	Migri	10 months
I7	28 May	III: Action Analysis	Design & Prototyping Lead	Migri	10 months

Second, phase II: *Legitimation* interviews focus on legitimation specifically. These interviews are conducted with individuals both internal and external to the Migri organization, seeking expertise in strategy, organizational change, and government innovation. Two interviews are conducted with internal Migri employees (see I2 & I5 in Table 2), focusing on Migri's strategic practices and change management. One interview is conducted with an expert in government innovation (see I4 in Table 2), focusing on topics of building legitimacy, trust,

and credibility in government design labs. Third, phase III: *Action Analysis* interviews are conducted at the end of the research, and focus on analyzing the strategic action interventions undergone throughout the course of the research. Interviewees include the Inland team designers (see I6 & I7 in Table 2); seeking an overall reflection on the key insights gained through strategic action interventions.

Watson (2011, 212) argues that relatively structured interviews can be a great approach to enable comparison of data afterwards. Subsequently, interview guides are created for each interview phase. An identical interview guide is used for each interview in the phase, but the interviews are conducted in a semi-structured manner. This ensures that the same main topics are covered, but also allows for freedom to go “off-script” when relevant. To help guide the reader, quotes from the interviews are listed in *turquoise italic text* with the respective interview abbreviation in brackets.

4.2.3 Participant Observation

Participant observation – establishing a place in some natural setting on a relatively long-term basis in order to investigate, experience and represent the social life and social processes that occur in that setting... (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw 2001)

Based on the research question and the researcher’s role as an action researcher within Inland Design, participant observation in this thesis closely models what Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008f) describe as the complete immersion form, “sharing the everyday life and activities of the people in the chosen setting.” This is not accomplished by briefly popping in and out of a few meetings, but by truly embedding oneself within the organization. Unlike the popular image of a researcher standing in a corner quietly peering over her clipboard, this form of observation is full-body, whereby the researcher sits at the table, is engaged in the conversation, makes relationships, and provides input (Watson 2011, 206).

It is important to carry out participant observation in the crucial settings where work is done. The researcher works in the Inland Design offices within the Migri premises, and moves with the team and the whole of Migri during the ensuing office move that takes place during this research. The researcher has her own desk in the Inland offices, uses the design workshop spaces and tools, and thus works alongside the whole Inland team. This setting alone helps to elucidate how Inland operates, and how the spaces, the artifacts, and the individuals within them contribute to the strategy and legitimization process on a daily basis.

The researcher works together with the designers in Inland to drive the strategic agenda for the team. This involves working together formally, casually, in person, and virtually to discuss, brainstorm, design, implement, test, modify, and analyze strategic interventions for the team.

It is important for the researcher to participate in meetings and discussions where organizational strategy, legitimacy, credibility, and trust are discussed. The researcher participates in as many meetings as possible involving the Inland team, the Inland managers, all strategy-related meetings or discussions, and myriad ad hoc meetings, discussions, and workshops. One particularly relevant meeting for this research is the Inland advisory board meeting taking place on June 14, 2018. Due to the extreme relevance of the conversations in that meeting, paraphrased quotations are captured from the discussions of the advisory board members. Advisory board meeting attendees are summarized in Table 3 below. To help guide the reader, paraphrased quotations from the advisory board meeting are listed in *red italic text* with the respective advisory board member abbreviation in brackets.

Table 3: Inland Advisory Board Members Present in June 14, 2018 Meeting

Advisory Board Member Abbreviation	Role	Organization
AB1	Head of Design Education; Professor	Aalto University
AB2	Head of Governance Innovation	Demos Helsinki
AB3	Lead Service Designer	Hellon
AB4	Chief Digital Officer; Head of Digitalization Division	D9, Valtiokonttori (Finland State Treasury)
AB5	Executive Director	Open Knowledge Finland
AB6	Business Development Director	Barona Logistics
AB7	Director	Migri
AB8	Head of Development Unit, E-services	Migri
AB9	Design Director, Inland	Migri
AB10	Design & Prototyping Lead, Inland	Migri

Field Notes

...Participant observation involves not only gaining access to and immersing oneself in new social worlds, but also producing written accounts and descriptions that bring versions of these worlds to others. (Emerson et al. 2001)

At their core, field notes are simply a written collection of observations and personal reflections concerning the field of research (Emerson et al. 2001). As it pertains to action research, field notes (i.e. *journal keeping*) provide “significant mechanisms for developing reflective skills” required by action research (Coughlan & Coughlan 2002). Keeping field notes or a journal assists the researcher in methodically noting and reflecting on day-to-day interactions and observations, and eventually provides a tool for analysis:

Rather, composed day-by-day, open-endedly, with changing and new directions, fieldnotes are an expression of the ethnographer's deepening local knowledge,

emerging sensitivities, and evolving substantive concerns and theoretical insights. (Emerson et al. 2001)

There is no prescriptive approach for how to take field notes, but instead they take whatever form allows the researcher to get their thoughts on paper (Emerson et al. 2001). Subsequently they are generally indecipherable by any other reader, hurried, and uncensored. Emerson et alia (2001) describe how field notes progress from mental notes to hurried jotted notes, to eventually full field notes. Finally, according to Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008d), observations may include the following: “What happens, action and behavior, verbal communication, non-verbal communication, and what does not happen.”

For this research study, field notes play an important role in gathering empirical data from the participant observation process. The researcher keeps a chronological log of field notes. Initially jotted notes are hand-written in notebooks, and then later transcribed into Microsoft OneNote as full field notes. These field notes capture observations from in the field, recalled events, as well as the researcher’s own reflections and reactions. In order to aid the later process of analysis, the researcher differentiates observational notes from personal reactions and reflections. To help guide the reader, excerpts from field notes and participant observation are listed in *purple italic text* with the date of the notes in brackets.

4.3 Data Analysis

Through the analysis of empirical data, this study aims to uncover what practices, actions, tools, and methods help or hinder the building of organizational legitimacy in a traditional public sector environment. This research leverages various analysis methods, both individual as well as collaborative, that pull from both the business research and design research traditions. In keeping with the action research and grounded theory orientations of this research, analysis occurs throughout the research process. Analysis is built into not only the iterative strategic action intervention cycles, but the whole process of actions, interviews, and observations. As Baskerville and Pries-Heje (1999) demonstrate, this type of constant analysis informs future actions and interviews that take place in the research, and thus enable learning, and the evolution of the theoretical frame.

Additionally, coding methodology from grounded theory supports the analysis of findings from all research methods. Grounded theory suggests that this coding process occurs throughout the research process. This is very similar to recommendations by ethnographic authors (e.g. Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008f; Watson 2011, 214), about continuous review and reading of data, seeking patterns, deeper meanings, and the “how things work.” However, the coding process of grounded research brings more rigor to the process of analysis.

In addition, other analytical methods are used as well. One source of methods that is particularly suited to collaborative research analysis methods is the school of design. As the design thinking literature has elucidated, design thinking methods and practices are

especially adept at involving users throughout the entire process of design and thus solving the problems and meeting the needs of a user/client/customer. Kumar (2013) presents 101 different methods that can be used throughout the design process in his book *101 Design Methods*. In particular, Kumar's (2013) Chapter Four: Framing Insights brings a new arsenal of analytical tools to the business action researcher. These framing insights methods focus on using,

...A mix of different kinds of methods in order to gain multiple perspectives on the context for a fuller understanding... [which] help us move to the next mode for exploring concepts and framing solutions. (Kumar 2013, 11)

This approach and goal is highly applicable to the problem-solving orientation of action research. Berg (2004, 200) reminds action researchers that the key to data analysis in action research is to “[examine] the data in relation to potential resolutions to the questions or problems identified during the first stage of the research process.” As such, analytical methods for this research borrow from the toolkits of both the traditional business researcher, as well as the designer.

4.3.1 Analysis Plan

The data analysis for this research occurs throughout the process, as is typical of both action research and grounded theory. The process is iterative and non-linear, as well as both collaborative and individual. As data is collected, findings emerge, and subsequently inform the whole process, thus revising the research questions, the key opportunities, and the actions to be taken. Similarly, the result of actions taken and feedback on those actions inform future actions. Moreover, a constant comparison of findings from interviews or observations informs emerging concepts, which informs further research design. This research is not lacking a starting question or plan, but it certainly changes dramatically as the research progresses.

Organization is one of the key elements of the analysis plan. Therefore all research, literature, interview information, field notes, photos, and any other data used in this study are stored in an organized manner, leveraging online tools to keep files synced (e.g. Google Drive, Microsoft OneNote). Additionally, Inland Design's own online tools are used for the creation of strategic action intervention plans, proposals, visualizations of results, and any other intervention-related materials. These tools make up the case record for this study, where all of the raw and edited findings from the research can easily be found, as recommended by Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008e).

Grounded Theory Coding

The coding methodology of grounded theory is highly rigorous and systematic, and acts as the most important feature in grounded theory research. Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008g) suggest that the coding process in grounded theory supports the researcher moving from

“description to prescription.” It is through immersion in the data and multiple rounds of coding that “aha moments” can be uncovered. There are three steps in the grounded theory and grounded action research coding process, as depicted in Figure 9 below (Baskerville & Pries-Heje 1999; Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008g).




Figure 9: Adapted from Baskerville & Pries-Heje's (1999) *Overview of the Coding Process*

Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008g) describe the first data classification of grounded theory coding as *open coding*. Open coding breaks down the line-by-line data from the interviews, observations, and interactions (i.e. the *saying & doing* pictured in blue in Figure 9) into key *concepts* (shown in red in Figure 9). In this research, the process of open coding is facilitated by the POINT analysis method (forthcoming). Every line of interview text is read and categorized into an analysis of the happenings: problems, opportunities, insights, needs, and themes.

Second, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008g) describe *axial coding* which leads to a higher abstraction of the data, leading to broad *categories* (shown in green in Figure 9). Axial coding requires detailed analysis of one category at a time, thus forming the data together in new ways, in order to unearth previously unseen similarities and differences. In this research, the comparison between POINT analyses of the interviews and observations helps facilitate the axial coding process.

Third, Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008g) describe *selective coding*, whereby categories are integrated in order to discover the *core category* (shown in dark grey in Figure 9) or, “the focus around which all other categories are integrated.” In this research, it is through this selective coding process that the core category of legitimization is unearthed.

POINT Analysis Method

One of the tools used to analyze data in this research study, is borrowed from the design discipline - the POINT analysis method. The POINT analysis method is a framework that enables reflection on data collected via five categories: problems, opportunities, insights, needs, and themes. The method was inspired by existing IDEO-U content, which suggested

that observation and interview data be parsed into **p**roblems and **o**pportunities. Martin Bontoft (with colleagues at IDEO London at that time) realized that in fact **i**nsights, **n**eeds, and patterns (**t**hemes) were also critical elements he and fellow designers sought in the data. The resulting POINT analysis method was later incorporated into London's IDEO-U curriculum and workshops conducted by Bontoft and his colleagues (M. Bontoft, personal communication, 6 June, 2018). Since then, the method has been adopted and adapted by practitioners around the world (e.g. the P.O.I.N.T.S./T.I.S.I. model in the Social Innovation Lab Kent's online Method Deck (SILK 2008); the Exercise 7: P.N.S.T.I.O. framework in the ArtCenter College of Design's *Systematic Analysis Methods for Research* guide (Bennett 2015); and the method is taught by Juha Kronqvist (2016) during his "Empathy Block: Making Sense of Data" in Aalto University's *Design for Government* course).

Through the researcher's experience, this is a very powerful method to extract all five categories (i.e. problems, opportunities, insights, needs, and themes), but particularly for extracting themes from diverse and disparate data. Subsequently, all field notes and interviews are initially analyzed with this method by the researcher individually. First, the analysis takes place in an analogue form, writing findings down on color-coded Post It notes to visually distinguish problems, opportunities, insights, needs, and themes. Second, these are digitized in an adapted form of a Kumar's (2013, 184-186) *Summary Framework* method.

Summary Framework Method

The [summary] framework provides a concise summary of what activities took place, the insights gained from each one, and what these findings indicate about opportunities for the future. (Kumar 2013, 185)

Kumar's (2013, 185) Summary Framework Method provides a methodical approach to assessing the findings and insights from multiple sources of data collection in a design project. For this research study themes and insights are captured in a summary framework, summarizing results from all action interventions, interviews, and field notes.

4.3.2 Analysis of Strategic Action Interventions

One of the defining features of action research is that data analysis is done together with the research group. Unlike traditional forms of business research, where data analysis is done individually by the researcher, in action research it is collaborative in nature, and democratically done with all key research stakeholders (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h). In fact this collaborative analysis element is often seen as critical for the success of an action research study. A symptom of the iterative and reflective nature of the action research strategy, analysis is also done perpetually throughout the study.

The problem-solving oriented iterative cycles of action intervention and reflection force an element of continued analysis. Therefore, there are not clear cut phases between data collection and data analysis, where the phase of data collection ends, and thus begins the

phase of data analysis. Instead, the two phases are interwoven and analysis occurs through the entire research process (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008e; 2008f). While this is not an easy task to undertake, Eisenhardt (1989, 538) recommends that field notes can be a great tool to assist with this process. For this study, field notes are taken throughout the study, and act as a record of the proceedings of the strategic action interventions, as well as a chronological diary of outcomes, outputs, and reflections from those actions.

As the strategic action interventions themselves function as experiments, from a design thinking perspective, analysis also occurs collaboratively through the testing of those experiments: What worked? What did not work? How should we refine our prototype and try again? This analysis is captured in the moment in the act of conducting experiments and interventions, for the purposes of redefining the problem, ideating based on new insights, refining solutions and prototypes, and iteratively testing them again. This analysis is informal and a part of the day-to-day activities in action research.

Strategic Action Intervention Analysis via Semi-structured Interviews

A formal analysis process also takes place at the end of the research process, by means of the aforementioned phase III: Action Analysis interviews with Inland's designers. These interviews provide a more formal analysis after the bulk of the research is complete to retroactively reflect on the key insights throughout the action research, what worked, and what did not work strategically for Inland. The Action Analysis interviews leverage the Strategic Action Intervention - Analysis Canvas (see Appendix G) as the interview guide. Per Eriksson and Kovalainen's (2008h) advice, these action intervention analysis interviews also function as an "assessment of the quality of the action research" project as a whole.

4.3.3 Analysis of Semi-structured Interviews

In order to aid the interview analysis, interviews are recorded and transcribed with the assistance of the OTranscribe online tool (Bentley, n.d.). Interview transcripts are then analyzed in various stages. First, transcripts are organized and cleaned up to distinguish questions from answers. Second, transcripts are analyzed more methodically, using the aforementioned POINT analysis method. The goal of this analysis is to capture any major themes or opportunities from the interview that might have an impact on the current state of Inland's affairs, and to support the coding process in unearthing key concepts. In comparing the categories from POINT analyses, this supports the coding process in finding the core categories that make up the theoretical framework for this research.

4.3.4 Analysis of Field Notes

Analysis takes place in the very act of making field notes, as well as in the meta-step of analyzing them as a whole. Separate phases of field notes analysis occur throughout this research. At various intervals throughout the research, the researcher reviews the field notes

as a whole, seeking themes and insights into deeper understanding. Similar to above, this first analysis produces the concepts for coding. Those concepts, when compared with the results of actions and interviews, inform overall categories. Finally, at the end of the research period, the researcher uses the aforementioned POINT Analysis method followed by the Summary Framework method to analyze the field notes as a whole. A final round of analysis occurs, applying the same coding and keyword methodology leveraged above.

4.4 Validity & Ethical Concerns

Validity and ethical concerns are a critical element of any research, and in particular in action research. The proximity to the research community and the embeddedness therein, require the researcher to proactively plan for and stay aware of validity and ethical considerations.

4.4.1 Validity

Validity is a particularly contentious and thus important consideration in action research. Common concerns about validity in action research include the study's transferability, credibility, and trustworthiness (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller 2014). Moreover, the aforementioned critique about the proximity of action research to consulting, make it more important than ever in business action research to consider the validity (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h).

Coghlan and Brydon-Miller (2014) identify five types of action research-specific validity, which are summarized in Appendix H. While it may be quite difficult to achieve or prove the same level of replicability as a quantitative research study for example, what is most important in action research validity is the real-world relevance. According to the authors, first *catalytic validity* produces change or transformation. Second *outcome validity* leads to action. Third *process validity* helps achieve goals by the use of appropriate processes and tools. Fourth, *dialogic validity* leads to critical discussion between stakeholders. Fifth, *democratic validity* enables collaborative stakeholder involvement. (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller 2014)

There are six steps that Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008h) recommend to increase the validity of action research. First, they recommend an explicit statement by the researcher on their role and aims for the researcher. Second, justifying the need for action research is encouraged. Third, they suggest distinctly outlining the goals of the research project. Fourth, they encourage explicitly disclosing the researcher's interpretations and opinions, and the effect this had on the research. Fifth, the authors propose detailing the action interventions, change processes, and subsequent learnings throughout the project. Sixth and finally, they recommend acknowledging the complexity of the action research and subsequent intended and unintended consequences. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008h)

4.4.2 Ethical Considerations

Part spy, part voyeur, part fan, and part member... (van Maanen 1988)

Van Maanen's (1988) description of the role of the ethnographic researcher above provides an accurate and visceral description of the role of researcher in this study. It is especially fitting when considering the ethical elements of the many roles played by the researcher: master's thesis researcher, service design intern, strategist, facilitator, supporter, collaborator, partner, coach, and coordinator at Inland (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008h). Based on the proximity in this research to immigrants, and work that impacts individuals at such a critical life stage, it is imperative to pay close attention to ethical concerns with all individuals involved in this research. Borrowing and adapting from Murphy and Dingwall (2001), the following ethical guidelines are employed for this research:

- Non-Maleficence: Do no harm
- Beneficence: Do some positive good
- Autonomy & Self-determination: Respect the values and desires of research participants
- Justice: Treat people equally

Specifically, where interviews are involved, the following ethical guidelines prevail:

- Ensure participation in this research is on a voluntary basis
- Gain informed consent & use consent forms
- Ensure all participants have the option to protect their identities
- Set proper expectations with all interviewees about the recording and use of interview data
- Inform all participants that they can stop an interview at any time, not answer a question for any reason, as well as withdraw their participation at any time, for any reason

As it pertains to action research and the role of being a participant observer inside an organization, one of the most important ethical considerations is ensuring there is voluntary and informed consent (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008c). The researcher must be very clear about the ethical ramifications of how, with whom, and to what extent they seek explicit consent. For this research study, the researcher is officially hired for a Master's Thesis position inside Migri, and thus theoretically the role of a researcher is transparent. However, that does not necessarily mean that any and every individual she comes into contact with volunteers or concedes to be studied. Thus, for this research, data is only used from interactions with the Inland team and managers, official interviews, and casual discussions where it is made clear in advance the role as a master's thesis researcher. Observations are not used or collected from explicitly or implicitly confidential conversations, social interactions, or interactions entirely out of scope for this research. However, as an action

researcher, it is important to acknowledge the indirect effect these “out of scope” observations have on potentially influencing observations and analysis indirectly.

When it comes to data collected via site documents, it is important to gain explicit approval from the researcher’s supervisor to use any document that is not public knowledge, as per Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008f). For this research study, the paid position inside Migri makes for a position of privileged information, having access to documents and details while working in Inland, and thus it is even more important to ensure permission is granted for everything that is not publicly available.

Another critical ethical element for consideration in this research is addressing the inherent bias in the research. Susman and Evered (1978) say it well that, “The researcher is necessarily a part of the data he or she helps generate.” Subsequently, it is essential to acknowledge the role the researcher plays in the data generated, and their inherent impartiality. In order to address this, one needs to acknowledge it, but also create strategies to avoid it.

5 Strategic Action Interventions

While this research uses multiple sources for empirical data, one of the most valuable sources is the action interventions carried out by the researcher, collaboratively with the Inland team. This research seeks to examine the building of organizational legitimacy, via these research questions:

RQ1: What practices helped and/or hindered the organizational legitimacy during the early stages of Inland Design in Migri?

RQ2: What strategic interventions support the organizational legitimacy of new design labs in the public sector?

Action interventions for Inland Design in this research proceed in an emergent manner. Each of the strategic action interventions is the result of collaborative, iterative, emergent needs of the Inland team. This is consistent with the action research iterative cycles of plan, act, observe, and reflect. Six specific strategic action interventions were carried out during this research study. Figure 10 visualizes the six interventions in their iterative cycles of plan > act > observe > reflect. The blue arrows depict the movement from reflections and learnings of one action to the revised planning of the next action.

It is important to point out that these actions were not necessarily linear, meaning that one action completes and then the next action begins, nor were they equal in time and effort. Figure 11 shows a timeline of the six action interventions. The figure illustrates when work took place in time, horizontally next to each strategic action intervention. As Figure 11 shows, some of the action interventions lasted the length of the research study (e.g. Inland's Strategy on a Page), while others were short, one-time activities (e.g. Establishing Mid-



Figure 10: Iterative action research cycles – Strategic action interventions at Inland

Manager Buy-in, Long Range Strategic Planning). Additionally Figure 11 depicts the amount of work/effort that each strategic action intervention required by the color (See Figure 11's Legend: dark blue = high effort, medium blue = medium effort, light blue = low effort). For example, the first row in Figure 11 shows that the Network of Designers in Immigration action entailed a high work effort in January and February, and then tapered off to short bursts of activity roughly once a month thereafter. Next, Inland's Strategy on a Page, required a high work effort initially in February, and then continued throughout the research study, but with much less effort required.




Figure 11: Timeline of strategic action interventions

Another important caveat to mention is that concurrently while all of these actions were taking place, parallel actions were taking place by the whole Inland team. Thus the following chapter is not a holistic picture of all actions and interactions within Inland at the time. Instead this chapter includes the subset of actions facilitated by the researcher, in very close collaboration and cooperation with the entire Inland team.

This chapter describes the specific action interventions that were carried out, detailing: the background for each intervention, the concept of the intervention, relevant research, and more detail about the intervention itself. The first section describes the intervention to build a network of designers in immigration. The second section details the intervention to talk strategy in Migri's language, building Inland's strategy on a page. The third section outlines the work to build Inland's strategic identity, including vision, mission, and manifesto. The fourth section details the intervention to build Migri middle manager buy-in of Inland. The fifth section describes using lunch as a strategic tool to learn about and get to know key stakeholders. The sixth section details the intervention to workshop Inland's long range strategic plan for success. Finally, the seventh section concludes this chapter by visually summarizing the progression of strategic action interventions of this study.

5.1 Network of Designers in Immigration

New kinds of strategies emerge from collaborative contacts between organizations. Firms cannot avoid learning and borrowing when they trade and work together. (Mintzberg & Lampel 1999)

5.1.1 Background: Network for Collaboration

As a new design lab in the Finnish Immigration Service, Inland had begun to join various networks for design and service design in government including a Finnish service designers in government group, and the UK-hosted International Design in Government community. These networks enable connection, sharing, and learning. However, Inland sought to find and connect with other designers specifically in immigration roles around the world. The hope was that a network of immigration designers specifically would enable best practice and knowledge sharing, and potentially collaboration across other immigration agencies.

5.1.2 Concept: Build a Network of Designers in Immigration

This concept was driven by the following *How Might We* questions:

- How might we connect with and build a network of other designers in immigration-specific public sector organizations globally?
- How might we share and learn from each other?
- How might we collaborate to support each other's efforts?

The hypothesis was that designers in government innovation labs, and specifically those in immigration services, face similar challenges and hurdles. By connecting with each other, we could learn from each other, share best practices, leverage tools and methods, and support each other.

5.1.3 Research: Is Anybody Out There?

The researcher conducted practical research to find other designers in government and in particular, in immigration. This research initially began online and eventually became a large physical map on the researcher's wall to map the findings (see Figure 12).

Research was conducted online to identify design labs in government around the world. Very quickly it became clear that without a very refined scope, this would become a huge task. Additionally, various efforts have been made previously to map the landscape of design labs, for example Selloni and Staszowski's (2013) *Gov Innovation Labs Constellation 1.0*. Thus, mapping all innovation and design labs became unnecessary.

Concurrently with online research, an email was sent through the European Migration Network (EMN), seeking other design or innovation-oriented teams within the network of migration organizations. The EMN is an organization within the European Commission

whose role is to disseminate up-to-date and reliable information on the state of migration and asylum (European Commission 2018). This email yielded five EU countries that have design or innovation teams in their migration services. We discovered that the few design/innovation teams in immigration were themselves all quite different. In some cases designers are embedded all around the government, rather than being centralized in a lab. In other cases, the innovation teams did not include designers at all. Perhaps our initial scope seeking only designers needed updating.

Figure 12: Map of innovation/design organizations in immigration

5.1.4 Intervention: Connecting

Through contacts gained via the EMN, Inland started to establish one-on-one connections with six innovation and design labs around Europe and North America. These connections led to online calls to get to know each other and share work. In the case of one particular country, an in-person meeting was arranged in April, 2018. The researcher and one of the designers from Inland travelled to their immigration office for a two-day exchange, focusing on sharing, networking, and collaborating.

community call on January 29, 2018. Additionally, Inland co-hosted an immigration-specific workshop at the GovDesign conference in London in July 2018 (Kane 2018) with fellow designers and innovators in immigration from seven countries.

As Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) say, “Firms cannot avoid learning... when they work together.” There is nothing but good that can come from building connections around the world, and fast-forwarding learning. Regardless, there is no need to create a new network, when many fantastic networks already exist. The ultimate intervention here was to keep it simple. Simple skype sessions enabled Inland to learn from different approaches to innovation in immigration, but also created a platform to share working practices, and moreover to exchange materials from projects - whether design tools (e.g. personas, mapping tools) or service solutions (e.g. service prototypes, code). As government organizations, serving society, these immigration innovation teams are open and transparent and can thus truly support each other across borders. Various connections and exchanges already began during the time of this research, and they are scheduled to continue.

5.2 Inland's Strategy on a Page

To empathize, one needs to communicate. But executives and designers speak different languages. Executives speak the language of reliability because they put a high priority on the production of consistent, predictable outcomes... Designers speak the language of validity because they put a high priority on outcomes that delight, whether they are consistent and predictable or not... The designer must learn the language of the executive - the language of reliability. Otherwise, designers might as well be speaking Greek to an Italian audience. (Martin 2007)

5.2.1 Background: Lost in Translation

In his article, “Design and Business: Why Can't We Be Friends?” Martin (2007) describes the fundamental schism between designers and traditionally trained business executives. According to Martin, this schism comes from their education, background, and orientation. Business executives have a reliability-orientation, focused on meeting budgets and targets, and proving success in advance, often based on past results. On the other hand, designers have a validity-orientation, seeking user understanding from the beginning, and thus focusing on creating a valid solution to their needs. As such, these two groups do not often see eye to eye, nor do they speak the same language. Executives, valuing predictability, often use words like, “proof, regression analysis, certainty, best practices and deployment.” Designers, on the other hand, valuing delightful outcomes for their user, often use words like, “visualization, prototyping, beta-testing and novelty.” However, as Martin describes, these words signal “danger, uncertainty, and guesswork” to executives. Thus, it is crucial that designers learn the orientation of their organization, as well as how to speak its language. (Martin 2007)

When Migri's Digital Services team (SÄPA) hired two in-house service designers to lead service design inside of Migri, the intention was to experiment with a new skill set inside the Migri organization, and all the new ways of working and doing things that came with it. The two service design professionals joined Migri and hit the ground running with new techniques, new tools, new practices, and a whole new language - in more ways than one. Whereas the Migri organization conducts business in Finnish, Inland's working language is English. But, even more shocking to the system was a whole new arsenal of terms. See Figure 13 for a sample of the new terms that Inland introduced to Migri. Key terms used in service design include *co-design*, *design thinking*, *user research*, *experimental culture*, and many more. Whether these terms were used in English, or translated in Finnish, nonetheless, they were completely new and quite confusing to most employees inside the Migri organization.



Figure 13: Inland's "Methods" slide - How Inland does their work (source: Inland Design)

During the first months of this research, there were many examples of situations where Migri employees expressed their confusion with these new terms. It became evident that the true strategic challenge was that the Migri organization did not understand Inland, what they do, what they could do, nor most of the new terms listed above. Moreover, teams inside Migri did not see the connection between Inland and the broader Migri strategy.

5.2.2 Concept: Strategic Storytelling – Talking Strategy in Migri's Language

This concept was driven by the following *How Might We* questions:

- How might we tell our strategy in a way that aligns with the overall Migri strategy?
- How might we strategically position Inland as a strategy driver for the whole of the Migri organization (versus only supporting digital services)?

The hypothesis was that if Inland could tell their strategic story in a way that Migri already speaks, this would help the organization understand what Inland does and why. Creating a “Strategy on a Page” would help people throughout Migri to quickly see how Inland’s work aligns with the broader organizational objectives.

5.2.3 Research: The SOAP Method

The Strategy on a Page (SOAP) method is a tool the researcher picked up working at Microsoft years ago. It may not have an academic background (that the researcher is aware of), but it has a very practical background. The idea is to articulate an organization's entire strategy onto one single page. In the course of preparing for this strategic action intervention, many different approaches, interpretations, and iterations of the concept were uncovered. Tjan (2011) includes the organization’s root purpose, value proposition, target customer, and goals and metrics into his SOAP. Aubrey (2016) lists a similar set of elements, but adds core values and a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis. Finally, Gartner’s (2017) templates focus on outlining current state, desired future state, and the required actions to achieve it. Appendix J includes the adapted and modified SOAP template used for Inland.

5.2.4 Intervention: SOAP Workshop

For this intervention, the goal was to map Inland’s strategic priorities to Migri’s, and thus begin to tell Inland’s story in a language the rest of the Migri organization could understand. Additionally, the intervention sought to clarify Inland’s strategy objectives, and begin to document the plan to achieve those objectives. This was carried out through a 90-minute workshop held on February 21st, 2018. Participants included Inland’s two designers and intern, one external guest, and the workshop was facilitated by the researcher. The workshop design consisted of two consecutive activities.

Activity 1: Identify Strategic Objectives

The goal of the first activity was to identify Inland’s strategic objectives, and how they mapped into Migri’s. To accomplish this, participants were asked to first brainstorm individually (using Post It notes), and then discuss the together the following questions for each of Migri’s four strategic priorities. First, what is Inland doing in this strategic priority area? Second, what could Inland be doing for this strategic priority? During the discussion phase, participants placed their Post It notes on the whiteboard underneath each of Migri’s respective strategic objectives. Figure 14 shows the whiteboard after the discussion phase. A key finding was that many of Inland’s strategic priorities and in-process projects served many, if not all, of Migri’s strategic priorities, although we could not, necessarily create a one-to-one mapping.




Figure 14: Image of whiteboard after SOAP workshop activity 1

Activity 2: Filling out the SOAP

The goal of the second activity was to develop Inland's organizational strategy with the newly clarified strategic objectives from the previous activity. The goal was that a SOAP would help Inland to clarify and communicate what they do to the rest of the Migri organization, in a language Migri is accustomed to speaking. To accomplish this, participants were asked to move notes from the previous activity onto the SOAP template, and begin to build the SOAP collaboratively. The Inland participants decided, however, not to use Migri's strategic priorities as the strategic priorities on the SOAP, and instead to do so with Inland's terms. Figure 15 shows one workshop participant filling in Inland's priorities on the SOAP.




Figure 15: One workshop participant during SOAP

After the Workshop

The first activity of mapping Inland's work and strategic priorities to Migri's did not turn out extremely fruitful. After testing the mapping on various Migri leaders, the result (shown in Figure 16 below), was that all of Inland's priorities support all of Migri's strategic priorities - and thus, what value does this view bring? Additionally, a few managers expressed concern with Inland having differing strategic priorities from Migri, asking, "Shouldn't they be the same?" However, Inland decided that they need not have the same strategic priorities as Migri, as their projects do not reflect Migri's strategic priorities as singular units.



Figure 16: Mapping Inland's priorities to Migri's (source: Inland Design)

The second activity, the SOAP, was useful for Inland and became a living and breathing strategy tool for Inland. It underwent various modifications and iterations throughout the course of the research, both by the researcher and the Inland designers. Figure 17 below shows the latest iteration of the SOAP, as it is continually being updated to accurately reflect Inland's work. The key elements of the SOAP (from top to bottom) include, first, the Inland team Mission at the top in dark blue. Second, the three strategic priorities are listed in dark blue. Third, underneath the priorities in light blue are the strategic objectives within those priorities. Fourth, in red and pink, Inland's key strategic projects/cases are listed, visually showing which priority areas they are within. Fifth and finally, Inland's key strategic initiatives are listed in green, in a similar fashion to the projects/cases.

In particular, the Inland team valued how the SOAP helped map their current work, both projects and initiatives (shown in red, pink, and green), to the strategic priorities in a clear and succinct way. Before that, the tool forced them to agree on and articulate the team's strategic priorities. It now enables an at-a-glance analysis of where they are spending their time, if one area is being over prioritized, and so on. The SOAP helps Inland to articulate and communicate their work. Additionally, it was seen as the right tool for a 2 year timeframe.

However, time will tell if this helps bridge the gap with communications in Migri. The strategic priorities at the top of the SOAP are Inland's, not Migri's, so questions are raised if this will help or hurt communications within Migri. While it certainly helps communicate

Inland's work, it still struggles to bridge the gap between Migri's lingo and Inland's. Additionally, the SOAP currently lacks measurable outcomes - which would help bring legitimacy to Inland's work. If Inland were to run a SOAP workshop again, they have discussed that it could be powerful to do together with key strategic Migri partners and management.




Figure 17: The latest iteration of Inland's SOAP (source: Inland Design)

5.3 Inland's Strategic Identity

A company's identity, which serves as a touchstone against which it can evaluate its choices, is often a more enduring statement of strategic intent. (Camillus 2008)

5.3.1 Background: Who Are We? Why?

Camillus (2008) points out that while, "Mission statements are the foundations of strategy," in organizations dealing with complex and wicked problems, statements of business purpose, concept, and scope are often changing and evolving more than ever before. Instead of a single statement approach, he argues for defining organizational identity, including: values, competencies, and aspirations. This organizational identity then can more accurately drive decisions, giving executives direction and focus.

During the SOAP workshop, it became apparent that Inland did not necessarily have an agreed upon statement of purpose, or aspirations and goals, or values. The team members, of course, discussed these identity elements often, but there were no shared formalized statements of identity to capture those conversations. Various written statements of purpose were handed down to the Inland designers by Fjord (e.g. Inland's original Manifesto), but

these were not internalized entirely by the team. Thus, it was necessary to begin the work to formalize Inland's identity.

5.3.2 Concept: Identity by Co-design

...Try out some strategy as a starting point; the consequences will give them a better handle on the real problem they face. So, to tackle wicked problems, smart companies conduct experiments, launch innovative pilot programs, test prototypes - and make mistakes from which they will learn. (Camillus 2008)

Camillus (2008) observes the importance of experimenting even with strategy. Rather than getting lost in analysis paralysis, he urges to experiment quickly and then iterate where necessary. Similarly, Mankins and Steele (2006) encourage continuous development of strategy, taking strategy work away from the annual cycle to an ongoing process to enable truly strategic and timely decision making.

The concept of this action intervention was completely in line with Camillus' (2008) experimentation focus and Mankins and Steele's (2006) continuous development approach. Borrowing from the design thinking discipline, the Inland team decided to use rapid prototyping as inspiration to quickly prototype strategy statements, test/try them out in various forms, quickly get feedback, and iterate.

5.3.3 Research: Vision vs. Mission

There are hundreds of resources and approaches to the writing of mission, vision, and purpose statements, from books in the management and leadership shelves of bookstores, to articles in leading business magazines, to insightful columns and blogs by the leading influential consulting firms. Most agree on a few key characteristics to differentiate vision statements, mission statements, and various forms of purpose statements.

Vision statements often describe a dream future state for the organization. Whereas, mission statements more tactically concern themselves with defining what the organization does and how it will achieve its objectives. Amabile and Kramer (2012) emphasize how a well written mission statement also connects the team to a sense of meaning and purpose; how the work contributes to something greater. Elements of both of these are often combined with statements of values and goals to define corporate purpose. Values describe the culture of the organization, while principles give direction. (Kenny 2014; Bain & Company 2018)

One great example of how government design-led teams have adopted and adapted these identity statements is through statements of *Design Principles* or *Design Values*. Design principles act as guiding principles for work practices. One particularly worthy benchmark comes from the Government Digital Service (GDS) team in the UK (GDS 2012). Their design principles can be found in Appendix K. These design principles have acted as a benchmark for many design-oriented teams in government. The Digital Transformation Agency (DTA) in Australia, for example, was so inspired by the list, they adopted them verbatim (DTA 2015).

5.3.4 Intervention: Prototyping Inland's Strategic Identity

In order to put Camillus' concept of experimentation with strategy to the test, Inland decided to use the design thinking cycle to develop their strategic identity. What does this mean, in practice? Refer back to Figure 2 in section 2.1.2, Gibbons' iterative nature of design thinking. Based on input from the Inland designers (*empathize & define phases*) during the SOAP workshop, the researcher created a draft vision and mission statement (*ideate phase*) in PowerPoint (*prototype phase*). The Inland team got together for a session to review them in a conference room (*testing phase*), to discuss new or missing elements (*re-define & ideate phases*) and to modify them (*prototype phase*). Together the group continued iterative rounds of prototyping, testing, and re-defining by: first, printing the slides, hanging them on the wall, and editing them with a marker; second, including the slides in team presentations about inland to test how they worked in practice.

These slides were eventually combined with Inland's manifesto, working methods, and SOAP to create a Strategy Overview for Inland, as seen in Appendix L. These slides and statements have become a living, continuously improving representation of Inland's overall strategic identity; they represent Inland's aims, what they do, how they do it, and why.

5.4 Establishing Middle-Manager Buy-in

It should be more than clear by now that innovation is everybody's job. That goes for employees, and it goes for different leadership positions - from the political level to front-line managers. (Bason 2010, 243)

5.4.1 Background: Struggling to Get Resources and Support from Migrating Managers

Bringing a brand new way of working, with brand new people, and brand new processes and methodologies into an old and traditional organization is no easy feat. Bason (2010, 99-105) outlines the common pitfalls faced by innovation labs in government. In particular he discusses the critical role of top and middle managers in "sponsoring real organizational change." Furthermore, Elsbach and Stigliani (2018) discuss how the effective use of design thinking in organizations necessitates organizational culture change, requiring the support of top and middle managers "to overcome the natural inertia of organizational culture."

At a practical level, Bason (2010, 146-149) points out the natural challenges to introducing design thinking to government. Among them, public servants need new skills and tools, and capacity-building to be able to "think like designers." This can be accomplished through a combination of education programs and direct involvement in innovation projects. However, as Rauth et alia (2015) find, teams implementing design thinking often face challenges with coworkers and managers freeing up resources to even enable them to participate in the first place.

Throughout the course of this research, various examples arose where Inland struggled to get middle- and in some cases upper-management support and buy-in, in order to attain resources to collaborate on projects. One particular team closed doors on collaboration possibilities repeatedly. In one case, Inland wanted to put posters up in customer service points, to gather client feedback on their experiences in Migri waiting rooms. This request was denied, and later the team responsible created an extensive process (requiring: a request/approval process, a clear statement of intentions and goals of the visit, and approval), in effect thickening the red tape, locking down control, and making it very difficult for anyone within Migri (not just Inland) to visit a customer service point. Naturally, this goes against the very foundational value of Inland - co-design with the customers.

Later, Inland planned a co-design workshop with a Migri client group, and proactively sought collaboration and participation again with this same team. Each attempt and request to find a subject matter expert to participate in the workshop was denied, and fueled further frustration between the two teams. While there are other examples as well, the increasingly hostile interactions between Inland and this team provide a great example of routine rigidity during change, lack of support and buy-in at the middle and upper management levels of Migri, and extremely evident legitimacy struggles.

5.4.2 Concept: Workshopping Relationship Management

Based on the above experiences, and corroboration from literature and from interviews (I1-I5), the team decided to enlist the Inland managers in the process of strategically prioritizing and action planning Inland's organizational relationship management. The concept was to host a stakeholder/relationship management workshop with the Inland leadership team, to:

- Identify the key internal middle managers for Inland's long term success
- Assess the current state of the relationship with those priority stakeholders
- Determine next steps in moving those relationships forward

One of the secondary goals was to enlist the Inland managers' support in the legitimacy work of the team. Inland needed buy-in from across the Migri organization, and would not be able to accomplish that alone.

5.4.3 Research: Relationship Management Tools

It was important to find the right tool to facilitate the right kind of discussion with Inland's management, regarding key stakeholders and relationships. Three different tools were researched for this purpose, including the stakeholder influence/interest map by Morphy (n.d.), the Relationship Map by Galbraith and Kates (2007, 239-241), and the Relationship Health Check tool by the same authors (Galbraith & Kates 2007, 242-243). Ultimately, in collaboration with the Inland team, it was decided to use the latter.

The Relationship Health Check tool is depicted in Figure 18. It is used to analyze the current and desired state of the relationship with another particular team. As depicted in Figure 18, the tool is a matrix consisting of stages of cooperation (1 through 5) across the top, and areas of cooperation down the left. The stages of cooperation across the top consist of: no partnership/limited engagement, coordinating engagements/encountering frustration, cooperation, collaboration, and true partnership. The areas of cooperation down the left include (from top to bottom): Vision/Identity, Mindset/Approach, Strategy/Purpose, Communication, Trust, and Results/Value Added.

		STAGES OF COOPERATION				
		STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	STAGE 4	STAGE 5
		No Partnership / Limited Engagement	Coordinating Engagements/ Encountering Frustration	Cooperation	Collaboration	True partnership
AREAS OF COOPERATION	Vision/ Identity	"Us" and "Them," with little or no middle ground; based on negative	"Us" and "Them," looking toward a future "we" – building trust	Beginning to think as "we"; some level of personal connection exists	Achieving partnership, based in personal relationships	Us/we, almost transparent - part of the same team
	Mindset/ Approach	Working together has not come up or is not feasible; sees little or no value in working together	Exploring partnership possibilities; sees other groups as a "necessary evil"	Work together to achieve our individual goals – quid pro quo	Work together to succeed as a team	Shares in both successes and failures
	Strategy/ Purpose	Plans and decisions are made with complete independence	Plans are made behind the scenes and then discussed	Decision making may involve discussion with and consideration of other groups; when asked, groups share objectives or strategy	Decisions and plans are discussed with other groups; input and feedback is requested regarding objectives or strategy	Decisions and plans are discussed and made together – joint strategy development and execution
	Communication	Little to no communication	Infrequent, but with communication modes being developed	Communication is as needed, to gain understanding of other groups' goals – tactically driven	Communication is the norm; both groups clearly understand the common goals; regular meetings with give and take	Communication is frequent, ongoing, honest, and respectful
	Trust	Conflicting interests or unawareness of common goals or mutual benefits	Aligning interests or are experiencing conflict in current interests	Still a focus on individual interests, but a degree of trust exists	Desire for mutual benefits; seeks out help and advice	Desire for a long-term partnership that is mutually beneficial; high level of integrity
	Results/ Value Added	Lack of any significant engagement precludes any value added	Value could be added in the future	Value is added for a specific project with limited time frame	Value added for extended period of time	Continually adding value and "creating synergy"

Figure 18: Adapted from Galbraith & Kates' (2007, 243) *Relationship Health Check*

This tool is used by first circling the desired stage of cooperation across the top. Then the participants go through each of the area of cooperation rows to assess the current stage of the relationship for each respective area of cooperation: Vision/Identity, Mindset/Approach, Strategy/Purpose, Communication, Trust, and Results/Value Added. This assessment then enables a visual cue for which elements in the relationship are strong, and which elements need work. Finally, this helps to facilitate a discussion on specific actions that can be taken to move the relationship to the desired stage. This was the perfect tool for what Inland needed to accomplish in this workshop.

5.4.4 Intervention: A "Co-strategizing Inland's Key Stakeholders" Workshop

For this intervention, the goal was to ensure that Inland builds deep and meaningful connections with the whole Migri organization, including the mid-level managers.

Additionally, it was to ensure that Inland strategically builds relationships with the right top and mid-level managers within Migri, in order for Inland to make a meaningful impact. This was carried out via a 60-minute workshop, held on April 16th, 2018. Participants included Inland's two administrative managers, one of Inland's designers, and the workshop was facilitated by the researcher. The 60 minutes were divided into a three-part workshop, consisting of three consecutive activities.

Activity 1: Identify Key Stakeholders

The goal of the first activity was to identify and prioritize who were the most critical people in Migri for building support for Inland, in order to create a user-centered & experimentation-oriented culture? In other words: Where was the important influence and power? Who could Inland depend on for support? Where did Inland need to build support? This helped the team to prioritize who they should focus their networking, communication, and collaboration efforts on. This was done by using the printed organization charts, circling the key middle managers, and discussions.

Activity 2: Relationship Health Check

The goal of the second activity was to assess the "health" of the existing relationship with those critical contacts. This portion of the workshop asked all workshop participants to use the aforementioned Relationship Health Check tool (Figure 18) on the critical contacts identified in step one. To use the tool, teams assessed the stages of each area of cooperation in the Relationship Health Check tool. This helped the team to articulate which areas of cooperation were strong and weak, and subsequently to prioritize how they should work on their relationship management going forward.

Activity 3: Action Planning and Next Steps

The goal of the final activity was to determine next steps and the most appropriate owner for the highest priority stakeholders. This helped Inland to strategically determine next steps for middle manager buy-in.

After the Workshop

The workshop proved to be a great method for strategically thinking about relationship management, and subsequently to proactively manage legitimacy. Additionally, it provided a great method to enlist Inland's managers in Inland's legitimacy, credibility, and trust-building work. One of the managers has been at Migri for many years, and was thus able to provide tacit knowledge of the way things and teams work within the organization.

5.5 Lunch & Learn

It is more fun to talk with someone who doesn't use long, difficult words but rather short, easy words, like 'What about lunch?' (Milne n.d.)

5.5.1 Background: Interviews as Strategy

One of the findings during this research was that the semi-structured interviews conducted for this research study, themselves, acted as a strategic intervention for Inland. They offered a safe place for interviewees to ask questions about Inland, about design, about service design - to gain a better understanding of the Inland team, what they do, and why. For example, during one of the first interviews conducted for this research, the Migri leader asked questions like, “What is design?” and “What is design thinking?” Given the semi-structured nature of the interviews, this provided a great opportunity to have a discussion about what these terms mean, and for the researcher/interviewer to gain a better understanding of where confusion lies.

5.5.2 Concept: Lunch, Listen, and Learn

An idea was generated between one of Inland’s designers and the researcher, to run a series of casual interviews (more accurately, discussions) with leaders in the Migri organization. These were to be casual meetings, conducted over lunch to get to know the individuals, their teams and challenges, and to provide them a safe place to ask more about design and to hopefully open up subsequent doors for collaboration. Most importantly, the goal was to listen and understand.

5.5.3 Research: Semi-structured Social Interactions

In order to manage wicked and complex strategic challenges, Camillus (2008) recommends leveraging social processes over analytical processes. One of the ways to do so is by involving stakeholders in much more dynamic ways. In particular Camillus (2008) discusses the critical knowledge, insight, and commitment of the often-overlooked employee stakeholders themselves. He describes how the Merrill Lynch Credit Corporation, for example, leverages their employees in various “semi-structured social processes” to ensure their involvement in strategic innovation. They focus on social events, common lunches in the company cafeteria, and virtual social interactions on the company intranet - all to encourage the routine and continuous interaction of employees across all levels.

5.5.4 Intervention: Lunch as a Strategic Intervention

For this intervention, the goal was to open opportunities for dialogue between Inland and Migri leaders. The setting was casual and easy-going, taking place over lunch. The atmosphere was meant to be of discussion, no printed questions, no note-taking; simply

chatting and getting to know each other. While these sessions were casual chats, for purposes of this description only, the term “interviewee” is used to describe the four Migri leaders who participated, and the term “interviewer” is used to describe the researcher.

Content of the lunches was intended to cover three main areas - getting to know each other, getting to know more about the interviewees’ team and strategy, and providing the interviewees a chance to get to know more about Inland. Lunch and Learn sessions were held with four different directors of Migri between April and May, 2018. Migri leaders were chosen based on those with whom Inland did not, yet, have substantial interaction with, but who Inland perceived as key for the development of the group. Three were, in fact, held over lunch time, and one was rescheduled to earlier in the day, and re-framed as a Coffee Chat. The researcher conducted three of the lunches, and the two Inland designers conducted one.

These sessions were seen as a big, yet very simple, success. Meeting individuals over lunch provides a casual and easy way to connect, to get to know each other, and a safe place to ask questions about each other’s teams. It was important that the lunches did not have an agenda or any work expectations, other than simply getting to know people. The biggest takeaway from this intervention was that all Inland team members should lunch with and get to know different people in Migri.

5.6 Long Range Strategic Planning

Strategy should bring clarity to an organization; it should be a signpost for showing people where you, as their leader, are taking them--and what they need to do to get there. (Brown 2005)

5.6.1 Background: Holistic Strategic View

After the previous two interventions focused on strategic stakeholder and relationship management, the Inland team realized that they needed to take a holistic look at strategic success for the future. Strategic relationship management was one key piece in the puzzle, in order to achieve Inland’s strategic priority of bringing organizational change to Migri, through experimental culture. Yet, that priority was not the only one. With only a 2.5 year contract to prove results, the team needed to take a look at the whole strategy picture, road mapping the future. Using Brown’s (2005) words above, they needed a signpost, and the necessary steps to get there. After nearly one year in operation, how could the team strategically and methodically map out the future success of Inland, and how to get there?

If strategy is in fact a design process, it has been using an incomplete toolkit. Human beings do not analyze their way into the future. (Golsby-Smith 2007)

In discussing this “signpost,” the team realized that we did not have a shared understanding of success for Inland. The Inland designers each had a slightly different preconception of what success for Inland would mean. In order to create a roadmap for the future, Inland also

needed to engage their leaders in conversation about their concrete expectations for success. This would require a strategic planning process that enabled fresh input from many sources, conversation and collaboration, and room for iteration.

5.6.2 Concept: Long Term Strategic Roadmap

The concept for this action intervention was to conduct a workshop that would enable the Inland team to map out their strategy for achieving their strategic priorities inside Migri. The goal was not only to look at the short term (Inland at 2.5 years old), but also to look into the future (5 years). The goal of the workshop was to answer the following questions:

- What does success look like?
- What do we need to accomplish in order to prove the success of Inland?
- How do we ensure that we are focused on the right projects, actions, and relationships to ensure Inland's success?

5.6.3 Research: Strategy Roadmaps

Strategy should be the process that enables organizations to create new futures and engage their people in that exciting task. (Golsby-Smith 2007)

Research for this intervention consisted of three parts. First, Inland needed a tool that would enable designing and mapping the future in a collaborative, interactive, and iterative way. One such tool is Kumar's (2013, 294-295) Strategy Roadmap tool:

The strategy roadmap is a method for mapping the future strategic direction of the organization by prioritizing the order of implementation among innovation offerings. (Kumar 2013, 295)

It consists of five steps. First, all existing solutions [or projects] are mapped on a timeline, that also includes a division by time frame (i.e. short term: 1-2 years, midterm: 2-5 years, and long term: more than 5 years). Second, assessing the time-frame not in project- or solution-specifics, but instead by timeframe bands, write summary strategies for the short term, mid-term, and long term value for the organization. Third, assess the needs of your organization specifically to support those strategies. Fourth, conduct a small market analysis for each of those strategies, assessing the competitive landscape as well as opportunities and threats. Fifth and finally, document this in a roadmap form to visually communicate the strategy to the rest of the organization. (Kumar 2013, 294-295)

Second, Inland needed to create a roadmap that would support the workshop. While Kumar's (2013) strategy roadmap tool was a bit more extensive than what was needed in Inland, it provided a lot of great elements to benchmark for the workshop. Appendix M includes the adapted templates created for Inland's workshop. Vogel (2009) suggests, "Design thinking is always most effective when it successfully connects strategic planning with execution of products, services, and communication." Thus, it was important to provide

a view of overall Inland sustainability, projects, and relationships. Additionally, a view was added at the bottom of Inland's key strategic objectives, in order to visually analyze what Inland was currently doing and could be doing for each of those priorities. This roadmap was developed collaboratively between the researcher and one of Inland's designers.

Third, feedback was solicited from Inland and Migri leaders about their vision of success for Inland. What would success entail for them after 2.5 years in operation? They told Inland to focus on the customer, to do more with users, to become a valued partner with different Migri units, and that project outcomes/results are less important... findings and lessons learned are the most important.

5.6.4 Intervention: "Long Range Strategic Planning Roadmap" Workshop

The goal of this action intervention was to create a clear shared vision and roadmap of success for Inland at 2.5 years and beyond. After the workshop, the goal was to have a roadmap that visually enabled Inland to assess:

- Are we prioritizing the right things, based on our strategic objectives?
- What should we continue to do, stop doing, or do differently?
- Are we on track to accomplish our strategic priorities?

This was carried out via a two-hour workshop, held on May 25th, 2018. The workshop room (shown in Figure 19) was prepared in advance with all workshop materials. Participants included Inland's two designers and both interns (including the researcher), and the workshop was facilitated by the researcher. The two hours were initially divided into seven activities, based on the seven rows in the roadmap template. However, as the workshop proceeded, this template was modified based on the needs of the team. In practice, four activities we completed, asking the participants to take a view on the existing and future landscape of Inland, based on: a projects view, relationships view, initiatives view, and an overall organization sustainability view.




Figure 19: The Long Range Strategic Planning Roadmap workshop room

Each of the four activities that follow is divided into two parts: brainstorming and sharing. First, workshop participants thought and brainstormed individually, writing ideas on Post It notes. Second, in turns, participants shared their ideas and stuck them to the respective places on the roadmap posters (shown in Figure 20). As new ideas arose through this discussion, additional ideas were added to the roadmap (shown in Figure 21).




Figure 20: Workshop participant placing ideas on the roadmap



Figure 21: Workshop participants discussing their ideas

Activity 1: Projects View

The goal of the first activity was to identify the roadmap for existing and future potential strategic projects. The driving questions were:

- What are our existing key strategic projects for Inland?
- What does success look like, in terms of projects, by year 2.5? By year 5?

Activity 2: Relationships View

The goal of the second activity was to identify the roadmap for Inland's strategic relationship management efforts. The driving questions were:

- What key relationships do we need to have built by year 2.5? Which teams are the priorities?
- What steps do we need to take to ensure we have trust and credibility by year 2.5?
- What does success look like, in terms of relationships, by year 2.5? By year 5?

Activity 3: Initiatives View

The goal of the third activity was to identify the roadmap for existing and future potential strategic initiatives. The driving questions were:

- What are our existing key strategic initiatives for Inland?
- What does success look like, in terms of initiatives, by year 2.5? By year 5?

Activity 4: Overall Inland Sustainability View

The goal of the fourth activity was to identify the roadmap for the overall sustainability of Inland. The driving questions were:

- What goals should we track towards for Inland's sustainability within Migri?
- What planning mechanisms should we put in place to track?

After the workshop

The final step after the workshop was to digitize the results, in order to have a living form for the team to track to. The researcher built the digital form in PowerPoint, completed multiple rounds of editing and iterations together with the Inland team, and finally created a poster for the Inland office wall. The final form of the roadmap can be found in Appendix N.

Overall, reflection on the workshop yielded much critique. The scope of the workshop was too broad, and thus yielded fragmented feedback. There was an uneven balance of tactically seeking short term actions and long term future envisioning. If Inland were to run this workshop again, it should be divided into entirely separate workshops: tactical action planning for short term success versus envisioning for long term success. Moreover, it would be worthwhile to consider different workshop methods.

5.7 Summary of Action Interventions

Figure 22 acts as a summary for the six interventions' iterative cycles. First, it describes the initial plan in the blue boxes. Second, it describes the key reflection outcome of the intervention, listed in the grey boxes. Subsequently it depicts the consequential next intervention, via the blue arrow.

Action interventions for Inland Design proceeded in an emergent manner throughout this research. At the start of this thesis research, the perceived key strategic opportunity for Inland was to build a Network of Designers in Immigration (number 1 in Figure 22). Throughout the course of the initial month of work together, however, we realized that the true key strategic challenge was that the Migri organization did not understand Inland - their terms, methods, purpose, or their potential.

Subsequently, we revised the plan and began working on the second intervention (number 2 in Figure 22) to define Inland's strategy in terms of Migri's strategy. Through the course of the SOAP workshop, the learning and outcome from this intervention was that Inland needed to establish and define their strategic identity.

This led to the third action intervention (number 3 in Figure 22) with a revised plan of defining Inland's mission and vision statements, and refining the manifesto. Many iterative rounds proceeded to define and refine those strategic statements. While that work was

proceeding, other interactions and interviews in Inland revealed that our next strategic priority and opportunity was to establish buy-in across the Migri organization.

Subsequently, we revised our plan and began the fourth intervention (number 4 in Figure 22) to enlist Inland's managers in conducting a key stakeholder relationship health check. We led a workshop with the Inland managers where we identified Inland's key stakeholders, assessed the current health of the inter-organizational relationship, and discussed next steps to build the relationship. This intervention led to some great insights and tacit knowledge of the organization. Upon reflecting on the workshop, we got the idea that Inland needed to take a step back and simply focus on getting to know our key stakeholders.

This led to the fifth intervention (number 5 in Figure 22), Lunch and Learn. This time we developed the idea of casually connecting with key stakeholders over lunch, to get to know them and their organization. Throughout the course of four lunch sessions we realized the value of casually connecting and having an opportunity to listen without an agenda. Upon reflecting on this action, we realized that we had an opportunity to strategically make a plan for not only our relationship management, but also our key projects and initiatives, with a long term view of the future.

Therefore, we began to plan the sixth intervention (number 6 in Figure 22) to hold a workshop to create a long term plan for the strategic success of Inland, looking 2.5 and 5 years out. While the workshop resulted in some great content, the workshop was, however, too broad in scope and focus. The learning and outcome from this intervention is that Inland needs to host another future-oriented discussion, keeping the scope focused on the future.




Figure 22: Summary of strategic action intervention cycles at Inland

6 Findings & Analysis

This chapter summarizes and analyzes the findings from this research study, seeking to examine the building or breaking of organizational legitimacy, in the government design lab, Inland Design. The research questions include:

RQ1: What practices helped and/or hindered the organizational legitimacy during the early stages of Inland Design in Migri?

RQ2: What strategic interventions support the organizational legitimacy of new design labs in the public sector?

This chapter is organized into six sections, each summarizing the six key category findings from all empirical data sources, as well as analyzing those findings based on the existing organizational legitimization literature. The first section describes the foundational role of communication and understanding in organizational legitimacy. The second section outlines the critical role of engaging and involving people in the design process and various manifestations of that involvement, in order to gain understanding. The third section conveys the importance of informal connections in attaining organizational legitimacy. The fourth section discusses the integral role of ambassadors and advocates at all levels of the organization for design legitimacy. The fifth section describes the importance of organizational positioning at all levels from the mandate, the identity, the organizational structure, and the organizational incentives. Finally, the sixth section reviews the emphasis for government design labs to prove the value and show results in order to gain and maintain legitimacy. To help guide the reader, empirical findings from the research are included in this study in color-coded italic texts, per the following color scheme:

- **Blue:** Excerpts from strategic action interventions
- **Turquoise:** Quotes from interviews
- **Red:** Paraphrased quotations from Inland's advisory board meeting
- **Purple:** Excerpts from field notes & observations

6.1 Communication

The first, and one of the earliest findings in this thesis research, is the critical role that communication plays in legitimization. As Suchman (1995) discusses, legitimacy is affected by both credibility and continuity. Credibility, in particular, first requires understanding. If an audience does not understand what an organization does in the first place, credibility and legitimacy are very difficult to follow. In the early stages of this research study, most of the problems that were faced constituted communication problems, in one way or another. Simply put, people in Migri did not understand Inland - the terms they used, the methods

Inland used for communication, nor the actual language they spoke in. This caused early legitimization turmoil for the team, and required extensive mitigation.

6.1.1 Terminology and Lingo

The first element of communication legitimacy involves terminology and lingo. In this research, it quickly became apparent that the designer lingo used in Inland was not understandable to the rest of the Migri organization. This came up countless times in field notes from the first few months of the research study. Various examples arose where the specific terms used by Inland caused confusion:

There is a problem that people do not understand what “service design” is. They don’t understand what we do or what we can do. [Fieldnotes from Jan 23, Feb 5, Mar 20]

There is so much focus on terminology. We’re not speaking Migri’s language. In one meeting, clarification had to be sought on three different terms. 1) “Needfinding? What is needfinding?”, 2) “Tool? Does this mean ‘system’?”, and 3) “Advisory board?... Migri already has advisory boards... what if you call it a ‘discussion group’? It’s a more neutral way of calling it... ‘advisory board’ is a strong way.” [Fieldnotes from Jan 29]

Our terms: ideation, co-creation, workshop, user research... don’t make sense to people. [Fieldnotes from Apr 9]

Interview I2, which focused on legitimation of Inland within Migri, focused extensively on the language and terminology. When looking at Inland’s strategic objective, “spreading design thinking throughout the organization,” interviewee I2 said:

“You should sell the design part. I’m pretty sure that I’m not the only one who doesn’t know what do you mean with the “design” here.” [I2]

He was absolutely right, just two months later during separate Lunch and Learn sessions (SA15) with Migri directors, both expressed their lack of clear understanding of “service design.” It is important to note that in all three cases, despite the lack of total understanding for what service design is, they were all hopeful and interested in the possibilities that service design could bring to their teams and to Migri as a whole. Inland simply needed to help its partners understand what it does in terms the rest of the Migri organization could understand.

This was the impetus, and ultimately the most important takeaway, from the Strategy on a Page intervention (SAI 2) - to communicate Inland’s work in the way that the Migri organization communicates. In particular, when it comes to organizational strategy, this is extremely true. Advisory board members gave this same advice,

“How to tie Inland’s vision to your stakeholder’s interests? ...Not just your customers/clients/users... but also your internal stakeholders.” [Paraphrase from AB3]

“What are the strategic goals of Migri? Connect there.” [Paraphrase from AB4]

In order to gain legitimacy, the audience needs to understand, and a large part of aligning the norms and values in an organization comes down to a common shared language. Similar to Martin's (2007) advice, Inland needed to begin to speak Migri's terms, not their own. During interview I2, the researcher brought a print out of one of the early forms of Inland's SOAP to get his feedback. The interviewee proceeded to re-name the elements on the page to the terms that Migri uses throughout the interview. The lesson was clear - if Inland wants to succeed in becoming legitimate and credible within the Migri organization, it needs to start speaking like the Migri organization.

Throughout the course of the research, there were countless examples of the Inland team testing and discovering the proper "translations" for various design terms that did in fact work in Migri:

*"Sell it as 'training' = YES! Sell it as 'workshop,' 'ideation,' or 'user research' = NO!"
[Fieldnotes from Apr 12]*

Even "design," itself proved to be an elusive term inside Migri, with need for translation:

"Design... but I understand it's engineering...? Because if you think about we have design clothes and then we have normal clothes. Design is something fancier than normal. When Inland started, they are designers, I thought they would make our products or systems more beautiful. I didn't understand... that for me they will engineer the system. That was in a way very hard to get over that. So, okay, what is the terminology? But now I understand... to me it's more engineering, that you in a way, plan or construct the system of systems and such things." [I2]

Multiple sources of data highlighted the importance of translating confusing terms, and wordsmithing to find the right terms that would help the rest of the organization understand. Similarly Rauth et alia (2015) find that tailoring design thinking to use existing organizational terms and organizational standards helps to build cognitive and moral legitimacy.

Despite the aforementioned fear of oversimplifying designers' terms (Vinh 2018), findings from this research suggest that simplification may actually be a necessity for succeeding in bringing design thinking into the public sector. Tõnurist et alia (2017) corroborate this assertion with findings from their research on a design lab that had been shut down, "...The rest of the organization did not understand what we did; we were not entwined with the system." Thus critical stakeholders must first be able to understand the foundational elements of the design lab's work, in order to judge them legitimate.

6.1.2 Communication Methods

The second element of communication legitimacy involves the methods of communication and how they correspond with the communication norms, values, and beliefs of the overall organization. During the beginning of this research, various breakdowns in communication occurred:

“Something in our communication isn’t working” [Fieldnotes from Jan 16]

This reflection related to four particular communication breakdowns occurring prior to and during the first weeks of this research. First, Inland conducted a user survey in the Migri customer service points, which went against the norm for communication with customers. Second, Inland sought (and was denied) to place interactive posters in the same service points, which was even farther from the norm. Third, Inland used their blog as a mechanism to share work on a particular project, which was seen as inappropriate over-sharing by the Migri organization. Fourth, Inland published a blogpost about a project involving Migri teams, whereby afterwards the teams were uncomfortable with the public positioning of their teams and work.

In each of these cases, Inland was leveraging brand new tools, methods, and approaches to communication which challenged the typical organizational communication norms, or the “perceived appropriateness” (Deephouse et al. 2017) of communication methods in Migri. The quick succession of these four communication breakdowns resulted in the need for Inland to defend their legitimacy. Inland faced mostly performance challenges (Hirsch and Andrews 1986) by related Migri sources, as these constituents simply did not understand the use of new media, like posters and blog posts. As Deephouse et alia (2017) pointed out, legitimacy leads to resource attainment; in this case the opposite was true as related legitimacy defense teams locked up resources.

Nonetheless, data was also gathered that included strategies for overcoming communication legitimacy challenges. One such strategy is to tailor the communication approach to the specific organizational audience. One advisory board member suggested creating profiles or personas for different stakeholder groups:

“How does Inland communicate (differently) to the different stakeholders?” - For example, at his company they create profiles [similar to personas] of their customers. Different customers have different needs, and subsequently the communication to them should also be different, based on that. “...It helped us to align how we can help the person the best.” [Paraphrase from AB3]

One element of this strategy is aligning the messaging of communication to meet the needs of the different stakeholders. Another element is adapting the communication tools or mechanisms themselves to the target stakeholder group. Inland tends to use different tools than the rest of Migri, which caused the previously mentioned communication breakdowns, and also may inhibit collaboration:

Today Inland met with a new team to discuss potential collaboration. Inland suggested potential communication tools such as blogs, podcasts, videos... they were very uninterested in new formats... [Fieldnotes from Feb 7]

Blogs, podcasts, videos, and posters are completely against the “socially constructed view of norms, values, and appropriate behavior” in Migri. Thus, these tools themselves pose a challenge to gaining legitimacy within Migri. Per Rauth et alia’s (2015) findings,

alternatively, Inland can adopt the communication practices of the broader Migri organization, in a tailored manor, with critical stakeholder groups. By aligning with the existing organizational work practices, Inland builds pragmatic legitimacy with Migri. Nevertheless, Deephouse et alia (2017) highlight, specifically, how new forms of digital technology, particularly give teams new ways to influence legitimacy. Online communication resources like Inland's blog, twitter account, and website, while concurrently challenging Migri's norms, also create a platform for enlisting legitimacy externally.

The very point of the founding of Inland, and often of design labs, is to do things differently, and communication is no exception. Design labs should not lose that. It is also important to remember that "artifacts" of design like advertising materials, can also help to build legitimacy on all levels (Rauth et al. 2015). Suchman (1995), in describing the "manipulating environments" strategy for gaining legitimacy, describes how advertising and strategic communication activities act as a means to persuade constituent audiences in the organization and build cognitive legitimacy. Thus, communication is a critical element in legitimacy gaining and maintenance. However, designers should make a proactive, conscious, and strategic choice of when to challenge the norms with their communication, and when to align with the norms. Tönurist et alia (2017) suggest one potential approach: using formal communication mechanisms for communicating such things as results to the parent organization, while leveraging less formal communication mechanisms (e.g. blogs, videos) internally and to peer labs. It is important to acknowledge the impact communication mechanisms have on legitimization, and ensure they are done intentionally and strategically.

6.1.3 Language

The third element of communication legitimacy concerns the inevitable language itself. It is important to note that the Migri organization, and by and large the entire Finnish public sector, speaks Finnish as their operating language. However, the Inland team speaks English, as Finnish is not the first language of multiple team members. As necessary as English is, it acts as a barrier to the legitimization of Inland within Migri. Additionally, it acts as a barrier to accomplish Inland's mission, as naturally many Migri employees are not comfortable speaking in English. This finding emerged in interviews and in fieldnotes throughout the study. During interview I5, the interviewee asked:

"Do you speak Finnish? ...Because I think [talking English] is one thing that people might be afraid of... They might be intimidated by having to speak it publicly. I think this can be a bit of a barrier HERE, especially in Migri." [I5]

This topic came up in many conversations, and fieldnotes throughout the research. People in the organization were not comfortable speaking in English generally, let alone to do so with complicated topics like service design. Suchman (1995) emphasizes the importance of building understanding and trust, in order to gain credibility and legitimacy. The very

foundation of understanding is language. In the case of Inland in Migri, the terms themselves are already complicated. Even in one's native language, the terms (e.g. co-design, needfinding, and ideation) need a figurative translation. That understanding is only further complicated by requiring a literal translation as well.

During the course of this research, the Inland team was well aware of this language challenge, and updated the hiring criteria for all future hires to include a working knowledge of the Finnish language. After this research was completed one visual designer was hired, and two new interns were hired, all who are native Finnish speakers. Martin (2007) says, "Seek to communicate on each other's terms," and that is exactly what Inland is doing.

6.2 Engagement & Involvement

The second key finding in this research is about the importance of engaging and involving the organization's people in the design process. Rauth et alia (2015), in their research, discover that one of the greatest challenges of their design thinking team participants was the difficulty in translating the values of design thinking to the organization. The organizations often struggled to recognize the importance of the new design methods and values. This dissonance between methods and values creates further challenges for legitimacy. Findings from this research suggest that a potential way to overcome these translation errors is through engagement and involvement of as many people in the organization as possible.

Design teams like Inland are perfectly set up to engage and involve others, as co-design is their foundation. One of the themes of this research is the ability to help people understand design and its practices through direct engagement and involvement. Six elements of engagement and involvement were raised in the data and validated in the literature.

6.2.1 Engage all of your Customers

The first element of engagement and involvement is a reminder to design teams to use the same design thinking tools and mentality they preach inside their own organization. While it is natural to use the tools of co-creation with end users, or Migri's clients, it is somehow easy to forget to use the exact same methodology on the internal Migri stakeholders. This theme showed up in the data in all forms, in interviews, the Lunch & Learn intervention (SAI 5), observations, as well as at the advisory board meeting:

"There are two discourses: 1) serve the customers of Migri, and 2) establish Inland as a practice within Migri... Many labs come and go, even though they have done great work. My analysis: designers can empathize with end users, but are not so good at empathizing with our own partners. What is important for our internal partners? What about their bosses? How do the people who order design see the world? What is their perspective?" [Paraphrase from AB3]

Viewing Migri as a customer of the design thinking process helps to reframe their engagement and involvement. By involving internal stakeholders in the co-creation process, it is possible to understand the varying needs of different individuals and different teams:

"...This is basically the design thinking method of actually listening in the beginning and seeing what's the situation. The thing is... our original approach works for one Migri team, yes, but already not for another Migri team, so we need to rethink." [I5]

When so much about legitimacy relies on understanding, one of the best ways to help bring understanding is to involve people directly in the process, to let them experience the benefits for themselves.

6.2.2 Enable Others to Experience Design Thinking

The second element of engagement and involvement came up repeatedly in the data - the importance of having others experience design thinking directly. This is an effective tactic to gain the organization's buy-in and establish legitimacy. By engaging others to participate in the design thinking process, one can harness their buy-in:

"Try to engage the other people somehow. For example, say that: 'okay, we are a new lab. We haven't taken the final form yet, let's try to establish the kind of entity that actually helps you guys. What would be beneficial for you?' Now this would be co-creation again. It would be (Migri) having a say... they would see that they are involved, that they in a way have a responsibility that this should work." [I4]

About the creation of Inland and its purpose, one of the founders stated:

"...We were hoping to build some kind of more lively kind of context where many types of people participate and participate in the early phases of the innovation process." [I3]

Rauth et alia (2015) include *convincing others through experiencing design thinking* as one of their five findings for building legitimacy. By including key stakeholders in the implementation of design, one can build pragmatic legitimacy (Rauth et al. 2015). This recommendation was corroborated in this research as well. Interviewee I4 built on and even extended that recommendation:

"I would actually have people do design thinking by themselves, in one way or another. This goes to two directions. One is more like a safe space laboratory setting, that you can have capacity-building sessions. The other pathway is that [they work on] real life challenges... send them off to their units and then they actually work there, and apply some of the methods, and then you help them, while you give support." [I4]

6.2.3 Physical Space

The third element of engagement, and one way of encouraging involvement is through the manifestation of design thinking as a physical space. This came up in the data repeatedly from the two founder interviews (I1& I3). Referring to the original founding targets of the Inland team both founders spoke of the desire to create a physical design space:

"We wanted to even create a space where the change is concrete, tangible, and people would come into the space and kind of discuss and collaborate and participate and FEEL the change. So participating in the change and feeling and experiencing, this was one of the original targets." [I1]

"We wanted also to build something hands on - Something that gives kind of a tangible experience of what kind of things designers do." [I3]

Similarly, Rauth et alia (2015) identify that flexible physical design thinking spaces, and the ability for the organization to take part by working in them leads to both pragmatic and moral legitimacy. Moreover, one of the founders spoke of the power of a physical space to challenge the traditional communication norms in the organization:

"...That's why we had a dream that Inland would be a space, so that the communication would be interactive, real time interactive..." [I1]

Interviewee I1 believed that interactive communication and work would enable the Migri staff to experience design. Lykketoft (2014) discusses how the physical design space at MindLab helps communicate consistency and leads to credibility and legitimacy by functioning as neutral ground between siloed organizations, and a safe place to try new things. However, the physical space can also have the opposite effect; the power of the physical space can send mixed messages of superiority. This came up in the data, particularly in field notes during the Migri-wide office move.

Are we alienating ourselves versus growing INTO Migri? [Fieldnotes from Apr 24]

When Migri moved office premises, Inland was one of the only teams that retained a designated office space, while the rest of the Migri organization adopted flexible workspaces. It is important to point out that this office space is not quite the design laboratory-type space interviewee I1 had envisioned, but instead a standalone office for the Inland designers, and their design supplies, high-resolution screens, and Macintosh computers. The Inland team is the only team in Migri that requires high-resolution computer screens, and thus it was imperative that they have a designated work space, unlike the rest of the Migri organization. However, it is important to point out the potential drawbacks as well, namely potential perceptions of special treatment. To mitigate that, and to continue to encourage collaboration and engagement throughout the organization, Inland put in place weekly "open office hours" to ensure that an Inland designer is in the Inland space, ready to collaborate and assist anyone in Migri that needs it.

6.2.4 Give Guidelines & Support

The fourth element of engagement and involvement in design thinking is ensuring that the organization is supported in their efforts. Interviewee I4 discussed the importance of giving autonomy and freedom, but that transformation of any kind requires some guidelines and support, so that people do not feel alone:

"Don't let them feel that they are not supported, because that's the stupid way to lose the game, because you're there anyway. A lack of feeling of capability - that's when people start to feel embarrassed, but if they know how to do it, quite often they are interested in it." [I4]

With support, people will feel more confident with the new tools, as well as with the credibility of the design team. Secondly, it is important to demystify design thinking. Rather than introducing the design thinking concepts under a veil of mystery and difficulty, it is important to position them as simple, easy, intuitive, and approachable. Interviewee I4 told how his organization runs capacity building workshops with civil servants in the public sector, and they make sure to use the exact same tools and methods during these capacity-building sessions that they actually use when designing an experiment:

*"I say at the end, 'hey guys, actually what you did in these 2.5 hours, you designed an experiment... this is not very far from what we actually do when we design a real life experiment.' They are so inspired about that, because they feel that - 'okay this was something that I can actually do with a little bit of expert support.' It's a normal thing. **Innovation is not something that happens far away in the stars - it's right here.**" [I4]*

It is imperative that design thinking tools be presented as simple, intuitive, and approachable. If the mandate of the government design lab is, in fact, to change the culture and introduce new working practices, then they have to be understandable in order to be considered legitimate. Rauth et alia (2015) find that employees having the opportunity to experience design thinking in workshops helps to build cognitive legitimacy. Moreover, participation in design thinking training, with the opportunity to learn and experience new things leads to pragmatic legitimacy. Finally, the experience of discovering user needs and then actually being able to directly address them leads to moral legitimacy. Subsequently, supporting and guiding the broader organization through the new practices is a ripe opportunity to gain legitimacy.

6.2.5 Ensure Everyone is Heard

The fifth element of engagement, and perhaps the foundation of involvement of the broader organization, is to ensure that everyone is heard. This came up in the data in many of the interviews (I1, I2, I4, and I5). Interviewee I4 discussed their experience running a large global change project with multiple stakeholders for a client, and how their company took a collaborative and co-creation-focused approach to making the strategy for the change. As this change was so big, he described how there was no way to simply manage this top-down, because so many people do not understand what's going on, the magnitude of the change, or even necessarily agree with it. For this project, they involved hundreds of people, from all levels of the organization in a co-creation process for the change:

"...That's the way to get them onboard and actually make a good [change] strategy... it's a co-creation process... Make sure that everybody is heard." [I4]

Similarly, in his role as Deputy Director of Migri, interviewee I2 leads the strategy work for the organization. He also raised the critical point about having as many people heard as possible:

"My role was only to write [the strategy] down. We had meetings with the board of directors. We had a meeting with all of the bosses, 72 people... a 1 day meeting where we discussed the issues from the strategy, and got all the information from the old workers as well as the new workers - how they see what the new Migri is..." [I2]

Likewise, in her role helping run a Migri-wide change initiative, change management expert interviewee I5, discussed the critical importance of getting everyone involved and "circling around" the organization to involve as many people as possible:

"We circled around every single unit here and through design-thinking-like workshops we asked people... what are the core problems? We circled around everybody and then combined them. ...The ideas came from the whole organization (not just the leaders)... the whole Migri... THEY came up with those ideas." [I5]

"So how to actually get ALL the people involved in this. So this is what we're trying to do at the moment." [I5]

Put simply, interviewee I5 is describing the co-creation process. This ensures that together, the whole organization is a part of collaboratively creating the future together. Rauth et alia (2015) observe that employees' involvement in the implementation of design thinking leads to pragmatic legitimacy and meshes design thinking with the overall organizational culture. Alternatively, the opposite is also true; when the broader organization does not feel heard, this leads to serious legitimacy challenges. In Inland, many of the aforementioned communication breakdowns took place with one particular Migri team. During the phases of legitimacy defense and repair, they expressed to Inland directly:

"You need to learn OUR ways... You don't know anything about what WE DO..." [Fieldnotes from Apr 17]

This is a great example of legitimacy defense underway. This particular organization struggled to find Inland legitimate, when they themselves did not feel heard or seen by Inland.

6.2.6 Multidisciplinary Collaboration

The sixth element of engagement and involvement relates to multidisciplinary collaboration. One of the foundational tenets of the design thinking ideology, as Brown (2008; 2009) describes, is diverse and multidisciplinary collaboration. For design thinking to work at its best, it requires diverse disciplines and stakeholders collaborating together to create more user-centered solutions for the user. One of the recurring themes in this research is the importance of the multidisciplinary element of design thinking teams. In fact, one possible tactic for ensuring everyone is heard is to involve their diverse disciplines in the design process.

Obviously designers play the most critical role in introducing design in any form (e.g. design thinking, service design, and strategic design) to an organization. However, for designers to succeed they need to demystify their discipline, as well as understand and incorporate the disciplines of others. Interviewee I4 observed this as a theme, not about Inland specifically, but about government design labs in general:

"This is only my opinion... and I work a lot with different designers... Actually what I'm sometimes expecting a little bit more of, is more collaboration with other disciplines. Because the big demand in the world right now, is not that you bring one method, because everybody can do that. I'm not saying it's not beneficial; it is beneficial... but it can only answer to a certain scope of problems. If you can do 2 methodologies, you can combine them into actually 100s of things." [I4]

Moreover, interviewee I4 described the "rare breed" of person who understands both the innovation process, as well as the traditional policy-making process. It is crucial to have both perspectives involved in the innovation process, but they are difficult to find. Even though Inland is only a small team with limited resources, one of the ways they can attain this value is through collaboration with the various disciplines and expertise areas across Migri.

Additionally, one of the most critical takeaways from the Network of Designers in Immigration intervention (SAI 1), related to the power of a multidisciplinary innovation approach as well. Upon reflecting on the intervention with interviewee I7, we discussed the inordinate focus Inland placed specifically on the design discipline:

"Just Design? Why? Now, I would change this to "people doing innovation" - this is much more inclusive. I wouldn't have this design-focused assumption again in the future." [I7]

Over the course of the research period, during SAI 1 efforts to build a network of immigration designers, we connected with innovation-focused teams in immigration offices from all over the world. We found brilliant approaches that sometimes had less to do with design, and instead teams were made of communications experts, user researchers, business analysts, project managers, IT and digitalization experts, and Lean methodology specialists. Indeed, Lykketoft (2014) emphasizes diverse expertise in skills and competencies, as a key factor bringing credibility to MindLab in the Danish government. In her research findings, what is important is a combination of the expertise/skills of the individuals on the team (e.g. public administration, social research, and design) and a collective of critical competencies among the team (e.g. project management, organizational development, creative facilitation, and social skills). Moreover, a design-only approach can, in itself, be limiting:

"Service design as well can be a bit biased.... you focus too much on serving your customer, and easily maybe forget that you should also take care of technology and strategy as well..." [I3]

While designers may argue that they, themselves, are multidisciplinary: facilitators, visualizers, systems focused, teachers, trainers, and ambassadors of user-centeredness, it is important to look back at the intention of multidisciplinary collaboration. The point of

multidisciplinary collaboration in the design thinking methodology is to harness the diverse perspectives of other individuals and other disciplines. This is, however, not easy when Inland and similar government design teams are so small. How can they maintain an identity as a *design* team, without designers themselves on staff? For Inland, first, they accomplish this multidisciplinary through the collaborations they invoke on projects. Additionally, in hiring, Inland maintains a philosophy that designers come from various backgrounds - some trained in various design fields, others simply having experience working on design projects and who might come from any background. Whatever the equation, government design labs must find their own recipe for ensuring that design projects involve as diverse a project team as possible. In doing so they will enable collaborations which offer opportunities to build or maintain legitimacy throughout the organization.

6.3 Informal Connections

As a rule, [design labs] have no authority over other public sector structures, thus their effectiveness depends heavily on their ability to communicate and persuade other units through informal networking. (Tönurist et al. 2017)

The third key finding from this research involves the critically important role of casual and informal connections. It may sound trivial, simple, and even self-evident, but evidence from this research, as well as from the literature suggests that it is very important to remember the value of informal interpersonal connections. In the hustle and bustle of busy work life and huge change scopes, it can be easy to forget. It truly is an invaluable resource to know people throughout the organization, to have a chance to listen to their experiences, to allow them a chance to get to know you, and finally to build trust. Frankly, without this piece, gaining legitimacy is near impossible. Rauth et alia (2015) notice that internal politics are a barrier in the organizations they studied. Teams felt threatened by design and design thinking methods. Informal connections are a powerful way to overcome the mystery and threat perception, and gain trust in the organization.

6.3.1 Getting to Know the People

The first element of legitimacy via informal connections involves simply getting to know other people in the organization. This came up in the data repeatedly during the Lunch and Learns (SAI 5), and in the Middle Manager Workshop (SAI 4):

"...You need to get to know people... not be such a mystery..." [Paraphrase from SAI 5]

Small tacit knowledge about the organization comes from getting to know people. No agenda, just getting to know people... [Reflection after SAI 4]

"...As simple as a lunch! No expectations both ways, simply a personal connection... Everything we do doesn't need to be strategic, sometimes just casual" [I7 about SAI 5]

These reflections are highly in line with legitimacy theory. People need to get to know you in order to assess you as credible and legitimate. Importantly, this “getting to know” process does not have to be formal; it can be “as simple as lunch.” Likewise, this same feedback arose in interviews:

"Maybe the only thing is to actually get INSIDE Migri. How much do you see people, or get friends with other people around here?... Just spending time, not having to achieve something, just to hang around, to get to know people... But you kind of have to be part of that group as well... For example at 2 o'clock Migri has these coffee breaks. They have it, and there's NO meetings during that time. If there are, they have to be very important meetings only." [I5]

Migri's 2pm coffee breaks came up repeatedly in interviews as well as in Lunch and Learn sessions (SAI 5). It acts as one of the important rituals and social norms of the Migri organization. According to Suchman (1995) and Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), the foundation of legitimacy comes from a socially constructed definition of norms and values. Furthermore, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) identify that communicating via the informal organizational rituals tends to bring more credibility than explicit formal forms of communication. Thus, to partake in the social norms of an organization plays a huge role in building credibility and legitimacy.

In this research, the opposite was also true, where not attending the social events and activities seemed to further alienate Inland from the organization. This finding came up in field notes on multiple occasions about Inland's absence from many of the 2pm coffee sessions, group lunches, and social events. Tönurist et alia (2017) share similar findings in their research of government design labs:

...Informal networking (coffee tables, etc.) and being present and seen in partner organizations was seen as very important ('when we are building a relationship, we never ask people to come to us - we always go to them').

Furthermore, Lykketoft's (2014) findings substantiate Tönurist et alia's (2017) point about “going to them.” A MindLab project manager says, “We meet people where they are and adapt the methods and communication to their setting” (Lykketoft 2014). To MindLab, this connotes sincere and conscious “professional empathy,” and plays a key role in establishing buy-in. This type of “meeting where they are” helps establish legitimacy via a conformity strategy (Suchman 1995).

6.3.2 Listening

The second element of legitimacy via informal connections, and a recurring theme from this research, is the importance of simply listening. This is a very simple tactic to build connections, and to understand the broader organization. This finding came up repeatedly in multiple interviews (I1, I4, and I5), and in fieldnotes:

"In the end, it's about talking to people... basically it goes to talking.... and listening." [I5]

One of the challenges that Inland faced, as a very small organization with limited resources, was balancing talking about their work and helping people to understand service design, with listening to the rest of the Migri organization to identify opportunities for service design, and then actually proving results. This is a very difficult balance to strike, and early on the balance fell on the side of talking, versus listening:

We spend a lot of time talking and telling about ourselves, but when do we listen and allow others to tell about them? [Fieldnotes from Feb 7, Feb 21, March 9, March 26]

We are not perceived as a listening organization [Fieldnotes from April 24]

Subsequently, listening was the main purpose of the Lunch and Learn intervention (SAI 5). Even though there is no agenda in a lunch, the simple practice helps open doors organizationally. Interviewee I7 reflected on the Lunch and Learn intervention (SAI 5):

“An ‘I want to learn from you’ mentality and approach - we should embrace this. This is human thinking, this works.” [I7 about SAI 5]

“Gives greater connection to their team and overall Migri... Having casual connection with the organization’s leaders helps speed things up” [I7 about SAI 5]

Interviewee I7 identified that Lunch and Learns also led to clear outcomes, acting as a quick way to build connections, understand needs, and get things done.

6.3.3 A Chance for Others to Get to Know You

The third element of legitimacy via informal connections is about allowing people to have a chance to get to know you. In the case of design’s introduction in the public sector, this is a very important task, as it is so new, and shrouded in mystery. This finding came up in the research in interviews (I1, I4, and I5), in the Middle Manager Workshop (SAI 4), and during multiple Lunch and Learn sessions (SAI 5). Not only do casual connections demystify a new function, but they also make room for people to ask questions.

Interview I2 with the Deputy Director kicked off with a question from the interviewee to the researcher: “What does design stand for?” He went on to explain how he has a similar difficulty understanding the new iterations of the word “design” as he has with “architecture.” Architecture, at one time, meant the designing and drawing of buildings, but nowadays can mean so much more (e.g. information architecture, systems architecture). Similarly, the new iterations and uses of “design” are quite confusing. The key insight here was that the interview gave him a chance to ask questions like “what is design?” The very next day, the conversation during the interview came up in a large Migri meeting:

In a big Migri meeting the day after the researcher’s interview with the Deputy Director (I2), he talked about the conversation during the interview to the audience of the meeting. He explained that he now understands what design is... that it’s like engineering... “The Deputy Director speaking with 40 Migri workers and talking about design thanks to your interview.” ...That interview, in effect, helped to advance the conversation about design inside Migri. [Fieldnotes from Mar 1-2]

This very insight became the impetus for the Lunch and Learn intervention (SAI 5). We realized that the discussion and connection with a student created a safe place for others to ask “What is design? What is Inland? What is service design?” or similar questions. Sure enough, during the Lunch and Learns two of the four sessions included discussions to help explain what service design is.

“Casual lunch enables people to ask questions easily.” [I7 about SAI 5]

“Listening and giving space for key questions to come up.” [I6 about SAI 5]

The Lunch and Learn intervention (SAI 5), and our team discussions in Inland helped raise awareness about our perceived mysteriousness to the rest of Migri. Beyond SAI 5, Inland team members began to have more casual lunches, and attend more social gatherings to get to know individuals in Migri, as well as a chance for the rest of Migri to get to know the Inland team members, as individuals.

6.3.4 Establish Trust

The fourth element of legitimacy via informal connections is simply that informal connections help to establish trust with the broader organization. Getting to know people casually goes a long way toward building trust, which builds credibility, and plays a very important role in legitimacy. Trust was a constantly recurring theme throughout this research study, coming from interviews (I1, I3, and I5) as well as repeatedly in fieldnotes:

“We don't have that trust created yet. It will come in time. It can't be there in the beginning... We have to work on that. ...It's similar to how we think about a good service: we have to discuss things and communicate with people. It's about trust anyways; about how (does) [the organization] see that there is no hidden agenda?” [I1]

In the beginning of introducing any new team to an organization, people need to know that there is no hidden agenda. Organizations seek cultural congruence (Suchman 1995), which comes from understanding, credibility, and ultimately trust.

During this research, Inland often faced closed doors and heard “We don’t have time” from various Migri teams. Rauth et alia (2015) uncover similar challenges, “...A difficulty in attaining required resources for design thinking, combined with a perception that design thinking takes more time.” Interviewees discussed how trust could help facilitate opening doors:

“I learned to know everyone [over the years], and it was a lot of fun... people learned to trust me. You said that “they don't have time for us,” but if I would be there, they wouldn't DARE to say “I don't have time” to me - They would somehow try to find it.” [I3]

“I emphasize the trust there... you have to have the trust... [For example], if you say something about vision that I fully don't understand, but if I trust you, according to the data, actually I don't need to understand it, because I trust you, I believe that you

probably got it, I believe you, then let's do it. And then it's easier to go forward with the change." [I5]

Interviewee I5, an expert in change management, points out a critical element of trust in change initiatives. Often times change is complex, but even if an individual does not fully understand the change or the vision for the future, if they trust their leader, then they do not even need to understand the complexity. Finally building trust through informal connections also provides a legitimacy maintenance strategy by “stockpiling goodwill and support” (Suchman 1995).

6.4 Ambassadors & Advocates

The fourth key finding in this research involves the importance of enlisting ambassadors and advocates throughout the organization for support of design thinking. This finding goes hand in hand with Suchman’s (1995) suggested strategy for gaining legitimacy: manipulate environments. When legitimacy cannot be gained through strategies of conformity or environment selection, teams must instead proactively create seek legitimacy via social networks and enlisting subsidiary actors. Suchman (1995) refers to these legitimization efforts as “collective mobilization” or evangelism. He says, “Simple persistence rarely matches the transformative power of true collective action” (Suchman 1995). Furthermore, Rauth et alia (2015) find the same to be true among their research participants; establishing networks of ambassadors is a key strategy they employ to enlist support. Enlisting and establishing ambassadors and advocates takes place at many levels, and can take on many forms.

6.4.1 Leadership Sponsorship

The first element of gaining and maintaining legitimacy through ambassadors and advocates is attaining sponsorship and buy-in at the leadership level. The need for design labs’ leadership sponsorship and buy-in became apparent in this research from the very beginning. Design simply will not succeed in the public sector without support at the highest leadership levels. This finding came up regularly in interviews, and in discussions with fellow designers in immigration (SAI 1):

"If you think of a public sector organization, the commitment, motivation, and this kind of ambitious-ness from the top management is really a key to success." [I1]

From discussions with peer organizations around the world, countless times they told us how critical it was that they had sponsorship and support from senior leadership in their teams. [Reflection from SAI 1]

Moreover, findings emphasized that the support needs to come from the highest levels of leadership. Tönurist et alia (2017) similarly observe that, “The most significant factor of

survival in these cases [of government design labs]... was chief executive support.” This was further substantiated by interview findings:

“And the vision has to be very strongly seen by the leadership - all the leadership... and the higher level of managers the better. If the leadership doesn't understand or share the vision, it is a really rocky road of actually completing the vision... because the leaders are the ones who are then talking to their teams...” [I5]

Interviewee I5 highlights that teams look to their leaders for the vision, so it is crucial that the top leaders share and understand the vision. Top management can act as a champion, providing overall support and advocacy, and the “free pass” to open doors in the organization. With the support of key top management, by association, comes credibility. Kannan-Narasimhan (2014) describes this as, “legitimacy based on governance structures.” Moreover, Rauth et alia (2015) find that the involvement of top management helps create cognitive and moral legitimacy. Furthermore, Lykketoft (2014) finds at MindLab that top management play a critical role, both as sponsors, and as enablers of the flexibility and maneuverability that MindLab requires within their ministries.

Additionally, findings specifically emphasize the role of middle managers as well. This is corroborated by the literature as Bason (2010, 104) and Elsbach and Stigliani (2018) discuss how any “real” organizational change requires the buy-in and support from across the organization, and this will not happen without the support of the middle management layer. In particular, resources will not be made available without middle manager buy-in and support. One prime example came up in interview I3:

“...Start looking at the 2nd layer of the units, the teams. I know that we have a lot of people who are now leading 40-50 person teams... so they are in those types of positions that would be the perfect target for gaining buy-in...” [I3]

This finding and further corroboration from literature were the impetus for the Middle Manager Workshop intervention (SAI 4). SAI 4 proved to be a very useful way to think strategically about relationship management, to consider where buy-in is most needed, and to enlist the support of Inland’s managers to help build and attain it. Suchman (1995) discusses how legitimacy is gained either through personal and individual validity or through the validity of the work. The middle manager workshop enabled the team to strategically assess where validity was or was not strong, and then put their best foot forward for gaining legitimacy:

“We got the strategic view plus the tacit organizational knowledge view from our bosses.” [I6 about SAI 4]

Additionally, Bason and Schneider (2014) suggest that when government labs can align with leaders and champions who are already inside the organization, those who know the inner workings and the politics, that then government design labs can be a “powerful tool for change.” This was the type of sponsor Inland had in the beginning with their original founder, as interviewee I2 described him:

"[The Inland founder] knew everything, had a long background in Migri, so that he could be a lever in the organization..." [I2]

Moreover, he had that type of individual validity described by Suchman (1995) that leads to credibility, trust, and legitimacy. This was observed during the fourth week of this research study as one of Inland's designers sought confirmation that he would be present for an important meeting with Migri leadership:

"Do you think you can participate in the meeting? I cannot go alone to talk to them about the future of Inland... I need your backup on this." [Fieldnotes from Feb 5]

Her sentiment has to do with the validity, credibility, and legitimacy that he had in the organization. She was too new to have established such credibility, and the propriety of the work was still not established, thus the best route to legitimacy during this very important meeting was through the individual validity of her boss, Inland's founder.

Early and frequent changes to Inland's management structure, however, created legitimacy challenges for Inland. When this particular manager left the Inland organization, Inland was left with a large legitimacy gap. Where previously legitimacy and credibility were granted based on his validity and credibility, now Inland had to reactively seek sponsorship at the highest levels all on their own. Inland did this through organizational ingenuity techniques, as Kannan-Narasimhan (2014) describes. Inland established bi-monthly meetings with key leaders, and began to attend critical board meetings. Through those board meetings, they discovered opportunities to support the Migri organization, and attain resources by focusing on projects with high attention from the board managers. While not an ideal situation, these practices proved critical to Inland attaining high level leadership sponsorship.

6.4.2 A Network of Advocates

The second element of legitimacy via ambassadors and advocates is the establishment of a network of advocates throughout the organization. This is something Inland sought to build very early on in their strategy. Such a network of advocates goes a long way in helping lobby for the benefits of design in the organization. This strategy was later encouraged and corroborated repeatedly in interviews, as well as the advisory board meeting:

"You can't do it yourself; you need the rest [of the organization]. Focus on somehow engaging a larger group of people with you, because you are the ones thinking forward here. Find the early majority. They are not as advanced, but they have the ability to follow you: to make big impact." [Paraphrase from AB4]

"You need people who will speak for you. You have to lobby. You have to mobilize your colleagues, who are respected enough that they will be listened to, that if they find out that you are useful, they will speak for you: 'our business will suffer if [Inland] doesn't continue.' This is much more powerful." [Paraphrase from AB4]

Advisory board member AB4 is describing precisely what Suchman (1995) speaks of in his description of the "manipulate environments" strategy to gain legitimacy. He describes this

type of legitimacy strategy as evangelism or advertising, but AB4's "lobbying" is even more appropriate considering the context of government design labs. The type of change involved in bringing design thinking in to the public sector cannot be done alone. Change of this magnitude requires leadership sponsors, advocates, and as many like-minded individuals as possible.

Suchman (1995) characterizes collective action as having "transformative" legitimation power. Collective action can take the form of "popularization" or of "standardization." One such popularization and standardization strategy that Inland is leading within Migri is a "Service Design Ambassadors" training series. This training series was organized in collaboration with Migri's HR team, and involves over 30 Migri employees during two days a month, for a year. This training has enormous potential to help bring standardization of the design thinking terms, techniques, and methods into the whole Migri organization. This series functions as a strategy for gaining legitimacy when institutionally innovating (Deephouse et alia 2017), and furthermore of organizational ingenuity to leverage resources (Kannan-Narasimhan 2014). According to Suchman (1995) it functions as a "bridging" strategy directly into constituent organizations to help maintain legitimacy.

In one Lunch and Learn session (SAI 5), the ambassador training was discussed multiple times, as it was perceived as a positive thing, both for people in Migri to get to know Inland, as well as for its overall mandate to bring new ways of working to Migri. Similarly, Rauth et alia (2015) identify how such design-related trainings (and specifically those in collaboration with HR) help to build both cognitive and moral legitimacy. The very nature of training and learning a new skill is motivating for the organization, acts as a reward to employees, and a chance to build understanding of the new design team. In another Lunch and Learn, the director expressed his hopefulness and interest in his team's participation in the ambassador training, even despite the fact that he did not totally understand service design yet.

However, advocates and ambassadors of design need not only take the form of an official ambassador training or network. It is equally valuable to simply enlist like-minded and change-oriented individuals at all levels whenever and wherever possible. This finding came up in interviews, in field notes, in the Middle Manager Workshop (SAI 4), as well as in Lunch and Learn sessions (SAI 5). Advocates can be gained by simply joining forces with those like-minded individuals informally:

"There are people within the government who really would like to change things. One of the strategies is to join them..." [I3]

"Somebody used to call them 'change agents,' but I wouldn't use that term (it's from the 80s or 90s), but those people that have a motivation to kind of challenge the current way of working, because they see that it could be better... maybe that could be harnessed more for the use of the organization." [I1]

Overall, design teams are often quite small (Bason 2010), and thus they need to gather as many people “on their team” as possible. This not only helps to accomplish more of their mission, but also plays a critical role in gaining and maintaining legitimacy.

6.5 Positioning

The fifth key finding in this research concerns the positioning in the organization, both literally and figuratively. One defining element of most government design labs is that they do things differently; they bring a new approach to innovation and problem solving inside the public sector. This then goes entirely against what Suchman (1995) describes as the “conformity” strategy of legitimation. If a design lab were to leverage a conformation strategy, they would conform to the existing social and organizational structure of their broader public sector organization. For Inland, and for most design labs, that is completely out of the question. With that comes multiple challenges about where and how to position oneself from an organizational design perspective. In this thesis research, the issue of organizational positioning came up frequently, and in multiple respects.

6.5.1 The Purpose

The first element of legitimacy through positioning involves the overall purpose of the organization. Choosing the right purpose statement for a government design lab is one valuable tactic in establishing legitimacy. A recurring finding from this research is the critical element of how design labs choose to position their purpose or the need for design in government.

The most common purpose for bringing design into government, found in this research, relates to technology and digitalization, and the resulting transformations and disruptions that they will cause. This theme was discussed repeatedly in interviews (I1, I2, I3, and I4) as well as in the literature (Tönurist et al. 2017). First, interviewee I1 discussed how technological innovation in the private sector affects clients’ expectations in the public sector, through *liquid expectations*:

“...Now it's easy [for clients] to compare a service that you get from Amazon to services you get from the Finnish Immigration Service. In my opinion, that is called "liquid expectations." They are not expectations to Migri anymore, but expectations to services in general. ...So if [our clients] see that something is very fluid and they really enjoy the digital services somewhere, they will think our [Migri] services should be the same.” [I1]

Thus, whether or not global public sector agencies, themselves have a technology and innovation strategy, they will be affected by global technology trends, at least indirectly. Furthermore, many of the global design labs and innovators in government that Inland networked with in SAI 1 discussed the power that technology and digitalization provide, as a driving force, or a reason for change in the public sector. When talking about the founding purpose for Inland, the founders both discussed technological disruption as a driving force:

"We saw that there was kind of a technological disruption that will take place during the next 10 years..." [I3]

"...This disruption will affect every part of the society - the private life of people, businesses and organizations, etc. Because of the increasing technical maturity, everything is possible. Technology is not restricting anything anymore, so how do we take advantage of that technology? It won't happen if we don't experiment different approaches... We need openness, we need participation. This is something different. There is a need for that." [I1]

In fact, this combination of technology and new ways of working is what makes Inland unique and a forerunner in the Finnish public sector:

"That's actually why I got excited about Inland, because it's not just human-centric design, but it's also combined to technology. You actually have developers in-house. That's an interesting setting." [I4]

Another way to think about legitimacy through positioning is to align with those interests of the Finnish government at large. Interviewee I3 brings up the critical element of aligning with the governmental agenda. In many countries today, technological disruption and innovation are high on the agenda, and for a government design lab, aligning with a technological disruption agenda enables support and credibility from the highest levels of government. In speaking of the founding of Inland, interviewee I3 discussed this:

"If you look at the high level political or organizational agenda, what are the key 3-5 really urgent themes/topics on top of that agenda? You should somehow be there. That is why we actually tried to do this. We tried to position so that Inland is focusing on such issues, themes, or challenges that should be actually quite high on the political agenda." [I3]

Moreover, interviewee I3 went on to discuss the particular importance of AI on the Finnish government's agenda. By aligning with the high level government's agenda of the need for AI and technological readiness, Inland can attain organizational legitimacy as they are. According to Suchman (1995), this is one way to gain legitimacy by "selecting among environments." According to Rauth et alia (2015) aligning design thinking with existing innovation objectives is a way to establish pragmatic legitimacy.

Once the purpose has been decided upon, it is important to establish understanding and agreement among the organization of the need for change by design. Legitimacy is founded on understanding, and subsequently the organization needs to understand the need for and value of design, in the first place. However, the work does not stop there; they need to agree with it. Regardless if the purpose of the design lab is technology-oriented, or responding to a specific government initiative, or something else entirely, the organization needs to become bought into that purpose/need, and subsequently agree with it:

"The people need to understand it, and they need to also agree with it." [I5]

"I think it starts from describing the problem setting together with the people... start from there. Then start talking to them: 'Do you agree? What don't you agree with?'

Then once you have agreement that there is a need for change - then you can actually start." [I4]

Interviewee I4 said it well that you cannot even start until you have this agreement on the need for change. This point relates back to the previous points on ensuring everyone is heard, and establishing buy-in. In order for constituents to deem design labs credible and legitimate, they need to understand and agree with their purpose.

6.5.2 Team Identity vs. Organization Identity

The second element of positioning legitimacy relates to the positioning of the team's identity. Does the design lab conform to the organizational identity, or adopt its own individual identity? This finding came up periodically during this research as it relates to organizational identity on many levels. First, a frequent conversation during this research had to do with Inland having a distinct and separate visual identity:

"Should we have our own identity? [Another global design team in immigration] isn't doing this. They particularly wanted to stay a normal part of the overall organization. They don't have their own website or anything else. I wonder if our website, branding, and so on is making us less accessible to our Migri people? But it is true that by being ambitious and having our website, brand, and so on is making us more visible..." [Fieldnotes from Mar 8]

There are multiple schools of thought on government design labs adopting the identity of their government agencies, or establishing their own. And there are pros and cons on each side. Rauth et alia (2015) discover that adapting to the existing organizational culture elements, like branding, helps to build moral legitimacy in the organization. However, Lykketoft (2014) also identifies the importance of maintaining independence and flexibility to do things differently. One Migri employee voiced her disapproval of Inland using their own brand and identity online:

Today our team was criticized for having our own Inland brand, website, blog, and twitter... Why should Inland be the only Migri team that has their own? "Do you think you're the only ones who want to help immigrants?" [Fieldnotes from May 16]

According to Ashforth & Gibbs (1990), this is a legitimacy defense issue, a challenge of Inland's overall value. Yet, on the other hand, in two separate cases Migri managers found Inland's unique brand to be an asset, especially as a means to communicate with groups who do not currently have a positive impression of Migri.

Similarly, we often discussed the pros and cons of Inland having their own unique strategy and strategic identity. This was discussed during the SOAP Workshop (SAI 2) in detail. While Inland's work is certainly in support of Migri's strategy, Inland has its own focus and directions in order to do so. Like Migri, Inland aims to support the well-being of immigrants in Finland. Yet, Inland seeks to support immigrants and the organization through design tools. Thus, Inland may in fact have a unique strategy from the broader Migri strategy in

order to achieve those goals, with their particular means. However, at the highest level, Inland and similar design teams must align with the broad organization's strategy.

The very purpose of Inland is to do things differently, and that stance creates a legitimacy stance as well for the organization. Being visually and strategically different enables Inland to operate differently, use different tools, go about things in a new way from the rest of the organization:

Doing things differently and positioning ourselves as different actually serves us quite well... it opens doors, even enables certain privileges. We are agile, we prototype things, we try things, and we get a lot done quickly. [Fieldnotes from Apr 13]

In the end the decision was clear to keep a separate identity, to enable Inland to operate in its own flexible, unique, and different way. It is important, however, to recognize and be prepared for the legitimacy defense activities that will ensue, like what was observed in fieldnotes above. A unique and separate team identity (both visually and strategically) goes against the norms of the overall organization, and makes legitimacy harder to gain. Design labs need to be aware of and proactively prepare for this dichotomy.

6.5.3 Organizational Structure

The third element of positioning legitimacy involves organizational structure. The positioning of the design lab within the overall organizational structure plays a key role in legitimacy and in the success and possibilities of the organization. This finding came up in interviews, during the advisory board meeting, and in field notes and observations. In Suchman's (1995) legitimacy terms, one strategy for gaining legitimacy is to "select among environments" for the most welcoming environment. One piece of this is the position of the lab within the agency. Interviewee I2 brought up what a difference it makes having the 'helping hand' function of Inland inside Migri, versus simply having consultants:

"...[What I don't like about consultants is that] half the time goes when you orient them to what we do, and then you get something that's not so good." [I2]

I2 raises a very important point for government design labs - about their position inside of or outside of the government and the role. Having anyone (designers included) not embedded in the government agency gives the perception that they are not fully invested. It is particularly important to consider the practical and legitimacy-oriented ramifications of the position of the design lab within the government. In the case of Inland, being official civil servants within the agency opens doors to much deeper collaboration, and enables projects that go far deeper than a consulting company, or even a government design lab that acts as a cross-governmental consultancy. Similarly, Lykketoft (2014) notes that MindLab's position inside the Danish ministries positions the design lab and the overall organization as colleagues, which enables greater networking opportunities:

You know the ministry from the inside and we see you as colleagues. You follow up after a while and ask how the implementation went and if you can assist with anything to support that process further. That gives you credibility and makes it worth coming to MindLab. (A middle manager in: Lykketoft's 2014)

This, as well as other literature (e.g. Bason 2010; Bason & Schneider 2014; Tönurist et al. 2017), suggests that organizational positioning within the public sector organization itself enables government design labs to make the greatest impact. However, it does not stop there. It is equally important to consider the design lab's organizational positioning within the government organization itself. This finding arose in the advisory board meeting, in fieldnotes, and interviews. Advisory board member AB1 brought this point up as organizational design:

"One kind of design you are doing is organizational - organization design. You have a vision here... but what is the problem that the organization design will solve? You can frame that problem in many ways: societal, civil servant work, services not working, public relations problems... There are several problems to diagnose. Which one is Inland focusing on? Then the possible organizational form of inland - it could take many forms, depending on the different problem." [Paraphrase from AB1]

Advisory board member AB1 suggests first considering what the problem is that Inland is solving, specifically, and that the organizational structure should follow. This suggests a proactive and strategic approach to organizational design and structure. Additionally, in fieldnotes, I captured conversations where we considered the pros and cons of various alignments within Migri:

Today we discussed how we should be aligned inside Migri, strategically. Is it better to report into an organization that understands service design? Or one more strategically central that doesn't understand what service design is and what it can do, but allows for greater influence? [Fieldnotes from Feb 6]

For Inland, and similar government design labs, it is important to consider the strategic and locational ramifications of reporting. For example, what is communicated by the department positioning? As with Inland reporting into the IT department, this often causes confusion for people when they would work on projects that were not necessarily tech-driven. Moreover, government design labs must consider how they want to work. This is similar to Suchman's (1995) "select among environments" - which departmental environment is the most welcoming of design and design practices? Government design labs should be conscious, as well, of the most favorable environment for their work, in order to attain and maintain legitimacy.

6.5.4 Incentives

The fourth element of position legitimacy relates to the incentives within the organization. The incentive structure inside and above the public sector organization plays a big role in the ease or difficulty of the lab attaining legitimacy. This pertains to how the organization and

the people within are incented. Does the lab's mandate align with the overall organizational incentives? Is the lab positioned so that it is needed to achieve the organizational goals?

In the case of Migri, this is a particularly applicable topic. Migri acts as a service provider to residents of Finland, implementing the policies and laws of the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, their mandate comes from above, and they have particular targets that need to be met. Therefore, when thinking about introducing new innovation-focused ways of doing things, it is critical to assess if those ways of working fit within the organizational paradigm; if not, legitimacy gaining is nearly impossible to attain. This topic of incentives was pervasive in the data - in interviews (I1, I2, I3, I4, & I5), in the Lunch and Learn intervention (SAI 5), as well as in fieldnotes.

Organization-level Incentives

It is important to consider if the incentives at the organization level align with the purpose of the design lab. Incentives at the organization-level include such things as how the public sector organization, itself, is incented:

"Government agencies are not without the upper layers above them. We just implement strategies. We are that part of the state which does not make laws, and we are not the legal thing, but we just implement things. That is very important to understand." [I3]

"All things can't be changed internally from Migri because there are superpowers on top of us: The Ministry of Interior. What are their steering methods, their expectations, what are the targets?... The primary target is internal efficiency. That also defines the practices and processes that affect the steering methods, and what is expected from us from the Ministry of Interior or the government." [I1]

Public sector organizations, like Migri, answer to higher level government bodies. They do not necessarily have the freedom to make any change they want. In many cases public sector organizations are driven by strict productivity and efficiency targets. This is a relic of the NPM approach to public sector management, and Migri is no exception. It came up in interviews repeatedly about Migri's operational effectiveness and productivity targets:

"A lot of what flows from the Ministry is quantitative requirements. We need to be more efficient. We need to do a certain number of asylum decisions per man year; we must cut down our salary budget 2% per year from now until 2020, and so on..." [I3]

"We should be 5% more effective every year. So, operational effectiveness is the main issue." [I2]

The bottom line at Migri is meeting the effectiveness targets set by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. Elsbach and Stigliani (2018) identify that design thinking clashes in organizational cultures driven by such strict quantitative targets. Thus, from a legitimacy perspective, it is important to be aware of this culture clash in advance, and proactively approach the resulting legitimacy challenge.

While making immigration services easier for customers is the first of Migri's strategic priorities, there are no key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure and track this metric for the organization. Interviewee I1 described the lack of incentive for change as a symptom of the agencies' "sleeping success:"

"I sometimes say that the organization, from top management down, has a sort of "sleeping success." Because we've achieved something without doing a lot of improvement work. There is a hidden feeling that we are quite good, so why should we be better? Why should we change the way we work? Working this way, and we have done quite well. This creates the feeling that the culture and bureaucracy and hierarchy that we have - the organization structures and everything - they haven't been a barrier for preventing the good things to happen... There's no need for change." [I1]

If it isn't broken, why fix it? This highlights certain incentives and disincentives for the people. Is it worth their while to try a new and potentially risky way of working, when they actually are measured by meeting specific targets? Is it realistic to make a change happen that does not align with the KPIs of the overall organization? Can a design lab gain legitimacy when their purpose does not align with those same KPIs? Design labs must consider how to mitigate legitimacy challenges that arise if their goals do not align with the existing KPIs in the organization.

Personnel-level Incentives

This relates to the second point about incentives, personnel-level incentives. Are the people in the organization incented to work in new design-thinking-oriented ways? How is success derived for them? Do people have the support, the skills, the motivation to be able to change the way they work? Interviewee I4 discussed how incentives for the personnel are often lacking in new government design and experimentation initiatives:

"What are the incentives for the people?... salaries, career progression, ... what if this new way of working is not drawing in the same direction? What are often lacking are incentives for the people who work for the government, to do things differently. There are very few incentives for that. So even though if you have projects, spear-head projects on your table, there's hardly any incentive for doing that in a very new way. There are so many risks [for the individual] because they don't have the skills yet, they can't do it, which is very understandable." [I4]

Without an incentive to change the way of working, creating legitimacy of an organization aimed at "doing things differently" is very difficult. Thus, it is important to consider the targets, metrics, incentives pre-existing inside the organization. Is it possible to align with existing incentives, as Rauth et alia (2015) suggest? This helps to build both cognitive and moral legitimacy. Without any alignment, design labs run the risk of their efforts competing with the real goals of the organization.

Overall positioning is an important lever when it comes to organizational legitimacy. Legitimacy requires understanding. In order for the organizational constituents to understand something like a design lab, they need to understand its purpose, how it fits in to

the broader organizational identity, where it physically fits in the organization, and how its goals relate to the organizational goals. In some cases the design mandate to “be different” will cause legitimacy clashes and challenges, which design labs can be prepared for to proactively mitigate. While it may not be conceivable to align purpose, identity, structure and incentives with those of the organization, design labs should strategically choose which to align, and which to mitigate.

6.6 Prove the Value

The sixth key finding from this research has to do with proving the value of design in government. This is a common challenge faced by design labs, both in the public and private sectors. Rauth et alia (2015) uncover the same challenge among the six design thinking teams that they study. Their study participants discuss how most of the values of design thinking are intangible, qualitative in nature, and difficult to track, let alone measure. Moreover, Elsbach & Stigliani (2018) deduce that the focus of large corporations and public sector agencies alike, on efficiency and productivity, often leads to a cultural division between the design team and the parent organization. Both the literature, as well as findings from this research show that “proving it” can be quite difficult for design labs. Yet the socially-constructed nature of success means that “proving” success has the potential to help organization constituents deem legitimacy (Suchman’s 1995).

6.6.1 Using a Narrative Approach to Communicate Value

The first element of showing the results is using a narrative approach to communicate the value of design in government. This is one example tactic to help the organization gain understanding of the work of design labs, and subsequently build legitimacy. During this research, two methods were used to tell Inland’s story and communicate their value: the Strategy on a Page (SAI 2) and the Strategic Identity work (SAI 3). The outcomes and findings from both of these interventions helped Inland to articulate what they do in a clear, concise, and visual way. However, both methods lacked the critical element of value:

*"[Designers] love talking what we do and how, but sometimes forget to tell results."
[Paraphrase from AB3]*

Both tools worked well internally for Inland and with peer government design labs to explain what Inland does and how. However, they are not necessarily the appropriate tools for communicating what Inland does to key internal Migri stakeholders. For that, the advisory board urged Inland to consider using a narrative approach, focused on communicating the value:

"What I haven't seen is the narrative: Inland in the broader societal frame. Two years can be hard to show success. A narrative is required to communicate what happened: complexity, change, new ways of operating, show the value behind the projects and processes, what other development happened? There is a risk if you can't show the

movement, if you don't have grand successes, but if you can show the development in the background..." [Paraphrase from AB2]

This was a very important point brought up in the advisory board meeting. In fact, the advisory board members gave Inland homework to create the new version of Inland's narrative by the next advisory board meeting:

"Maybe you could create the next version of your narrative. I like the idea of the narrative: How is the world changing? What is the impact on Migri? On society? Telling the story of how inland provides value." [Paraphrase from AB3]

"Narrative: we have provided value this way to this person..." [Paraphrase from AB1]

Additionally, Martin (2007) suggests using analogy, "...Crafting a story that takes an existing idea in operation elsewhere and show how it is similar to the novel idea being proposed." A narrative approach focuses the storytelling on the value, tying the work of the design lab back to the purpose, the need for change, and the reasons for being. When those elements are connected to the values that the rest of the organization cares about, this helps them to relate to the work, and become interested in the new techniques used to create value.

6.6.2 Show Results

*The main capabilities of i-labs [i.e. innovation labs, design labs] lie in their ability to jump-start or **showcase** user-driven service redesign projects. (Tönurist et al. 2017)*

The second element of proving the value of design is showing results. Showing the results of design thinking in the public sector is a constant question in literature on the subject (Bason 2010; Lykketoft 2014; Tönurist et al. 2017). Existing literature suggests that no design lab has yet established best practice for showing results, "It can be argued that the optimal way of measuring has yet to be found" (Lykketoft 2014). Lykketoft (2014) goes on to describe the four different angles that public sector organization can use to show value: productivity, service, results, and democracy. While it is very difficult to create value in all four dimensions at once, design labs need to show value in at least one in order to gain legitimacy. Suchman (1995) encourages "accumulating a record of technical success" as one strategy for gaining legitimacy. Performing technically, he says, results in legitimacy and validation within the organization. This finding was also discussed both in interviews, and during the advisory board meeting:

"Of course, showing results when you have them, is really important." [I4]

"...Importance of showing results, and the value: show savings, suggest where to direct resources, etc." [Paraphrase from AB3]

Designers are very good at talking about what they do and how. Thus, this is a bit of a mental shift to focus not on what they do or how they do it, but instead on the bottom line. In field notes, I noted a discussion within Inland about the provocative idea that designers should

stop talking about design, but instead about improvement and effectiveness. In terms of communicating to the predominantly effectiveness-oriented mindset of public servants, that idea is exactly what is needed. Advisory board member AB3 shared this thought as well:

"People are tired of hearing "design," but get excited when they see the value... I have learned to appreciate the numbers too. Show the savings - where to direct the resources." [Paraphrase from AB3]

Martin (2007) refers to designers and executives speaking each other's' language. Numbers, not processes, are most certainly the language of executives, and of Migri leaders. Advisory board member AB3 suggests borrowing from the business case methodology to show results:

"Business case building: Before starting a project, you need to do a business case analysis to calculate if it is worth it. Is it worth the money? Societally - what kind of societal impact if we make this change? What are the positive effects? What does it mean to Migri? The leadership requires this to make a decision." [Paraphrase from AB3]

Many public sector agencies, like Migri, have quantitative results that they must achieve annually. They have targets given by the government, and numerical metrics to achieve. Thus, one of the most powerful ways for design to show results is by using those same numerical goals as their parent organizations:

"Yes, put it in euros. The chatbot example is a juicy case - show its value in euros." [Paraphrase from AB5]

For public sector managers and business managers alike, nothing tells a story quite like numbers. Martin (2007) discusses how designers and business managers both bring different skill sets to an organization, but that they typically do not understand each other:

Business executives live in an ecosystem that rewards meeting budgets, hitting quarterly earnings targets and 'proving' in advance that initiatives will succeed.... Designers worry less about whether they can replicate a particular process and more about producing a valid solution to the problem before them. (Martin 2007)

During a discussion with a global peer innovation team in immigration, we discussed the power of combining quantitative results with qualitative results:

"You need both. Leaders want the numbers, while qualitative data describes what's behind the numbers. If you only show quantitative, then there is nothing in it for them to even get curious about. So BOTH are needed: Quantitative: what are the problems? Qualitative: what's causing the problems?" [Fieldnotes from Apr 12]

While there may not be a proven model for showing results, there are various tactics and methods that can help design labs prove the value, and thus "accumulate a record of technical success" in the terms that their respective government organizations understand success.

6.6.3 Quick Wins

The third element of proving the value is that of creating *quick wins*. Most design labs, Inland included, are initially hired for short term 2-3 year contracts (e.g. Lykketoft 2014), thus they need to prove their worth in short time frames in order to ensure their longevity. Thus, they often do not have much time to “prove it:”

“Usually with labs it is a two way street: need to find something to show it’s useful and meanwhile do other things that have longer term goal.” [Paraphrase from AB2]

Advisory board member AB2 above points out the balance that is required in government design lab work. On the one hand, design labs need to show results to prove their usefulness, and on the other hand they are often working on broader longer term change goals. Quick wins enable design labs to quickly communicate their success, which in turn helps to build cognitive legitimacy in the organization (Rauth et al. 2015), and builds toward Suchman’s (1995) record of success. Deephouse et alia (2017) summarize various methods of concretely demonstrating accomplishments through *substantive actions*, thus creating pragmatic legitimacy. Substantive action came up in this research in interviews, field notes, and the advisory board meeting, in the form of quick wins:

“I think it’s better if we have small experiments in a limited area. This way people can understand, and the people participating will learn by example.” [I1]

Tiny interventions sometimes have the best results. Another team uses rapid prototyping, combined with 4 week sprints to quickly prove the benefits of design. [Fieldnotes from Jan 29]

Thus small experiments and interventions have the potential to quickly help the people in the organization understand and experience design thinking. Furthermore, advisory board members suggested that design labs run many projects concurrently, helping to mitigate the potential failure of any given number of the projects:

“Don’t have 3-4 projects, have several. For example, 12 failed, but look at these 6 that succeeded!” [Paraphrase from AB2]

“...Experiments, whether they go well or not, are always a learning. If we succeed or fail, it’s learning. Failure is very important in terms of how you learn, because you learn by failures, you don’t learn by success stories.” (I1)

Interviewee I1’s sentiment is similar to Camillus’ (2008):

...Make mistakes from which you can learn... Companies like GE and Fujitsu encourage risk taking and celebrate thoughtfully implemented initiatives even if they turn out to be failures. These companies believe that unexpected and even unsatisfactory results contribute to organizational learning.

Designers and innovators alike see failure as positive; “we learned something!” Whereas, business-minded individuals tend to see failure as negative, as something lost. This relates to Martin’s (2007) aforementioned schism between designer’s and executive’s orientations.

Elsbach and Stigliani (2018) discover that organizations that have a preexisting culture that embraces experimentation and is open to failure are pre-disposed to support design thinking. On the other hand, quantitatively efficiency-driven cultures, like Migri and many public sector organizations, tend to be risk averse and are predisposed both to clash with design thinking, and its failure-embracing mentality.

As section 2.1 illustrated, design thinking is anchored in experimentation. Crazy ideas are brainstormed, prototyped, and then tested, while the expectation is to learn from failed elements of the prototype, and iterate to get closer and closer to innovative solutions that support the user. However, it is important to be aware of the fundamental culture clash that any such “failure” has in risk-averse organizations, like the public sector. The very word itself is repulsive for many, as was observed in fieldnotes:

“Don’t call it “failure,” I don’t like that word...” [Fieldnotes from May 3]

Government design labs will not change a risk averse organizational culture overnight, but they should be aware of the culture clashes with regards to failure, and proactively position them as learning. Moreover, they can take advice from Inland’s advisory board and mitigate the inherent failure that comes with experimentation by running many small experiments and projects, versus investing too heavily in a few small projects.

7 Discussion

"...Over the last 10 years, we've seen the emergence of innovation labs all around the world. This development pace is even accelerating right now. There are 100s already, I would say. And what is clear is that there is a need for renewing things in governance systems. Some of the labs have been really successful already; they've shown results. But in my opinion nobody has been able to mainstream the new approaches very well yet. And I think that's because it's a really complex matter... In a nutshell I would say it's a very multi-layered thing to incorporate totally new ways of working inside public administration. And, nobody has kind of made the effort to do it in a really holistic way yet, because it is a big thing." (I4)

Attaining legitimacy of design in the public sector is, indeed, no easy task. It involves introducing multiple layers of newness to old and traditional structures: new techniques, new methods, new tools, and new values and ideals. Applying organizational legitimacy theory, proactively, in the early stages of design lab formation may however, provide a holistic framework, as I4 says above, to fast forward the credibility, legitimacy, and ultimately success of government design labs.

This research aims to examine the practices and strategies that make or break legitimacy in one such design lab, Inland Design, and this chapter discusses said findings. The first section summarizes the results of this research, thus answering the research questions. The second section outlines the contribution this research makes to existing research. The third section describes the limitations of the research. The fourth section provides suggestions for future research. The fifth section details practical implications for Inland.

7.1 Results

7.1.1 Practices that Help and Hinder Legitimacy

This research uncovered six key themes regarding legitimacy in Inland Design. These six research finding themes are examined in light of research question one:

RQ1: What practices helped and/or hindered the organizational legitimacy during the early stages of Inland Design in Migri?

First, this research found that communication is a key element to the legitimacy of newly formed government design labs. One of the foundational elements of organizational legitimacy is understanding, which ultimately boils down to communication. This research found that pervasive use of design-oriented terminology hindered Migri's understanding, and thus their ability to deem Inland legitimate. Furthermore, while Inland's new and unique ways of working and communicating are part of their design values, as well as their overall mandate, those methods created numerous communication breakdowns, which further hindered their legitimacy within Migri. Moreover, understanding and legitimacy were made even more difficult by language barriers in the organization.

In order to help the legitimacy-building process, government design labs need to consciously focus on their communication. By defining and translating the design-centric terms in a way that the constituent organization can understand, design labs help their organizations to understand their work, and deem them legitimate. This is not a question of belittling or simplifying the design profession - it is instead speaking to one's stakeholders in language that they understand. Additionally, by communicating in a way that aligns with the norms and values of the constituent organization, this helps the design lab to appear credible and ultimately legitimate. Finally, this applies not only to confusing terminology and communication methods in one's native language, but also to literally using the native language. This is especially applicable in an ever-globalizing world.

Second, this research found that engagement and involvement of the rest of the government organization is a key tactic to building legitimacy. One of the easiest ways to grow understanding of design thinking is to engage people in the process directly. In Inland, and in like government design labs, it can be easy to immediately focus efforts on co-creation with end users, and it is important to do so. However, it is crucial not to forget the in-house government peers as customers too, and in fact, legitimacy depends on it. This research found that Inland's engagement of Migri employees in the design process was one of the fastest ways to build their legitimacy. The opposite was also true, whereby teams that were not involved and engaged with Inland demonstrated more legitimacy challenges. Moreover, this research found various tactics for helping legitimization processes including creating a physical design space, providing guidance and support of design thinking processes and tools, creating mechanisms to ensure everyone in the organization is heard, and involving multidisciplinary teams in their collaboration.

In order to help the legitimacy-building process, government design labs should proactively create strategies for engaging and involving as much of the organization as possible. This begins with using the very design thinking methodology on the internal customers. Particularly if the design lab's mandate is to support organizational change overall, it is critical that the organization overall feels involved, seen, heard, and understood. Engagement and involvement can take many forms, but some key practices that help build legitimacy include the use of a physical design space, providing explicit design support and guidance, programs that specifically circle the organization to hear everyone, and involving diverse disciplines in co-design projects. Design labs have, no doubt, a lot on their plate to prove the benefits of their ways and methods in a new public sector milieu. However, when it comes to legitimacy building in the broader organization, one of the greatest ways to achieve widespread understanding, trust, and legitimacy is to find ways to engage, hear, and involve as many people as possible across the organization.

Third, this research found a very powerful tactic for overcoming legitimacy defense within public sector organizations - building informal connections. Inland provides a great example of a very small government design lab with very limited resources. Thus, when meetings and

activities had to be prioritized, the informal social meetings were often neglected. This led to Inland being perceived as a mystery to the rest of the organization, which hindered their ability to become legitimate members of the Migri organization. One strategy to overcome that mystery and help build understanding was casual lunches, and agenda-free informal connections. Such informal encounters provided a chance to simply talk, get to know people, and most importantly for the Migri people to get to know and demystify Inland.

Design labs should not overlook the value of informal connections within the organization to build legitimacy. A critical element of organizational legitimacy is the norms and values of the organization, which make up the culture. A considerable part of culture is constructed socially during the casual rituals and social gatherings of the people. Design labs should harness informal connections as a resource to help overcome the stigmatization of newness (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990), to create an “ear to the ground” to understand the rest of the organization, to enable others to get to know them, and finally to build trust.

Fourth, this research found that “collectively mobilizing” ambassadors and advocates of the design lab is a critical practice to build and maintain legitimacy. For a newly formed team, nothing is as powerful for legitimacy as an already credible and legitimate source vouching for you. This research found that a lack of leadership sponsorship hindered Inland’s perceived legitimacy by the rest of the organization. Later, building buy-in and sponsorship proactively helped their overall legitimacy, and thus supported legitimacy within the rest of the organization. Despite great challenges with changing managers throughout their first year, Inland established practices to connect with and stay in sync with the upper management level of Migri, including recurring meetings with key leaders, and attending board meetings and other key team meetings. This is and will remain crucial to their continued perceived legitimacy by the rest of the organization. Moreover Inland’s strategic initiative, “Service Design Ambassadors,” a yearlong training series, proved to be a fantastic practice for helping build legitimacy throughout the organization. The partnership with HR, as well as the broad involvement of many multidisciplinary people across Migri, supported Inland’s legitimacy.

Design labs should strategically enlist and harness ambassadors and advocates of their work. First and foremost, legitimacy of government design labs simply does not occur without the support of the government organizations upper management and leadership. If design labs do not begin with upper level management sponsorship, they should proactively work to gain it. Secondly, a formal training, education, or involvement program like Inland’s “Service Design Ambassadors,” is a fantastic example of a practice to build design advocates at all levels of the organization. This practice is a great strategy for legitimacy building, particularly when done in collaboration with the organization’s human resources team, and plays a key role in evangelizing or lobbying for the value of the design lab. This ties back to the second legitimacy strategy mentioned above, engagement and involvement. By engaging

a network of individuals across the organization, they can experience the benefits of design for themselves, and come to understand its value through experience.

Fifth, this research found that the overall design lab's positioning plays a key role in gaining or defending organizational legitimacy. Inland found that aligning with a technology and digitalization purpose helped them quickly build legitimacy, while aligning with broader experimentation or organization-change strategies hindered the legitimacy processes. Next, this research found that Inland's unique visual and strategic identity both helped and hindered their legitimacy in Migri. For some Migri sources, this unique identity gave them the credibility and flexibility to be different and stray from the communication norms of the organization. Yet, for other Migri sources, Inland was perceived as not conforming to the norms and values of the Migri.

Another key finding was that Inland's team position within the broader organizational structure played a role in their legitimacy. Aligning within the IT team, a team that understands and values design thinking, innovation, and service design, helped their legitimacy in the overall organization. Inland "chose among environments" for the most welcoming environment of their new methods and practices. Finally, Inland found that organizational efficiency-focused incentives hindered their legitimacy, as those incentives are not aligned with Inland's goals of change, introducing new practices, and improving customer experience.

Design labs need to critically consider, and strategically and proactively manage, the ramifications of organizational structure and positioning, and the resulting implications on the lab's legitimacy. By conforming to or aligning with a pre-existing government purpose, design labs can avoid many of the legitimacy challenges they would otherwise face. Similarly, design labs can choose to align with the existing visual and strategic organizational identity to simplify the legitimization process. However, as many design labs have similar mandates as Inland to "be different," this is not an option to conform or align with the existing organizational identities. Thus, design labs must strategically create their own unique identity, meanwhile proactively mitigating the legitimacy challenges and defense that occur.

The very position of the design lab plays a key role on legitimacy. An official in-house position inside of a government agency enables access and opportunity for far-deeper impact. However, there is a growing trend of cross-governmental innovation agencies that attempt to bridge the gap between 20th century disparate government siloes. From this research study it seems very unlikely that the level of access needed to make a meaningful impact on the agency would result from any external party. Quite practically, the key card to walk around and meet with people, the access to the internal intranet where information is shared, and most abstractly but most importantly, simply the "you are one of us" mentality are appetizers at the legitimacy table. Legitimacy and credibility are granted from within the agencies themselves, and thus this research suggests the greatest position is therein. Most

importantly, design labs may sometimes make positioning choices, strategically, that go against the easiest path to legitimacy, and that is okay. It is simply important that they do so consciously, in order to preemptively mitigate the consequential legitimacy downsides.

Sixth, this research found that one of the most straightforward, yet most difficult practices for gaining legitimacy is proving the value. Many of the benefits and values of design thinking are soft and intangible, and not always easy to track. Yet, when brought to public sector organizations that are tasked, by society, to achieve certain productivity and effectiveness goals, design labs simply have to find a way to articulate their value quantitatively. “Success,” in the organization’s eyes leads to legitimacy. Inland found that communicating their value in terms of what they do and how they do it, hindered their legitimacy. Alternatively, Inland’s advisory board members suggested communicating the value of design with a narrative approach, and focusing on detailing quantitative results (e.g. leveraging the business case methodology). Inland’s success with the large and high profile Chatbot project helped them gain legitimacy, while the lack of a long list of many quick success story projects hindered their legitimacy.

Design labs should quickly tackle the challenge of creating a mechanism to communicate their work, and their value. Accumulating successes will lead to validation and legitimacy within the broader organization. Various tactics exist in order to do so. One tactic is to focus communications on the value of the design lab’s work, versus processes and methods. Another tactic is to borrow from the business school and leverage the business case methodology to tell results in terms of bottom line numbers. Finally, focusing on small and quick wins can support design labs in mitigating inevitable experiment “failures” and quickly achieving results, which support their overall legitimacy, and subsequently allow them to focus on broader goals.

7.1.2 Strategic Interventions that Support Legitimacy

This research employed six strategic action interventions within Inland Design. These interventions are examined in light of research question two:

RQ2: What strategic interventions support the organizational legitimacy of new design labs in the public sector?

First, building a network of designers in similar design labs (SAI 1) did not, in fact, support Inland’s organizational legitimacy within Migri. Joining existing networks of innovators and designers in government, and connecting with those specifically working in immigration proved to be a useful tactic internally for Inland to network, learn, and collaborate, but did not impact their legitimacy within Migri. There is potential for networking activities to have a future impact on Inland’s legitimacy. As Lykketoft (2014) describes, international acclaim helped to support MindLab’s legitimacy within the Danish government; the same can be true with Inland’s press and involvement in the international design in government scene. Thus,

while networking activities are extremely important for government design labs, their effect on organizational legitimacy, specifically, is only indirect.

Second, creating a Strategy on a Page (SAI 2) provided a clear and concise operational view of Inland's objectives and work, but it did not necessarily lead to greater understanding and legitimacy within Migri, at least in the short term. The understanding that was required by Migri was still more foundational - an overall lack of understanding of the purpose or mandate of Inland. Findings from this research suggest greater understanding can be achieved with a narrative approach, or through direct engagement and involvement of the people in the design process. Nonetheless, the SOAP proved to be a useful tool for Inland to articulate and communicate their work, which certainly indirectly effects legitimacy. I hypothesize that the SOAP could more directly impact legitimacy if done together with key stakeholders, and mapped directly to the overall organization's strategic priorities.

Third, creating a unique strategic identity (SAI 3) both supported and hindered Inland's organizational legitimacy. On one hand, a unique strategic identity leads to credibility to be different and stray from the traditional norms of the organization. On the other hand, this leads to the perception of not conforming to the norms and values of the organization. In the case of Inland, the value of uniqueness and difference is most important, and thus Inland mitigates the negative perceptions, and leverages the freedom and flexibility of their unique identity.

Fourth, workshopping middle manager buy-in (SAI 4), collaboratively with Inland's managers, proved to be a fantastic strategy for building legitimacy of Inland in Migri. This intervention enabled Inland to proactively manage legitimacy of key middle management stakeholders. Galbraith and Kates' (2007, 243) Relationship Health Check proved to be a very valuable tool to assess key relationships, and focus future relationship actions specifically where it was needed. This strategy helped to build legitimacy through many practices and tactics: engagement and involvement of key stakeholders, leveraging informal connections where appropriate, leveraging Inland's management sponsors, and proactively gaining middle-management sponsorship.

Fifth, leveraging lunch as a strategic intervention (SAI 5) also proved to be a powerful strategy for building the legitimacy of Inland in Migri. Informal meetings, like agenda-free lunches, create an informal platform to get to know people, build informal connections, attain leadership sponsorship, and ensure everyone is heard, engaged, and involved.

Sixth, elements of Inland's long range strategic planning workshop (SAI 6) helped Inland's legitimacy, while overall the workshop neither helped nor hindered legitimacy. One of the key elements of the intervention was to establish a shared vision for the success of Inland. Thus, one of the research phases involved enlisting key Inland managers and leaders in the definition of that success. This element certainly supports the design lab's legitimacy by engaging key sponsors in defining what results need to be proven in order to succeed.

However, as the workshop was run in this research, the scope was too broad, and thus the results were not refined enough to support Inland's legitimacy overall. One opportunity is to run a workshop again, this time involving key Inland stakeholders directly in the workshop, with a clearly defined scope, and focusing on defining not just success, but the key steps to get there.

7.2 Contributions

This research contributes to existing literature on multiple levels. First, this thesis adds to the currently limited body of action research in the business discipline. Additionally, it provides an example research that combines literature and findings across multiple disciplines: design and business. As our world continues to face growing complex and wicked problems, more cross-disciplinary studies of this nature are required to begin to theoretically understand the multidisciplinary ecosystem approaches that are being applied. Moreover, it provides empirical versus theoretical findings on the legitimacy implications of a design thinking team's introduction to a public sector organization.

While management and organizations studies literature has begun to study design thinking, very little literature exists to focus on the nuances of the public sector specifically. As government design labs are a growing trend globally, this thesis research provides a unique glimpse into the case of one such lab in Finland, one of the early global adopters of design in government.

Furthermore, very little literature merges design thinking with the organizational legitimacy lens. Fayard et alia (2017) extensively study the service design profession, but leverage an occupational legitimacy lens. Elsbach and Stigliani (2018) study design thinking in detail, but with a lens of organizational culture. Both of these are close, but not quite the necessary lens for public sector agencies, specifically, introducing design thinking and facing the storming phases (Tuckman 1965) of legitimacy challenges. Rauth et alia's (2015) study of the organizational legitimacy of design thinking teams in large corporations, comes close to the aims of this thesis, however in the private versus public sector. Lykketoft's (2014) chapter in Bason's (2014) *Design for Policy* book is the only literature available on organizational legitimacy of a design lab in the public sector specifically, and still it is a retroactive study. This research provides a view into this unique phenomenon while it is happening.

7.3 Limitations

This research is not without its limitations. There are at least two key limitations in this thesis research. Both limitations relate to the context-centricity of the research results. First, the research design, action research, is highly context centric. Second, the organizational legitimacy literature lens is also highly context bound (Rauth et al. 2015), given its social

construction. The context of this research (i.e. the environment and setting; the individual actors involved; the culture, norms, beliefs, and values of the organization) most certainly affects the results. Subsequently, some may argue that the results of one organization's legitimization practices cannot translate to another organization. Moreover, action research authors discuss similar limitations of action research, and argue about the transferability and replicability of results. This may be true, to some degree. However, in an emerging area with little to no literature, any case can act as a benchmark for cases that follow.

The context of this thesis research may certainly affect its applicability to future government design labs. This case takes place in Helsinki, Finland, arguably an early adopter of design in government practices, and a country with relatively low government corruption, and relatively high belief in the government by the people (OECD 2017b). Specifically, this case involves introducing design to the Finnish Immigration Services office. The type of national government, the structure of government, and then the unique service offering of the particular public sector agency, all play key roles in the results of such a research study. Finally, Inland is a co-design focused design lab, employing service designers specifically. As noted in this study, design labs, even just those in immigration offices, take on very different strategies, not all leveraging design, or service design for that matter. All of these elements affect the results gathered in this study, as well as the individual role of the researcher, herself.

7.4 Suggestions for Future Research

One possibility for future research is to build on the findings from this research, and further study the dynamics of organizational change at Migri, as a whole. Specifically, how design and Inland can enable Migri-wide organizational change. While the lens of this thesis research was organizational legitimacy, a constantly recurring theme in the data related to organizational change. While legitimacy was the necessary first step in understanding the relatively new phenomenon of design thinking in the public sector, a second logical step is to deeply study the dynamics of organizational change. While this research was not focused on an organizational change lens, regardless findings arose repeatedly that suggested its importance:

"This is establishing organizational change. First, rock the boat: something isn't working, thus we need to change. Second, introduce the new idea, the life vest - "we have this approach..." Third, establish a vision for the future, with Inland as a steady part of that future for Migri... a future of Inland and Migri together." [Paraphrase from AB3]

"You need to be changing the culture, which is the most difficult leading process to be done - changing how people really think. What are the attitudes? What are the everyday habits in the organization?" [14]

“...We need to change the culture. This is why you [Inland] are here, by the way... We need to disrupt the way of working...” [Fieldnotes from Apr 4]

This is a very logical next step to study in this relatively new phenomenon of design in the public sector.

7.5 Practical Implications for Inland

The results of this thesis provide practical implications for Inland, in the form of a detailed action plan for Inland, as well as some overall recommendations.

7.5.1 Future Action Plan for Inland

Based on the strategic action interventions carried out during this research, I have created a recommended future action plan for Inland. Most of the foundational elements of Inland's strategy were already in place prior to this research, and were strengthened by the Inland team and the researcher during this research. Thus, for the most part, future strategy actions require low to medium effort, simply to maintain. Figure 23 depicts my proposal for continued work of the six strategic action interventions of this research. The left side (blue) portion of Figure 23 is identical to Figure 11, depicting the work that took place during this study. The right side (green) portion of the figure outlines my future recommendation. The shade of green depicts the amount of work/effort I believe are required (e.g. dark green = high effort, medium green = medium effort, light green = low effort). This figure is discussed in more detail in the sections below.

Network of Designers in Immigration

The bulk of the work to find and establish connections with other designers and innovators in government took place in January and February. Going forward the work to stay connected is the easy part. In some cases, monthly calls have already been scheduled for the rest of 2018. In other cases, conferences are already scheduled. My recommendation is to continue to connect with existing networks for calls every 2 months (shown in Figure 23 as low effort), as well as bigger conferences or exchanges 2-4 times per year (shown in Figure 23 as high effort every 4 months). Most importantly, I recommend expanding the scope from just designers to all innovators working in immigration. A lot can be learned from multidisciplinary and alternative approaches.

Inland’s Strategy on a Page

The bulk of the work to create Inland’s SOAP took place during this research study. At this point, keeping it up to date is a matter of simple edits with minimal effort. This is depicted in Figure 23 as ongoing low effort. This research found it was a useful tool for Inland to articulate their work, internally and externally. Thus, I recommend they keep the SOAP up-to-date with ongoing minimal effort required.

Inland’s Strategic Identity

Similar to Inland’s SOAP, the bulk of the work took place for Inland’s strategic identity during March and April. Very little work is required to maintain it going forward. Based on conversations from the advisory board meeting, however, it is recommended to refocus toward a narrative approach. Inland should focus on telling their story in terms of the value they bring, not just for immigrants, but also for Migri, and society as a whole. In Figure 23, the recommendation is for high and medium effort during the summer to re-write Inland’s identity based on this advice of the advisory board. My recommendation is to revisit that every 3-4 months and make updates and revisions as necessary.




Figure 23: Proposal for continuation of strategic action interventions for Inland

Establishing Mid-Manager Buy-in

While the act of building legitimacy and buy-in from the middle managers of Migri is an ongoing task that is never done, there are a few small tasks that can make the process more strategic and proactive. First, create a simple relationship management tracking system. This could take many forms, but does not need to be complicated. One example is a simple spreadsheet to track the key relationships, the current status of the relationship, and the next steps. Second, hold a discussion or workshop on this topic with the Inland managers on a recurring basis. That could take a really simple format by just checking in with them on the status of the relationship and legitimacy, or it could also leverage the Relationship Health Check tool again. I suggest a quarterly cadence, as shown in Figure 23 as brief high effort every 3 months. One noteworthy lowlight from the Middle Manager Workshop (SAI 4) was that it was rushed; there was not enough time to support the detailed conversations. Thus, I recommend ensuring enough time is set aside for future workshops or discussions.

Lunch & Learn

There is very little effort required to continue the Lunch and Learn approach, as the concept was developed and tested during this research study. My suggestion is that each Inland team member meets with different key leaders and stakeholders in Migri for lunch once per month. These lunches should remain casual, with no agenda other than getting to know people, listening, and providing space for key questions to come up. Naturally, business will be discussed but I think it is most powerful for Inland to use these lunches as a tool for listening.

In addition and separate from lunching, I suggest that Inland undergo user research (i.e. needfinding) with the internal Migri stakeholders. This can take many forms, for example the lunches, or attending team meetings, or even workshops. I believe that Inland needs to needfind together with Migri internally to understand their internal clients' wants, frustrations, and motivations, in order to unearth insights and then co-create solutions together with them.

Long Range Strategic Planning

The long range strategic planning workshop that was held in May acted as a test run. Based on feedback from the workshop, I do not recommend running it again, as is, but instead to reassess the best tools and methods to ensure a long term strategic focus for Inland. My recommendation is to hold a workshop of this nature every six months. As the method cannot, unfortunately, be borrowed from the May workshop, the future workshop is listed in Figure 23 as high effort. I suggest establishing a regular cadence to review Inland's strategic priorities. This should take place with the whole Inland team, including Inland's managers and key leadership advocates.

Assign an Inland Strategy Owner

One of the positive takeaways from this action research related to the benefits of having a team member dedicated to the advancement of Inland's strategy. While it is unfeasible in a small government design lab to have a single person dedicated to strategy long term, it is still powerful having one individual accountable for the strategy work. Borrowing from the RACI methodology (Smartsheet n.d.) in project management, which suggests a clear definition of roles for team members (e.g. responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed), Inland should establish clear roles for the strategy work going forward. I suggest that Inland's team director be accountable to ensure that all necessary strategy activities, workshops, and conversations proceed according to plan.

7.5.2 Overall Recommendations

Overall recommendations for Inland are elucidated in detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis. Inland has already done great work to establish themselves inside the Migri organization, and make a tangible impact on processes for immigrants. The process of legitimization is never done, and thus I recommend Inland to keep an active focus on legitimization. With certain Migri teams, it is simply a matter of legitimacy maintenance, while with others legitimacy and credibility still need to be gained. Deephouse et alia (2017) says, "Legitimacy enhances organizational survival." As Inland seeks to renew their contract after 2.5 years, I recommend they review the legitimacy themes as a team every six months. The intention of these recommendations is to help Inland not just survive, but thrive. Inland Design has such a great opportunity to be a leader in government design in Finland, and in the world!

8 Conclusions

"One of the most worrying statistics that I've seen is how trust between citizens and government is eroding, and almost throughout the OECD countries [only 43% of OECD citizens trust their government (OECD 2018)]. So we are not meeting the expectations. We/governments are not making good results. Now, of course, this is an overstatement, it's not black and white of course, we are also making good results. But at the same time, we see that the world around us is changing and the old ways of working are not giving the same results or the desired results in every sector we'd hope." [14]

Indeed, the 21st century is a time of exponentially disruptive change. Wicked global problems are multiplied by the pace of technological change and transformation, which are further compounded by globalization, information access, and connectivity. Global smartphone and application proliferation, and increasingly simple and seamless services are leading to "liquid expectations" by consumers and citizens. Once citizen consumers experience how simple and easy it can be to use Amazon, for example, they begin to hold the same service level expectation of their governments as well.

The old ways of doing things in government, are simply not working as they used to. Subsequently, many modern governments around the world are experimenting with new ways of working in order to support their societies through this technological transformation and revolution. One such experiment is that of introducing design thinking to government. Yet, even as design and innovation labs multiply and spread at various levels in governments globally, still little is known of how to sustain them:

[Innovation] labs, although prominent in many modern public-management strategies, are yet far from becoming an organic part of the public sector and its change. (Tönurist et al. 2017)

As new teams, of any type, are introduced to existing organizations, organizational dynamics, like legitimacy, take place. This is particularly true of the application of design thinking in the public sector. Organizational legitimacy is an invisible process whereby the existing organization seeks to understand the new incumbent team in terms of existing organizational rules, norms, values, and beliefs. Therein lies the challenge for government design labs. Design-focused teams in the public sector have a mandate to do things differently, to ignite change, and to bring a new innovative approach to the public sector. Thus, the very nature of the purpose of design labs is to bring a new and different set of norms, values, and methods to the public sector. Naturally, this creates organizational legitimacy challenges and culture clashes.

Design thinking truly has become one of the newest forms of public sector innovation. Even as the trend grows and propagates in the form of design labs at various levels of government around the world, it still remains "uncharted territory," to borrow Amatullo's (2014) term. It must not be taken for granted that the design discipline will first be understood and second,

embraced by new organizational cultures. Design teams must set aside the assumption that entrenched cultures will embrace their way of working, and instead embrace the need to build understanding and legitimacy toward the benefits they can bring to an organization.

Much of the focus of design for government conversations centers on the public sector's need to learn new approaches and ways of working, like design thinking. However, in order to gain legitimacy within the public sector, so too do design labs need to learn the organizational dynamics, approaches, and traditions of the public sector. Legitimacy is socially constructed and collectively created, therefore, in order to succeed with implementing design thinking in the public sector, some adaptation is required.

This research found various practices, tactics, and strategies that design labs can use to adapt and help in building their legitimacy. Most importantly, a strategic and proactive legitimacy management approach can help design labs learn about their public sector organizations, avoid common legitimacy breakdowns, fast-forward through the processes of gaining legitimacy, prove the credibility and value of their work, and to create a sustainable future for design thinking in the public sector.

The wicked problems of the world must be taken on by the public sector. However, the public sector will only succeed by embracing new approaches and collaborations to these new problems. The designers of the world, and their collaborative, experimental, and user-centered practices, will play a key role in overcoming these challenges. It is only through this union of public sector execution and design thinking evolution that we will ever be able to truly turn our wicked global problems into wicked opportunities. The first step in doing so is for government design labs to lead with legitimacy.

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
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Appendices


Appendix A: The *Double Diamond Model*

Divergent thinking, according to Brown (2009, 67), is thinking that opens up possibilities and solutions, exploring the world of observations and insights and all the possibilities they bring. This type of thinking is very particularly opposed to convergent thinking that begins to refine ideas and narrow in on a solution (Brown 2009, 66; Design Council 2018). The Double Diamond model depicts how these two ways of thinking play out in the design process, according to designers. First, design thinkers diverge to explore the problem in the *discover* phase. Second, designers converge on the focus area during the *define* phase. This first round of convergent and divergent thinking ensures that designers are focused on solving **the right** problem. Then, in the third phase, *develop*, designers again diverge to ideate and explore solutions through prototyping. Finally, they converge again during the fourth, *deliver* phase, in order to narrow in on and refine a single solution that will work.



(Adapted from Design Council's (2018) *Double Diamond Model*)

Appendix B: The Design Thinking Cycle by Gibbons (2016)



(Source: Gibbon, 2016)

Appendix C: Noteworthy Global Design Labs in Government

MindLab (Denmark)

MindLab was originally set up in 2002 to support the Danish Ministry of Business, and was later reconceived in 2006 to operate at a cross-ministerial level across the Ministries of Industry, Employment, and Education to introduce them to design and user-centricity (MindLab n.d.; Lykketoft 2014). MindLab's mindset consists of a foundation in gathering insights, experimenting with prototypes, and focusing on the desired outcomes/effects up front (MindLab n.d.). Their goal is to work across silos and introduce new approaches to problem solving and solutions. Their mission is change-oriented and involves three strategic objectives, "public sector innovation, strengthening change capacity, and visibility/legitimacy" (Lykketoft 2014).

Lab @ OPM (USA)

The Lab at OPM was originally set up in 2012 within the United States' Office of Personnel Management. The Lab@OPM, thus operates at a federal government level, and was established in response to a federal level innovation initiative. The Lab was set up as a physical space within the OPM premises to act as a hub for collaboration and co-creation, and founded on human-centered design practices. The Lab works to teach human-centered design practices across the entire US federal government, and collaborates with various actors to lead cross-sector design projects. (Lab@OPM n.d.a; Lab@OPM n.d.b; Bason & Schneider 2014)

Government Digital Service (GDS) (UK)

GDS was established in 2010 within the Cabinet office, and with the goal of creating gov.uk, a single platform website for all UK government digital needs (GDS n.d.a; GDS n.d.b; Bason & Schneider 2014). Describing themselves they say, "We're a centre of excellence in digital, technology and data, collaborating with departments to help them with their own transformation. We work with them to build platforms, standards, and digital services" (GDS n.d.a). GDS's uk.gov is a fantastic example of simplifying government services for citizens with a new mindset: building services not websites. GDS now acts as an inspiration for fellow digital service transformation teams around the world. Moreover, they are taking the lead to coordinate an International Design in Government (#govDesign for short) community to establish a network of innovators working in government around the world (Kane 2017). At the time of this writing the community contained 450 members.

Appendix D: Legitimizing Design Thinking

(Source: Adapted from Rauth et alia 2015)

Efforts by managers to enlist support for design thinking:	Cognitive Legitimacy	Pragmatic Legitimacy	Moral Legitimacy
Demonstrating the usefulness of design thinking	Communicating success stories Creating project-specific metrics	Aligning design thinking with existing company innovation objectives	Aligning design thinking metrics with already established metrics
Meshing design thinking with the organizational culture	Using company-specific terms Tailoring design thinking to organizational standards	Including key stakeholders in the implementation Aligning work practices with existing practices	Adapting to the existing culture Tailoring design thinking to organizational standards
Convincing others through experiencing design thinking	Employees experiencing design thinking in workshops	Rewarding through titles like “coach” or “facilitator” of design thinking Rewarding through access to individual training, learning, new experience	Employees learning about user needs and then addressing them
Creation of physical spaces and artifacts	Creating training Creating advertising materials	Advertising design thinking through the flexible interior and artifacts of design thinking in physical spaces	Employees working within the design thinking physical space Seeing artifacts
Establishment of ambassador networks	Training in collaboration with HR	Involving top management	Involving top management Employees influencing colleagues Collaborating with other units (particularly HR)

Appendix E: Inland Manifesto

MANIFESTO

Our design principles:

We put people first, no matter what

We always begin by identifying the people's needs. By knowing the *who* and the *why*, we can make a difference. We are a team of changemakers - people for the people and we continuously work towards better services.

We create together

We lead the co-design process with different stakeholders. We share what we're doing with the people we work with and the people we work for, the public.

We experiment

We try out new things. We ideate, prototype, and test in order to learn. We learn from both our successes and failures to improve the next time.

We are bold and visionary

We are ambitious and work towards our vision of having a positive impact on immigrants' lives. We work with an open mindset without limitations.

We make real things


We don't give in to "it's always been this way," nor do we make empty plans. We believe that real measurable things create value. We work to make things real.

in

land

(Source: Inland Design)

Appendix F: Inland Operational Model



(Source: Inland Design)

Appendix G: Strategic Action Intervention Analysis Canvas

Strategic Action Intervention - Analysis Canvas

Strategic Action Interventions	Image	Key Insights/ Takeaways from the Intervention	What worked well?	What didn't work so well?	What would you do differently next time?
Network of Designers in Immigration					
Inland's Strategy on a Page (SOAP)					
Inland's Strategic Identity (Mission, Vision, Manifesto)					
Establishing Middle Manager Buy-In					
Lunch & Learn					
Long range Strategic Planning					

(Source: Swan)

Appendix H: Types of Action Research Validity

Type of Action Research Validity	Validity	Evaluation
Catalytic Validity	Produces change or transformation	Assessment of learning outcomes of researcher and researched group
Outcome Validity	Leads to action	Achieves the goals or aims of the research
Process Validity	Appropriate use of process/tools to achieve the goals or aims of the research	Knowledge generated
Dialogic Validity	Leads to critical discussion between stakeholders	Knowledge generated
Democratic Validity	Collaborative stakeholder involvement achieved	Locally relevant outcomes produced

(Source: Adapted from Coghlan & Brydon-Miller 2014)

Appendix I: Design in Government International Networks and Online Resources

Name	What is it?	More information:
Nesta	"Nesta is a global innovation foundation - We back new ideas to tackle the big challenges of our time, from the pressures of an ageing population to stretched public services and a fast changing jobs market."	https://www.nesta.org.uk/
States of Change	A collective, initiated by Nesta, whose purpose is "to build the capability and culture of governments to practically deal with the complex problems they face, and to strengthen the community of practice around public innovation."	http://www.states-of-change.org/
OECD Observatory for Public Sector Innovation	The OPSI "collects and analyses examples and shared experiences of public sector innovation to provide practical advice to countries on how to make innovations work. The OPSI provides a place for sharing, discussing and co-creating solutions that work."	https://www.oecd-opsi.org/
aPolitical	"Apolitical is a global network for government, helping public servants find the ideas, people and partners they need to solve the hardest challenges facing our societies."	https://apolitical.co/
Center for Public Impact	"The Centre for Public Impact has been founded by The Boston Consulting Group to help improve the positive impact of governments. We are a not-for-profit foundation that brings government leaders together to learn and exchange ideas about strengthening public impact."	https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/

(Source: Swan)

Appendix J: SOAP Template for Inland

<div> <div>inland</div> <div>STRATEGY OVERVIEW</div> </div>				
MISSION	insert			
PRIORITIES	1 Sub Strategy Title	2 Sub Strategy Title	3 Sub Strategy Title	
OBJECTIVES	insert	insert	insert	
DESIRED OUTCOMES	insert	insert	insert	
CRITICAL SUCCESS METRICS	insert	insert	insert	

(Source: Swan)

Appendix K: The UK's GDS Team Design Principles



1. Start with user needs
2. Do less
3. Design with data
4. Do the hard work to make it simple
5. Iterate. Then iterate again.
6. This is for everyone
7. Understand the context
8. Build digital services, not websites
9. Be consistent, not uniform
10. Make things open: it makes things better

(Source: GDS 2012)

Appendix L: Inland's Strategy Overview




Appendix M: Long Range Planning Workshop - Roadmap Template




(Source: Swan)

Appendix N: Final Long Range Planning Roadmap



(Source: Swan)



(Source: Swan)